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Introduction 
SUSANLEIGHSTARAND GEOFFREYC. BOWKER 
CLASSIFICATIONI  THE WILD* 
“CLASSIFICATIONS THE SLEEPING BEAUTY OF library and information sci- 
ence,” said Hanne Albrechtsen (personal communication, November 
199’7).In some ways, at the most technical core of traditional library sci- 
ence, it also stands as a bridge builder between the past and the future of 
our field. Anthropologists have long seen classification as a tool for un- 
derstanding culture. The distinctions that people make, as Lkvi-Strauss 
(1969) argued in his famous report on The Raw and the Cooked, constitute 
cultural membership if not culture itself. 
Classification involves the informal embedded in the formal and vice 
versa. If anthropological/cultural distinctions shape culture, the attempt 
formally to evaluate and improve those distinctions forms much of what 
we think of as information systems. We then take cultural cues from the 
systems so created. 
In traditional library classification research, there have been two dis- 
tinct challenges. The first is an ethnographic challenge: what distinctions 
does this specific group of clients use in forming their knowledge culture? 
How may we mirror in the thesauri, catalogs, and other search and re- 
trieval tools we create for them? This challenge is one of uerstehen-i.e., 
understanding the sense of vernacular terms. Here the information sci- 
ence researcher becomes an anthropologist-i.e, how to disambiguate 
* These words are a play on Edwin Hutchin’s excellent Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, 
MA, 199.5), which explores aspects of planning, coordination, and cognition from a 
social/organizational and niaterial viewpoint. 
Susan Leigh Star, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, 501 E. Daniel 
Street, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820 
Geoffrey C. Bowker, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, 501 E. Daniel 
Street, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820 
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terms, decide what distinctions are really necessary, and which are reflec- 
tions of ephemeral debates or fads? 
The second challenge is a formal one in two parts concerning the 
structure of the information system or tool: 
1. Occam’s razor: how many terms can we afford given systern capacity, 
user capability, and the means of distribution? 
2. 	Structural soundness: are logical flows followed, are the branches of 
the tree carrying the right weight in proportion to the trunk, are the 
means of navigation easily grasped for accurate modeling? 
There are no a priori solutions here: each scheme must be taken in its 
own context of use. 
Classifications that work in the real world must meet both challenges 
siniultaneously. For example, in studying the history of the International 
Classification of Diseases (Star & Bowker, 1994; Bowker & Star, in press), 
we noted that the designers of this global classification system must con- 
stantly make practical tradeoffs between the two challenges. In order to 
do justice to the range of subtle vernacular terms used by medical person- 
nel around the world, a huge unwieldy list would have to be developed. 
In order for physicians and other users to actually employ the system, a 
much shorter key to filling out forms is the only possible alternative. 
As the Internet, Web, and various digital libraries burst their bound- 
aries and appear on desktops and in homes, the tension between these 
two challenges deepens. What do we understand about the interplay be- 
tween vernacular classifications and the more formal structures underly- 
ing search engines, online catalogs, and other electronic guides? For 
groups of users that may be both global and unknown, what is the mean- 
ing of joining the two aspects of classification? What is usability in the 
context of both the Web and the intimate desktop? 
The combination of the cultural and the formal in turn produces a 
third challenge-a moral and ethical one. For large-scale systems, whose 
voices will be heard and whose silenced? Whose culture will become the 
taken-for-granted and whose the exotic other? Where makers and users 
of classification systems do not address these questions, silent inequities 
prevail. The dominant voices may become the common sense of the de- 
signers or the loudest of the user voices (Forsythe, 1992). 
The articles in this collection each address this set of issues from a 
variety of angles. Huber and Gillaspy’s article tackles a core methodologi- 
cal issue surrounding the translation from vernacular systems of classifica- 
tion and vocabulary to the more formal controlled vocabulary systems such 
as those in LCSH, MESH, and ICD/DSM. Looking at AIDS and HIV vo- 
cabularies within the communities of gay men and IV drug users, they 
show how the political and historical situations of those affected help shape 
vocabularies and, in turn, the usability of more formal systems. They re- 
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port on their research-testing and refining vocabulary within a large-com- 
munity AIDS provider organization via a series of face-to-face meetings 
with a range of users, from health care providers to patients and activists. 
They then move the findings to a large-scale vocabulary test sponsored by 
the National Library of Medicine. Grappling with the rapidly changing 
vocabulary, sensitivity to issues of stigma and race, and mapping the ver- 
nacular to the large-scale system, their research forms an exemplar of 
participant design and community-based research. As well, it points in 
some important directions for moral, political, and ethical aspects of ap- 
plied classification work. 
Jennifer Tobias’s piece is similarly a manifesto for the examination of 
marginal, stigmatized, and experimental cultures under the rubric of 
“cyberspace.” She continues in the tradition of Sanford Berman, chal- 
lenging the worlds of cataloging and classification to keep up with cul- 
tural and social changes and to resist elitist or ethnocentric tendencies in 
large-scale systems. She argues that librarians need to become conversant 
in a range of specialized languages in order to provide the best possible 
services-and that this need is only heightened by the fluid nature of 
documents on the W’eb. 
Another methodological piece, that by Star, provides a more abstract 
example of how “classification in the wild” could be joined with some 
foundational work in both library and information science on the one 
hand and sociology on the other. Star compares the faceted classifica- 
tion method developed for use in libraries by Ranganathan with the 
grounded theory method of qualitative analysis developed by Glaser and 
Strauss in sociology. Both systems struggle with the core dilemma posed 
above-i.e., how to braid the formal and the informal together in the 
study of classification. Future work in this area would, it is hoped, link 
some of the naturalistic findings of qualitative research with the devel- 
oping technologies stemming from faceted classification and advanced 
networked information technologies for navigation (see Bradley & 
Sutton, 1993; McCombs & Maylone, 1998 for excellent overviews of re- 
search in the area). 
Olson finds a theoretical mandate in the work of postmodern and 
feminist philosophy for some of the space mapped by the three discus- 
sions above. Perhaps instead of speaking in the “master voice” of the 
state-sanctioned list, she suggests that we might see the classification of 
marginalized domains as an exercise in cartography. Picking up on many 
of the same issues raised by Tobias and Huber and Gilaspy, she notes the 
implicit Western, and often sexist, constructions in the Dewey Decimal 
Classification. As an exercise in both imagination and method, she calls 
for a spatial imagery for neglected and stigmatized domains. Drawing on 
recent work in critical geography, she shows us both critique and a posi- 
tive path for classification work and research. 
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Bowker’s article adds a close reading of information-system as cul- 
tural artifact. He suggests that one can find traces of social and political 
debates in the classification of disease entities in the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). He argues that this encoding of social 
and political dimensions is a natural feature of such classification schemes, 
which thereby serve to encourage the development of some forms of knowl- 
edge while discouraging others. His article draws particular attention to 
the organization of time and space in the ICD-suggesting in turn that 
the scheme favors particular kinds of narrative of diseases, and that it best 
represents disease in the developed world. 
Extending this theoretical contribution, Albrechtsen and Jacob con- 
ceptualize information in another inherently spatial fashion, that of in- 
formation ecologies.‘ They note that classification systems play a key 
role as boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) in the organizations in 
which they are used-i.e., they serve simiiltaneously as lingua franca and 
as specialized tools in particular domains. Drawing on public library ex- 
amples from the Book House Project and Database 2001, they emphasize 
especially the continually reconstructed nature of classifications as orga- 
nization and knowledge tools. 
Finally, Mark Spasser examines issues of agency and structure in psy- 
chiatrists’ use of the Diapostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)of mental dis- 
orders. Drawing on Gidden’s concept of structuration, he suggests that 
the DSM, through its propagation of a particular biomedical reading of 
mental disorders, severely constrains the kinds of research that can be 
done by psychiatrists. He argues that Gidden’s work provides an analytic 
purchase on this constitution of psychiatric discourse through classifica- 
tion and maintains that the concept of structuration will also provide a 
useful tool for understanding the development and change of library clas- 
sification systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Library and information science stands at a historical crossroads. New 
information tools appear daily and are used in more kinds of settings than 
before. They are part of not only desktops or kiosks but, increasingly, of 
living rooms, gyms, cars, banks, and hospitals inter aha. The formal tools 
of classification construction and evaluation, and decades of experience 
and research in working with client populations, give us a unique suite of 
tools for understanding this phenomenon. As sleeping beauty wakes up 
in this new world, there is a unique opportunity for her to build bridges 
across its rivers and canyons. 
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Social Constructs and Disease: Implications for a 
Controlled Vocabulary for HIV/AIDS* 
JEFFREY T. HUBERAND MARYL. GILLASPY 
ABSTRACT 
THEBODY OF KNOWLEDGE AssocIArm with the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) rep-
resents complexity not present in any other disease. HIV infection is not 
only an extremely complicated disease process, but it also transcends the 
boundaries of biomedicine. Various domains shape the construction of 
HIV/AIDS as chronic disease with the societal construct circumscribing 
the body of knowledge concerning the pathological, mirroring the com- 
plexities of the malady itself. Disease, and the respective body of knowl-
edge, co-exist within a social reality; consequently, a controlled vocabu- 
lary designed to facilitate knowledge organization and access relative to 
HIV/AIDS must reflect the complexities of this socially constructed reality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Social constructionists posit that reality is constructed through dy- 
namic socialization and that the sociology of knowledge must examine 
the process in which this reality construction occurs (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966,p. 1). Sociology of knowledge deals not only with empirical knowl- 
edge relative to various societies but also with the processes by which bodies 
of knowledge become established as social realities. In essence, reality 
evolves through continued socialization, yielding outcomes that result from 
* This article is based, in part, on a presentation given at the 60th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society for Information Science, November 1-6, 1997, Washington, DC. 
Jeffrey T. Huber, School of‘Library and Infor mation Studies, Texas Woman’s University, 
Denton, TX 762045438 
Mary L. Gillaspy, Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 250 E. Superior Street, Suite 1705, 
Chicago, IL 60611 
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social interactions, negotiations, and power. Where the human immuno- 
deficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) are concerned, social construction of reality is grounded in the 
spatialization and politicization of the pathological. 
The body of knowledge associated with HIV/AIDS represents a com- 
plexity not present in any other disease. Furthermore, the epidemic has 
altered the model of information production and consumption and has 
spawned its own vernacular, one representative of a diverse population of 
information producers and consumers. Further compounding this com- 
plicated communication picture, the body of information surrounding 
HIV/AIDS continues to grow at an epidemic rate, often in tandem with 
the numbers of reported cases. Finally, HIV infection is not only an ex- 
tremely complicated disease process, but it also transcends the bound- 
aries of biomedicine. Various domains shape the construction of HIV/ 
AIDS as chronic disease, including the political, social, economic, legal, 
philosophical, psychological, religious, and spiritual ramifications associ- 
ated with the illness. The societal construct within which the body of 
knowledge concerning HIV/AIDS exists mirrors the complexities of the 
malady and the various controversies associated with it. This diseased 
body of knowledge-a body of knowledge that breathes life into the patho- 
logical by providing it visibility-exists because of HIV/AIDS. Disease, 
and the respective body of knowledge, co-exist within a social reality, a 
social reality that binds and circumscribes. Consequently, the organiza- 
tional schema of a controlled vocabulary designed to facilitate knowledge 
organization relative to HIV/AIDS must be broad in coverage yet specific 
in terminology so that the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature 
of the epidemic is reflected. In representing the dynamic nosological 
record of HIV/AIDS, the controlled vocabulary captures the societal con- 
struct circumscribing the pathological. 
BACKGROUND 
CorriplmNature of HlV/AIDS 
Infection with the human immunodeficiency virus results in a com- 
plex chronic disease process, complicated by various nonbiomedical factors. 
The disease itself is characterized by a constellation of signs and symp- 
toms that culminate in a diagnosis of acquired immune deficiency syn- 
drome. Ultimately, most individuals infected with HIV die of AIDS-re- 
lated causes. From a biomedical perspective, what differentiates HIV from 
other chronic disease processes is the variety of opportunistic infections 
and cancers commonly associated with AIDS as well as HIV-related wast- 
ing and dementia and the wide variation in the dying trajectory. Although 
there have been numerous therapeutic advances where HIV is concerned, 
drug regimens, when available and accessible, have not proven uniformly 
effective. Combination therapy involving antiretrovirals and protease 
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inhibitors, while greeted with much fanfare, has proven to be a great dis- 
appointment to the many HIV-infected individuals who have failed to im- 
prove while taking the drug cocktails. Moreover, of the 612,078 AIDS 
cases reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
through June 1997 in the United States, 379,258 have died (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 1997, p. 14). 
Further exacerbating the medical complexities of the illness, HIV is 
complicated by myriad factors outside the biomedical arena-economic, 
legal, political, psychological, religious, social, spiritual-that compound 
disease chronicity. These components of an individual’s psychosocial re- 
ality exist in tandem with the biophysical illness with stigma trajectory 
corresponding to disease course progression (AlonLo & Reynolds, 1995, 
p. 306). Although the spatialiation of disease has been plotted along a 
historical continuum that forms the foundation for modern medicine (Fou- 
cault, 1975, pp. 3-20), the politics and stigma associated with HIV/AIDS 
prevents the illness from advancing to its ultimate position in the sequence 
(Huber, 1996, pp. 6-9). The pathological continues to exist within a so-
cially defined set of spaces. As well as affecting the emotional, mental, 
and physical well-being of the HIV-infected individual, these nonbiomedical 
complications dramatically impact education and prevention efforts, treat- 
ment advances, and coping mechanisms. The repercussion of infection 
and disease manifestation is much more than an individual life event. In 
fact, given the multifarious nature of the pathological, HIV transcends 
the boundaries of life and death (Huber, l993a, pp. 230-31). 
HIV/AIDS Information and Communication 
Since the beginning of the epidemic in the early 1980s, information 
has been viewed as a key resource in efforts to prevent HIV transmission, 
manage various disease complications, and ultimately prolong life. As 
HIV/AIDS-related information was initially limited, however, in size, scope, 
and availability (SantaVicca, 1987,p. 115), underground press networks, 
supported largely by affected individuals and community-based organiza- 
tions, began emerging within the first few years of the epidemic. These 
networks subsequently have evolved into recognized legitimate informa- 
tion resources with many AIDS service organization newslet.ters now be- 
ing indexed by the National Library of Medicine for inclusion in its HIV-
specific bibliographic database, AIDSLINE. 
The AIDS pandemic, in effect, has witnessed a confluence of roles re- 
garding information creators, seekers, arid providers ((;inn, 1987, p. 333) .  
This paradigmatic shift has resulted in a nontraditional scientific commu- 
nication model where traditional consumers of information are very often 
producers, arid traditional producers are consumers. In a traditional sci- 
entific communication model, information is generated by researchers, 
disseminated, accumulated, distilled, and applied in the clinical arena (see 
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Figure 1). Practical information, when made available, is watered down 
into lay terms for public consumption (Patton, 1990, p. 5 ) .  However, in 
this nontraditional model, traditional consumers are active contributors 
to the discourse (see Figures 2 and 3). As a result, HIVrelated informa- 
tion is currently produced and consumed at virtually every level-indi- 
vidual, institutional, organizational, community, local, regional, national, 
and international. 
F - - - + Research
I 

Dissemination 
I 

I 

I 
 I
I Accumulation 8c DistillationI 

I 

I 

\---+ Clinical Application 
Figure 1. Traditional Scientific Communication Model. 
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In addition to HN-related information being produced and consumed 
at multiple levels, the epidemic has spawned its own vernacular, one rep- 
resentative of the diverse group of individuals infected with the virus and 
those working within the AIDS arena (Huber, 199313, p. vii; Huber & 
Gillaspy, 1996b, p. 1). The language of the pandemic embodies cultural 
predispositions. This vocabulary consists not only of technical, scientific, 
and biomedical terminology but also includes verbiage germane to the lay 
population directly affected by the malady as well. The lexicon also re- 
flects the various disciplines touched by the disease. 
Further complicating access to HIV-related information, the body of 
knowledge concerning the epidemic is growing exponentially. The litera- 
ture continues to increase in volume parallel to the rise in the number of 
documented cases of AIDS worldwide (Huber & Gillaspy, 1996a, p. 297). 
In addition, HIV-related information is currently produced in every con- 
ceivable format-audiovisual, electronic, print, realia-and is present in 
all discipline-specific bodies of knowledge affected by the pandemic. 
Societal perceptions and individual perspectives fashion the pathol- 
ogy of the HIV/AIDS epidemic with the course of disease progression 
marred by politics and stigma. Complexities associated with both the patho- 
logical condition and the body of knowledge concerning HN/AIDS exist 
within, and because of, social constructs circumscribing the pandemic. 
Illness, information, and intricacies are all entwined, evolving relative to 
both scientific advances and social interactions. 
SOCIALCONSTRUCTS 
Reality Construction 
Although a person’s conception of reality-fear and danger, abnor- 
mality and stigma, health and beauty-may be very individual, this per- 
ception, to a large extent, is culturally patterned (Ferrante, 1988, p. 224). 
Events, actions, attitudes, and beliefs are mediated by historical and cul- 
tural factors. Individual reality is a social construction and not necessarily 
an absolute truth. Personal conceptions are reflective of a much larger 
construct, one that transcends any individual. The relationship, however, 
between individual perception and social construct is an integral one in 
that dynamic socialization shapes the construction of reality. 
Reality is constructed within three realms-social, physical, and indi- 
vidual-and is composed of societal definitions and interactions (Charon, 
1992, pp. 37-38). Social, physical, and personal realities operate in con- 
junction to construct and define an individual’s reality. Social reality is 
molded within the context of societal circumscription of the individual 
bounded by his or her culture. This spatial reality is grounded in social 
action and interaction. A physical reality also exists, independent of so-
cial reality, as a paradigmatic structure present at the instance of every 
situation. Physical objective reality consists of an individual’s surroundings 
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and current set ofcircumstances. Social reality responds, in part, to physi- 
cal reality where physical reality is the existing situation. The situation, 
however, is defined by one’s social reality. In addition, each individual 
possesses a personal reality based on that person’s unique perspective. 
Personal reality, consciously and unconsciously, is shaped through social- 
ization. Social reality, physical reality, and personal reality interact simul- 
taneously to form one’s cumulative perception of what is real. This cumu- 
lative perception then, when combined with other individuals’ realities 
derived from a similar perspective, forms the basis for defining social con- 
structs. Social constructs, however, being created from societal percep- 
tions, may lack scientific foundation. In fact, political and economic elites 
very often generate media images and other forms of discourse to influ- 
ence social construction of meaning and reality (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, 
& Sasson, 1992, p. 374). Social ideologies and political interests, in es- 
sence, shape the construction of reality. Where HIV and AIDS are con- 
cerned, the social construct within which the pathological exists is built 
upon the politics of bodies and disease. 
Bio-Politics Versus Bio-Power 
Within the historical development of civilization, bio-politics, or poli- 
tics of the body, emerged as a result of the “proliferation of political tech-
nologies [that] ensued, investing the body, health, modes of subsistence 
and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence” (Foucault, 
1978, pp. 143-44). Prior to, and in parallel with, the development of bio- 
politics, there was an “explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, mark- 
ing the beginning of an era of bio-power” (Foucault, 1978, p. 140). Both 
bio-politics and bio-power continue to mold reality construction today. 
Bio-politics relates to the empowerment of individuals, while bio-power 
may be thought of in terms of power over bodies by bodies-i.e., corpo-
real and social, individual and collective. Within the AIDS arena, politics 
of the body and the body politic are inextricably intertwined and often 
diametrically opposed. 
Nowhere perhaps is the strife between bio-politics and bio-power more 
obvious than in the debate between public health and individual rights, 
with regulation of individual sexual practices possibly being the best illus- 
tration (Gillaspy & Huber, in press). Societal normalization of sexuality is 
an instrument of power (Hewitt, 1991, p. 229). By defining what is nor- 
mal, the body politic creates a tool that can be applied to control indi- 
vidual sexual behavior. Discourse-psychiatric, legal, moral, ethical-binds 
physical actions by rendering normative behavior. Social discourse is used 
and applied to define the rules of sexuality. The various standards, mod- 
els, exclusions, limitations, and perversions of sexuality are derived from 
a particular discursive practice, based not on scientific discourse but on a 
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system of values and prohibitions (Foucault, 1972, p. 193). Organized 
religion’s stance on homosexuality, the continued existence and enforce- 
ment of sodomy laws, the legal position concerning prostitution, the lack 
of inclusion of homosexuality as a legitimate sexual orientation in sex 
education curricula, and promotion of “just say no” campaigns regarding 
safe sex are a few examples of the establishment’s efforts of regulating or 
administering sexual practices. 
Given that gay men continue to constitute the largest affected popu- 
lation in the United States and a significant portion worldwide, along with 
the fact that engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse-heterosexual 
or homosexual-is the primary mode of transmission, issues involving sexu- 
ality cannot be cleaved from the complex discourse defining HIV/AIDS. 
In fact, where sexual practices are concerned, the struggle between poli- 
tics of the body and the body politic extends well beyond the traditional 
establishment and into the gay community. Even within organized sexual 
communities, individual sex acts and identities vary widely (Vance, 1991, 
p. 878). For the gay community, this variation is often a source of conflict, 
given the difficult nature of striking a balance between maintaining sexual 
liberation gained in the wake of the Stonewall riots and seeking wider 
social acceptance among the heterosexual population. The relationship 
between sexuality and the AIDS pandemic has further exacerbated this 
debate. Prominent gayjournalists advocating reduction in promiscuity as 
a means of HIV prevention have come under fire by gay theorists who 
counter that this position engenders “gay positive but sex negative” pos- 
turing (Crain, 1997, p. 28). 
The contention that the struggle between politics of the body and 
the body politic occurs where HTV and AIDS are concerned is important 
because it exemplifies societal regulation-overt and covert-of the HIV-
affected individual and community. Social policy and processes have been, 
and continue to be, used to shape the politics of the HIV-affected body, 
both individual and collective. These politics, supplemented by medical 
complexities and exacerbated further by the nonbiomedical complications 
of the disease, frame the social construct within which HIV exists as a 
chronic disease. Within the United States, this socially constructed plat- 
form is built largely upon individual perceptions and societal perspectives 
involving homosexuality, drug abuse, race, and gender. 
Construction of Marginalized Populations 
The complex nature of this chronic disease cannot be examined with- 
out considering the social construction of homosexuality given the close 
affinity of AIDS with the gay community in the United States. Homosexu- 
ality has been constructed socially in much of the world as a negative la- 
bel, stigmatized largely because of perceived deviation from a broader 
societal norm. Moral entrepreneurs have toiled tirelessly in attempting to 
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persuade society that homosexuality is abnormal and immoral. “It is be- 
liefs that homosexuality is evil, sick, or undesirable-and the correspond- 
ing efforts to punish, cure, or prevent it-that make homosexuality devi- 
ant” (Greenberg, 1988, p. 2) .  This conception of deviance has resulted in 
discriniination against, and repression of, individuals seeking to engage 
in same sex unions. There has been tremendous effort from within the 
gay community, however, to liberate gays and lesbians from the psychoso- 
cia1 stigma associated with their respective sexual orientations. “It was a 
historic step to have homosexuality changed from a medical anomaly to a 
psychological impairment in the early part of the century, and an equally 
significant step to have homosexuality removed from DSM-3 and K D - 9  in 
the early 1970s and later 1980s” (Patton, 1990, p. 3) .  The close associa- 
tion of HIV and AIDS with homosexuality, though, has threatened to un- 
ravel social tolerance extended toward gays and lesbians, with the stigma- 
tization of one fueling the stigmatization of the other. 
While the gay community has borne the brunt of the AIDS pandemic 
in the United States, other socially marginalized populations have been, 
and increasingly are being, woven into the disease-related web of devasta- 
tion. Drug injection has been determined as the mode of exposure to 
HIV in 26 percent of reported AIDS cases among adolescents and adults 
in the United States with an additional 6 percent attributed to men who 
have sex with men and inject drugs (Centers for Disease Control arid Pre- 
vention, 1997, p. 8).  Moreover, of the adolescent and adult cases reported 
to the CDC from July 1996 to June 1997, 43 percent were black and 20 
percent Hispanic (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1997, p. 
3 ) .  Further, incidence of AIDS among women in the United States now 
accounts for 15 percent of total reported cases (Centers for Disease Con- 
trol and Prevention, 1997, p. 3) .  These groups live within social constructs 
that bind and circumscribe just as homosexuality is stigmatized by society. 
Although men who have sex with men continue to constitute the great- 
est portion of the HIV-infected population in this country, injection drug 
users contribute significantly to the total number of AIDS cases. Like 
homosexuality, substance abuse has been modeled around issues involv- 
ing morality and disease. Drug abuse has been constructed as a societal 
taboo and criminal problem, imposing a certain degree of forced invisibil- 
ity upon members of that community. Moral panics and crusades relative 
to illicit drug use foster the perception that this is yet another disposable 
population devoured by demonic deviant behavior. 
Perhaps one of the most visible forms of deviation, though, in a pre-
dominantly white culture, is that of race. Race is employed as a social 
concept to differentiate populations based on physical traits, blood types, 
genetic code patterns, and inherited characteristics. However, race also is 
applied to ascribe psychological and moral attributes, facilitating the justi- 
fication of a discriminatory system exhibiting ethnocentric biases. In this 
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way, race categories support destructive social labeling, founded in soci- 
etal perspectives rather than scientific fact. “Race categories are social 
constructs, that is, concepts created from prevailing social perceptions 
without scientific evidence” (Witzig, 1996, p. 675). Unfortunately, the 
continued use of race taxons, despite scientific evidence repudiating the 
validity of racial constructs, fosters the application of race as a negative 
descriptive social label. This is particularly poignant where HIV infection 
is concerned, given that the number of documented cases of AIDS is ris- 
ing disproportionately among people of color. Blacks constitute approxi- 
mately 13 percent of the U.S. population and roughly 35 percent of CDC 
documented AIDS cases, and Hispanics account for about 11 percent of 
the American populace but close to 18percent of the documented AIDS 
cases (World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1997, p. 133; Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 1997, pp. 9-11). 
Tightly woven into the social fabric defining race, gender has been 
constructed in many cultures to portray female submissiveness and male 
domination as societal norm. Building on the conflict between politics of 
the body and the body politic, many feminists argue that the rules of sexu- 
ality have been delineated by men (Few, 1997, p. 619). In general, univer- 
salistic feminist theory views gender as being defined in terms of binary 
opposition-man/woman-and assumes that women are subject to gen- 
der subordination (Dugger, 1995, p. 139). Social order revolves around 
patriarchy, with women occupying secondary positions. While this view 
does not recognize the role of race, ethnicity, and nation in gender con- 
struction, it does serve to frame loosely the social construct within which 
HIV-infected women and those at risk for infection live in much of the 
world. This construct is even more binding, however, when applied spe- 
cifically to women of color. Although white women are subject to societal 
circumscription and HIV-related prejudices, women of color are stigma- 
tized further by individual perceptions, social expectations, cultural norms, 
and socio-historical development. For Hispanic women, male dominance 
is often typified by machismo attitudes. For black women, “womanhood 
was constructed not in terms of familial and domestic activities, but through 
black women’s role as laborer in slave, colonial, and market economies, 
and through their roles as domestics and surrogate mothers to white fami- 
lies” (Dugger, 1995, p. 140). HIV-infected women of all races are at the 
same time “innocent victims” and “immoral carriers,” further illuminat- 
ing “prejudices which have long existed in medicine and law” (Van Vliet, 
1993,p. 193). 
Because of the biomedical complexities, disfiguring nature of the ill- 
ness, and close association with death, HIV/AIDS would most likely have 
been stigmatized to some degree no matter who was initially infected 
(Herek & Glunt, 1988, p. 887). However, the American AIDSepidemic has 
been defined as a disease of marginalized populations with the resulting 
200 LIBRARY TRENUS/FALL 1998 
social construct being shaped by this definition. The construct is not sur- 
prising, though, given that the coiistructioii has been based on a social 
response to a disease most prevalent among already stigmatized 
populations. 
Stigma 
Much of the construct circumscribing the HIV pandemic is plagued 
by stigma. Stigma may be thought of in terms of a language of relation- 
ships, resulting in the construction and application of deeply discrediting 
attributes (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). Stigma represents a deviation from some 
socially constructed ideal or expectation, such as adhering to an accepted 
sexual orientation or remaining free from a disfiguring disease (Alonzo & 
Reynolds, 1995, p. 304). Deviance is key to this broad multidimensional 
construct and acts as a negative discounting social label. However, devia- 
tion itself is not intrinsically immoral or pathological; rather, it is inferred 
from a culturally defined meaning. The social construct within which 
stigma exists allows stigmatized attributes to be discredited and tainted, 
resulting in prejudice and discrimination. In its extreme, stigmatization 
of disease withholds legitimate privileges afforded non-stigmatized mala- 
dies and imposes special obligations on those affected, thus resembling 
crime more than illness (Freidson, 1970,p. 236). 
Blatant stigma-related rejection, prejudice, and discrimination are 
manifested-overtly and covertly-where HIV and AIDS are concerned. 
Attributes involving the disease are stigmatized because of a variety of 
biomedical and nonbiomedical factors, including modes of viral transmis- 
sion, psycho-demographics of populations most affected, and obvious \is-
ibilityof the disfiguring nature ofthe illness. Fear of contagion, homopho- 
bia, racism, sexuality, social perception of drug abuse, and the close asso-
ciation of AIDS with an unaesthetic form of’death feed the stigma brand- 
ing this pathological condition. The degree to which the disease is stig- 
matized affords the imposition of shame directly on those individuals who 
are HIV-infected as well as indirectly to family, friends, and partners in the 
form of a courtesy stigma. All too often, “existing societal fears and ste- 
reotypes quickly amalgamate with misrepresentations of medical and so-
ciological facts” (Patton, 1992, p. 323). In fact, stigmatization of HTV and 
AIDS is so strong that the stigma trajectory has been conceptualized to 
mirror the course of disease progression, resulting in full manifestation 
being equated with passage to social arid physical death (Alonzo & 
Reynolds, 1995, pp. 309-1 1j . 
The reality of the social trajectory of stigma is painfully apparent in 
the AIDS pandemic. Stigma and disease often outlive infected individuals 
through sheer irrationality and the continued politicization of the disease. 
“Cultural narratives of perversion and contagion seem endlessly capable 
of turning apparently interpretation-proof facts into ammunition for pan- 
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ics and discrimination” (Patton, 1992, p. 323). Social construction of the 
pathological condition ensures regulation of the HIV-affected, with the 
construct of the AIDS arena being described and recorded in the body of 
knowledge that has evolved since the inception of the epidemic. 
Relatzonship between Disease and Body of Knowledge 
Bodies of knowledge are bound by societal norms, policies, and pro- 
cesses, and scientific discoveries, social interactions, and personal beliefs 
are recorded within the containers of information that support those bodies 
of knowledge. Information and society are indelibly linked, as are pathol- 
ogy-specific bodies of knowledge and the diseases they represent. There 
is an integral relationship between a disease and the body of knowledge 
concerning that disease. In reality, one does not occur without the other. 
In order for a body of knowledge about a pathological condition to de- 
velop, the disease must exist and have been discovered. The body of knowl- 
edge concerning a disease, then, is generated to define and describe the 
malady, classify the pathological, and provide discourse regarding affected 
individuals. In return, this pool of knowledge breathes life into the patho- 
logical, providing it vkibility. Without a representative body of knowl- 
edge, the disease remains invisible. Information concerning a disease, 
however,is bound by the life of that pathological condition and is circum- 
scribed by any stigma associated with that illness. The body of knowledge 
is riddled with the same complexities as the malady itself, yielding a dis- 
eased body of knowledge where HIV and AIDS are concerned. Mirroring 
the complex nature of the epidemic and the controversies associated with 
the disease, the body of knowledge regarding the pandemic is circum- 
scribed by the same societal construct as the pathological itself (Huber, 
1996, p. 33). 
HIV/AIDS CONTROILEDVOCABULARY 
Given this societal circumscription, the controlled vocabulary and clas- 
sification structure used to organize the body of knowledge associated 
with HIV/AIDS has been problematic. The very names first used to de- 
scribe the disease reflected not only the community originally most af- 
fected but also society’s stigmatization of it. These names included gay 
cancer, gay pneumonia, gay bowel syndrome, gay-related immune defi- 
ciency (GRID), acquired community immune deficiency syndrome (AC-
IDS), and community acquired immune deficiency syndrome (CAIDS) . 
The controlled vocabulary referenced here, HW/AIDS and HW/AIDS- 
Related ’lh-minology: A Means of Organzzing the Body of Knowledge (Huber & 
Gillaspy, 1996b), was developed in direct response to a need voiced within 
AIDS service organizations (ASOs) across the United States-i.e., a need 
for a system of organization and access to the ever growing and evolving 
data, information, and knowledge spawned by the epidemic. Organization 
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and access were complicated by the variety of formats in which informa- 
tion was appearing and the diversity of individuals needing to use it. The 
system needed to be comprehensive and yet simple enough for 
nonlibrarians to use, as many ASOs do not employ information profes- 
sionals (Huber & Machin, 1995, p. 242). 
The vocabulary was tested and refined at a large community-based 
AIDS organization that provided direct information services to physicians, 
educational staff, caregivers, patients, students, and allied health person- 
nel. Resources included the variety typical across the board: videos, mono- 
graphs, vertical files, brochures, serials, arid even realia. The vocabulary 
evolved from efforts to organize this collection. 
Central to the entire development process was the conviction that 
the vocabulary must be descriptive yet flexible to suit the needs of users 
and to portray and preserve the rapidly expanding, multidisciplinary body 
of knowledge. Using the Dewey Decimal Classification as a model, ten 
“umbrella” concepts, termed domains, were identified: 
1. 	 Generalities; 
2. 	 Epidemiology and Transmission; 
3.  	 Education and Prevention; 
4. 	 Clinical Manifestations of HIV and Complications, Malignancies, and 
Infections Associated with AIDS; 
5. 	 Treatments, Therapies, and Medical Management of HIV Disease; 
6. Psychosocial and Religious Issues, Case Management; 

’7. Legal, Ethical, Economic, and Political Aspects; 

8. 	 Organizations, Funding Opportunities, and Health Policy; 
9. 	 Fine Arts; and 
10. Belle Lettres and Non-Fiction. 
Having identified ten mutually exclusive domains consistent with the 
reality of the epidemic, the content within each domain was developed. 
Core medical references, an AIDS dictionary, and a curriculum from an 
HIV/AIDS Education and Training Center were key to ensuring inclusion 
of all relevant concepts and terms identified at the time. Newsletters, 
especiallyGMHC Treatment Issues and BETA: The Bulletin ofExpwimenta1 Treat- 
ments for AIDS, were invaluable for identifying possible future research 
directions and assuring space in the scheme for the addition of terms 
resulting from such work. 
Upon completion of the first draft of the vocabulary, it was compared 
to several existing works, including an early nonhierarchical HIV-specific 
arrangcment developed by librarians at Philadelphia’s AIDS Information 
Network. Development of biomedical content using core medical texts 
was supplemented with the National Library of Medicine’s Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH). The Thesaurus of Educational Descriptors, compiled by in- 
formation specialists at the National AIDS Clearinghouse, was used to 
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determine completeness and accuracy of the third domain, Education 
and Prevention. Subject specialists reviewed the sections on religious as- 
pects, United States government components, and virology and clarified 
the terminology. 
Since some concepts were applicable across domains, standard subdi- 
visions, called “universal subdivisions” in this work, were developed and 
may be appended to main concepts as necessary to facilitate access to the 
information. The categories of subheadings finally included were Age 
Ranges, Sexual Orientation, Gender, Stages of Infection, Ethnic Groups, 
Geographic Names, At-Risk Populations, Religious Faiths, Signs and Symp- 
toms, and Special Populations. 
The final tasks were the generation of an alphabetic listing of terms 
and cross-references, the tagging of MeSH and near-MeSH terms, and the 
composition of instructions for use. The alphabetic listing and cross-ref- 
erences are intended to be particularly valuable for users unfamiliar with 
hierarchical arrangements; the cross-references guide users to the pre- 
ferred terms within the vocabulary but reflect the full spectrum of the 
vernaculars used within various communities to describe concepts appli- 
cable to the pandemic. 
Participation in the Large-Scale Vocabulary Test 
In 1986, the National Library of Medicine embarked on a complex 
research and development project designed to link various biomedical 
vocabularies to a single system, today known as the Unijied Medical Lan- 
guage System ( UMLS). One of the four knowledge sources for the UMLS is 
the UMLS Metathesaurus, a “uniform, integrated distribution format for 
more than 30 biomedical vocabularies and classifications” (National Li- 
brary of Medicine, 1997). Between July and December 1996, individuals 
were invited to participate in a test of the UMLS to determine to what 
extent existing biomedical language schemes fulfill the needs of health 
information systems. 
HIV/AIDS and HW/AIDS-Related Terminology: A Means of Organizingthe 
Body of Knowledge (Huber & Gillaspy, 1996b) was one of the test vocabular- 
ies. The work as it stands contains 1,457 terms, excluding the Universal 
Subdivisions. Of these, 537 were identified at the time as MeSHheadings 
while 98 were considered near-MeSH headings. (Since publication, some 
of the terms have been added to MeSH.) There were 822 terms that were 
considered unique from MeSH and approximately 336 of these (23 per-
cent) have no equivalent in the UMLS. Such a significant number reflects 
not only the multidisciplinary nature of the disease but also the distinctive 
flavor of the lexicon itself, one that has added new terms (e.g., safe sex) to 
the language and increased both visibility and notoriety among the 
marginalized groups of people associated with the epidemic in the mind 
of the body politic. 
Examples from the Controlled fiicabulnry 
The instructions for use state clearly that the evolution of the epi- 
demic and progress on the scientific front guarantee that the lexicon will 
grow. Therefore, users are encouraged to add terms to the scheme as 
they are developed. For example, this work went to press shortly before 
HIV protease inhibitors, integrase inhibitors, and non-nucleoside reverse 
transcriptase inhibitors burst onto the scene; these are perhaps only the 
most obvious examples of terms that must be added for the vocabulary to 
remain current and useful. 
Biomedical terms, however, are eventually accessible from other 
sources. The strength of a controlled vocabulary devoted solely to all 
aspects of the HIV/AIDS cpidemic is that it includes terms commonly 
used among those affected by HIV but not reflected in other schemes. 
Some examples of vernacular terms that have no equivalent form or have 
a different meaning in other vocabularies but are, nonetheless, commonly 
employed within the discourse of the pandemic may serve to illustrate the 
usefulness of the arrangement. One series of terms, for example, de- 
scribes unique individual responses to HIV infection: rapid progressors, 
nonpro<qessors,and long-term surviiiors. 
Rafiidj)ropessorsappear to be infected with a particularly virulent strain 
of Hn! Their blood counts tend to fall precipitously over a short span of 
time, perhaps just within two to three years, and their overall health fails 
rapidly (Khanlou, Salmon-Ceron, & Sicard, 1997, p. 163). Nonprogressor.5 
are patients who have tested positive for HIV antibodies but who retain 
normal blood counts and good health over a period of seven to twelve, or 
even more, years. Long-term survivors are patients at any stage of Hn‘ dis-
ease whose conditions remain stable over several years. Even if their dis- 
ease has progressed to AIDS, they tend not to be stricken with opportunis- 
tic infections but to remain relatively healthy (“AIDS Medical Glossary,” 
1997, pp. 20-21). Of’ these three terms, only the concept of long-term 
survivors has roughly equivalent MeSH headings: Survivors, Survival Analy- 
sis, and RemissionIn,duction/Methods, where methods is a subheading attached 
to the main heading. None of these terms, however, is common to the 
literature and discourse surrounding HIV/AIDS, though to experienced 
searchers, a relationship is evident. 
With purely vernacular terms, however, no such relationship that would 
be meaningful in community settings exists. For example, a primary means 
of HIV transmission is shared needles among injection drug users. In 
international urban areas, a common venue for this activity is shootinggal-
leries, often abandoned buildings or similar areas where users assemble for 
the specific purpose of injecting various substances into their bodies in a 
social setting. MeSH headings used to describe documents where shoot- 
ing galleries is a text word include Substance Abuse, Intravenous, or Needles 
and Rzsk-Taking. While information professionals find such indexing logi- 
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cal, populations needing access at the community level to information 
about these behaviors are unlikely to use such terminology. Moreover, 
this controlled vocabulary is meant to be a record of the lexicon of the 
epidemic, mandating the inclusion of “street language,” especially when 
it records a place with a social ecology that facilitates the transmission of 
the virus. 
While the term “shooting galleries” or its equivalent does not exist in 
the biomedical literature, some other terms do but are defined differ- 
ently in the community. An example of such a term is frottage. Dorland’s 
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (1994) defines frottage as “paraphilia in which 
sexual arousal or orgasm is achieved by rubbing up against another per- 
son, who is unaware of the activity, as when pressed close to others in a 
crowd, usually without specific genital contact. Called also frotteurism” 
(p. 665). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edi- 
tion (DSM-IVj,used in constructing the UMLS Metathesaurus, employs the 
term frottage in defining Frotteurism. In the section on Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders, DSM-IVstates that “the paraphiliac focus of Frotteurism 
involves touching and rubbing against a nonconsenting person” (Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of MentalDisorders, 1994,p. 527).  Using computer 
systems, such as the National Library of Medicine’s Internet Grateful Med 
(IGM) that incorporate the UMLS Metathesaurus in their search functions, 
entering the term frottage automatically maps to Frotteurisrn. However, 
among both heterosexual and same-sex partners, frottage has long been 
considered a consensual act, one that can lead to sexual gratification with 
little chance of either disease transmission or unplanned pregnancy. Edu- 
cational units of some AIDS service organizations teach frottage as a safe- 
sex alternative to penetration. Researchers studying contraception effec- 
tiveness among married couples in Ireland noted that “about half reported 
using oral sex and/or frottage (body rubbing) [to achieve sexual release] ” 
(Bonnar, Lamprecht, & O’Connor, 1997, p. 1’73). The equating offrottage 
in authoritative biomedical sources with a defined, deviant, nonconsensual 
act is a prime example of the body politic’s continuing efforts to regulate 
sexual behavior by declaring deviance of both heterosexual and homo- 
sexual community norms. Such declarations further isolate, burden, and 
assign stigma to already marginalized populations. 
CONCLUSION 
As an evolving narrative, the discourse surrounding the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic represents the dynamic nosological record of the disease. This 
record, as captured in an HIV/AIDS controlled vocabulary, reflects the 
social construct within which the pathological condition and respective 
body of knowledge exists. For HN/AIDS, examining this social construct 
is imperative because it sheds light on the direction in which disease and 
socio-scientific response have developed. 
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Although HIV is a complex chronic disease process, it has, to a large 
extent, been defined in the United States by the body politic. Discourse 
originating from the empowered elite fosters idealized conceptions, con- 
jured through rhetoric, that are ultimately disseminated to the public. 
l h i s  discourse then becomes a tool central to constructing reality and 
building social constructs. However, social constructs, deriving from indi- 
vidual perceptions and societal perspectives, may be destructive in nature. 
Given the complexities associated with HIV/AIDS, the importance of this 
potentially negative effect cannot be overlooked. By representing HIV/ 
AIDS as being reflective of particular socio-sexual categories and 
marginalized populations in public discourse, the body politic is provided 
the opportunity to promote the normalcy of “traditional” behavior and 
the abnormality of “deviant” conduct (Nzioka, 1996, p. 567). Discourse 
facilitates the shared construction of meaning, positive or negative, but 
only with socialization does the discourse yield consequences. In this way, 
HB7, through public discourse, becomes synonymous with promiscuity, 
permissiveness, and moral decadence, thus facilitating stigmatization of 
the disease and fostering prejudice, discrimination, and blame. By politi-
cizing and stigmatizing the pathological, the biomedical complications of 
HIV/AIDS are further exacerbated. 
The organizational schema of a con trolled vocabulary intended to 
facilitate knowledge organization relative to HIV/AIDS must be reflective 
of the various biomedical and nonbiomedical complexities connected with 
the disease. Similarly, the structure needs to be flexible enough to accom- 
modate evolution of the discourse, and the controlled vocabulary itself 
should be representative of the multifarious intricacies defining the body 
of knowledge associated with the pathological. Both disease and respec- 
tive body of knowledge exist within the societal construct circumscribing 
HIV/AIDS, with social interactions and scientific advances delineating this 
construct being recorded in the controlled vocabulary. However, a lexical 
representation devoted to HIV/AIDS does not exist irrespective of the 
influence of the construct; rather, the vocabulary is affected by, just as it is 
reflective of, social ideologies and scientific realities framing the pandemic. 
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Seeking the Subject* 
JENNIFER TOBIAS 
ABSTRACT 
As AN EXERCISE IN PONDERING CATALOGING in the networked environ- 
ment (“networked environment” meaning electronic information sources 
interconnected through the Internet), this article compares traditional 
cataloging and Web-based description of two topics-the concept of “green 
cards” and a recent nonfiction work. This involves, first, outlining intel- 
lectual access issues as they apply to reference services today (“intellectual 
access” meaning the formal or informal description of a work for pur- 
poses of its discovery by others). Following this is an outline of key cata- 
loging issues, per Sanford Berman, and corresponding issues in Web-based 
intellectual access. Ways that catalogers and public service librarians can 
address these issues conclude the article. 
THEREFERENCESCENE 
Several key issues in intellectual access apply to reference services 
today. Perhaps the most crucial is an increasing demand for what this 
author calls “naive” access-i.e., access to specialized subject knowledge 
by nonspecialists in that subject. Two major trends contribute to this de- 
mand. The first is the sheer volume of scholarly, professional, and popular 
publication. The second is a general intellectual trend toward 
interdisciplinarity (for one perspective on the implications of 
interdisciplinarity, see Messer-Davidow, Shumway, & Sylvan, 1993). 
* Excerpted from “Issues of Intellectual Access in Our Electronic Age,” with Elliott Shore 
(Director of Libraries, Bryn Mawr College) and Sanford Berman (Chief Cataloger, 
Hennepin County Library, Minnesota) a presentation of the Rutgers University SCILS 
Professional Development Program, April 1996. 
Jennifer Tobias, Reference Department, Library, Museum of Modern Art, 11 West 53rd 
Street, New York, NY 10019 
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As a result, librarians must be fluent in many subject vocabularies. 
Consider, for example, a historian seeking technical information about 
medical effects of lead use in ancient material culture. What vocabularies 
apply (historical, medical, chemical, sociological, or material)? The li- 
brarian must be able to communicate across these disciplinary vocabular- 
ies. ‘This is a crucial skill for reference librarians today. 
A third key issue is that increasing sophistication of hypermedia cre- 
ates higher expectations by information seekers. In concrete terms, if 
home-Internet and twenty-four hour news channels (not to mention cars, 
phones, and the occasional coffee maker) appear to respond so readily to 
our everyday information needs, why is it so hard to pursue a question at 
the library? 
This sophistication is also redefining what constitutes a scholarly work. 
Contemporary scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, for ex- 
ample, more often looks to the medium of messages-i.e., the way ideas 
are conveyed as much as the ideas themselves (see this line of thinking 
applied to hypertext navigation in Aarseth, 1997, chap. 8). The rise of 
media studies and the methodology of deconstruction are but two ex- 
amples of this. 
Further, the products of such scholarship are increasingly likely to be 
expressed in multiple media. In the humanities, a good example of this is 
the Perseus Project (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu), a hypermedia work 
thoughtfully integrating history, geography, literature, cultural studies, 
material culture, and mythology. In the “hard” sciences, as computing 
becomes increasingly integrated into methodology, the results of research 
increasingly integrate computing. Think of the Human Genome Project 
(http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP),the international gene-mapping 
collaboration. 
Finally, fast-paced changes in information technology are having ob- 
vious effects upon reference services. The task of integrating reference 
resources in diverse formats is one. The breakdown of distinctions be- 
tween reference services and computing/information services is another. 
Ways to address these issues are discussed in the concluding section. 
THECATALOGINGSCENE 
To outline some key issues in subject cataloging, this discussion will 
now turn to the indefatigable Sanford Berman (1993)and summariLe his 
longstanding critique of traditional cataloging-i.e., deficiencies in tradi- 
tional (AACRII) cataloging conceals works. These deficiencies are illus- 
trated by a search in a traditional catalog (the Library of Congress catalog 
is used here) for information about “green cards” (representing “resident 
alien” immigration status in the United States). These deficiencies in- 
clude: 
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Anachronistic subject headings (Aprevious heading in LCSH was Alien 
reffistratioiireceipt cards (C’nited States) 
Table-of-contents absent 
Lack of added titles 
Lack of notes 
Poor cross-referencing (for comparison, see the Hennepin County 
Library’s treatment of the topic, in particular the scope notes visible 
in the catalog). 
Compare this to indexing of this topic with the Yahoo! Internet search 
engine (http://www.yahoo.com) (for purposes of argument, the domi- 
nant advertiscments for immigration lawyers have been ignored). The 
result includes the site illustrated in Figure 1,which leads to an authorita- 
tive site about U.S.immigration (http://travel.state.gov/visa-services.htm1) 
(see Figure 2) .  
- Personalize Yahoo! Mail - Stock Ountes Yahnol Chat~ 
Yahoo! Site Matches (20 30 of30) 
Govenunent L a t m i m a t i o n .  U.S Immiwati~~nfo*riatian:U.S. Invnigrahon 
1998 Diversity Visa Lottery (r)v-981-new enrollment period Feb 3 
through March 5,1997 for the Green CardLottery, and a consumer alert ofhudulent 
practices by law firms. 
Figure 1. One Result from “Green Card” Search in Yahoo! 
Compared to traditional cataloging, what do we observe about the 
two pages in Figures 1and 2? 
Traditional cataloging data are absent, nonstandardized, or  

nonapplicable. There is no reliable information about authorship, 

title, date, and place of publication. 

A fuzzier idea of discrete work-where are its boundaries, and are 

boundaries a useful way to think about the content? 

Many more contextual cues about the “spin” or point-of-view of the 

work conveyed through its organization and graphic packaging (for a 

thoughtful approach to “spin, ” see Crowe, 1986). 

Heterogeneous, unstructured, popular subject vocabulary. 

Commodification of subject terms.’ 

Cross-referencing through hypertext. 

Visa Services 
~~~(:o to INS to.doa~nloadthe new Affidalit of Support (FormI-864)P a c k s- .. 
General Information oil the Affidavit of Support (Foriii 1-8641 
~~ ~Checklist for the Affidai4t of Support ( F m 
~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~BORDER CROSSINGLASER t’lSA TO REPLACE ________ CARD~~~~~ ~~ 
Visitor and Student \‘is= 
IrrlrrLigrant Visas 
Figure 2. 1’.S. State Department Site. 
Su BJECT AcCESs SHoK’I‘C: OMINc s  
The “green card” question exemplifies Berrnan’s longstanding critique 
of much subject cataloging, starting with the problem of applying a 
nineteenth-century idea of indexing to thc twentieth-century scene. The 
limits of the Dewey 1)ecirnal Sysrem and the plethora of specialized in- 
dexes indicate that the world cannot be organized into a single coherent 
vocabulary. And even t could, it can be easily argued that data struc- 
ture slzould be different for different disciplines, professions, arid popula- 
tions. Attempts to organize diverse information such a5 news broadcasts, 
chemistry literature, visual materials, and fiction in one truly useful vo- 
cabulary haw been less than successful. 
Bermari also criticizes the lack of organic holistic cross-references in 
vocabularies such as LCSH. Extensive synonym relationships and inclu- 
sion of popular vocabulary, Berman argues, is a crucial element of any 
subject vocabulary. It is worth noting that his HCL, system of subject head- 
ings is far more associative than hierarchical with many more “see also” 
references than broader-term and narrower-term relationships. 
SUBJECTA c c ~ s sALTERNATIVES 
Networked information such as that found on the M’eb offers some 
alternatives to these dilemmas. This is enabled, most obviously, by the 
interlinked nature of the Web and relational databases: hypertext is literally 
a cross-reference (of course, hypertext also enables not-so-useful linking of 
information, the most prevalent being the lists of links so prevalent on the 
Web). Richer search results are also enabled by the presence of more search- 
able content. Simply, there is more data in a given work to search-one is 
not searching siniply a cataloging record (a description of awork) but more 
of the work itself’. This can be used for indexing in new ways, as we see in 
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search engines based upon prevalence and proximity of terms (for an over- 
view of mechanisms at work in search engines, see Steinberg, 1996). 
However, full-text searching and its multimedia equivalents should 
not be the last word in indexing. Computing presents an opportunity to 
rigorously interlink diverse vocabularies-to create a thesaurus of thesauri. 
The Getty Institute’s *a.k.a.* project (http://www.gii.getty.edu/vocabu-
lary/aka.html) attempts to put this idea into action. The *a.k.a.* initia- 
tive attempts to cross-reference search terms across several subject authority 
files. The governing idea is this: it does not matter what you call some- 
thing as long as it is linked. 
Perhaps the most interesting alternative to traditional cataloging pre- 
sented by networked information is the opportunity for self-determina- 
tion in indexing and retrieval. The Web presents the clearest evidence of 
this; self-publishing is the norm, a byproduct of keyword indexing of these 
works’ titles and major subdivisions. 
Traditional cataloging rules such as LC’s emphasize the assignment 
of subject terms based on title keywords and the “rule of specificity,” but 
this filtering process has a perverse tendency to remove the author’s voice 
from searching for works by subject, sometimes so much as to render the 
work invisible. While the intent of subject cataloging is enhanced retrieval 
through normalization of terms, often this is not the effect (quantifying 
the effectiveness of subject cataloging is debated by Mann, 1997). 
This is not to argue for abandoning subject access in favor of keyword 
searching, however. Even with sophisticated query languages, keyword 
searching of full-text databases, citation indexes, and Internet search en- 
gines reveal definite shortcomings. 
To examine these strengths and weaknesses more closely, we will ex-
amine subject access to Escape Velocity (Dery, 1996), a nonfiction work, in 
two contexts. 
SEEKINGCYBERCULTURE 
The first context is Library of Congress subject access. How might we 
get to Escape Velocity? Searching the Library of Congress catalog (http:// 
lcweb.loc.gov/catalog) by title reveals the results illustrated in Figure 3. 
In terms of subject access, we observe the familiar bibliographic stan- 
dard with its reliable provision of title, author, publisher, date, and physi- 
cal description. We also find subject access: “Computers and Civilization” 
and “Internet(computer network)-Social Aspects.” The subject head- 
ings describe the book’s content to a degree-a limited degree. 
One of the limits is the number of subject headings assigned, a 
longstanding criticism by Berman and one that LC has tried to address in 
recent years. Within the LCSH vocabulary (20th ed., 1997), subject ac- 
cess would be enhanced by the addition of: Computer sex, Cyborgs, Fantasy 
games, Internet (Computer network), and Self-organizing systems. 
~ c r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
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Author : Dery, Mark, 1959-

Title: Escape velocity: cyberculture a t  the  end  of the century/ 

Mark Dery. 
Edition: 1st ed .  
Published: New York: Grove Press, ~ 1 9 9 6 .  
Description: viii, 376 p. ,  [16] p. of plates : ill. ; 24 cm. 
I,C Call No.: QA76.9.C66D47 1996 
Dewey No.: 306/.1 20 
ISBN: 0802115802 
Notes: Includes bibliographical references (p .  [323]-359) and  
index. 
Su bj ec ts : Computers a n d  civilization. 
In te rne t  (Computer  network-Social aspects. 
Control No.: 95040922 
Figure 3. Library of Congress Catalog Search Result. 
Another major limitation is the lack of access to subtopics in the book. 
In other words, what else is the work about? Additional headings could be 
assigned for body marking, cyberpunk fiction, and perhaps the social ef- 
frcts of the millennium. 
A still better approach would be adding the table of contents to the 
1 CLUld. A t)d~ik&a~ d ~ m i r a g t -~ ~ r - ~ ~'LV ~ i ~ t ~hfctrnna iu~r 
returns us to the issue of self-determination in subject access, as will be 
seen later in this discussion. 
In light of these limitations, we next observe how Escape Velocity iden-
tifies itself on the Web. Searching for some of the suggested headings 
above (again in the Yahoo! search engine) leads to the self-promotional 
site illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. EscaDe Velocitv Web Site: Sulash Page. 
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Exploring the site, we see these major supplements: author informa- 
tion, excerpts of (selected) reviews, and a table of contents (see Figure 5). 
Figurc 5. Enhanced Access to a Published Work Escape Veloczty Web Site Contents 
Pagr. 
First, note the evocative words from the table of contents: “synth-rock- 
ers,” “cyberdelia,” and “mechanical spectacle.” The words are 
unsystematized, jargonistic, and perhaps ephemeral, but they express the 
work in a way that standardized vocabulary would obscure. (Interesting as 
well that these idiosyncratic terms might escape search-engine stop-word 
lists, unlike generic terms like “cyberspace,” “computer,” and “Internet”- 
the number and nature of stop words in Internet indexing is a rich topic 
in itself.) 
For comparison, consider grassroots cataloging. These descriptors 
(with underlined terms hyperlinked to a definition) are assigned to Escape 
Velocity in a site about Cyberpunk authors (http://euro.net/mark-space/ 
bkEscapeVelocity.htm1): nonfiction, cyberculture, cyberpunk, identity, 
culture, posthuman, future, Pat Cadig-an, William Gibson, Mark Pauline, 
Stelarc, social history, edge, and 1990s. Besides explicit descriptors, we 
also observe indirect cues to content. These are conveyed through, first, 
the URL (the sub-subdirectory of a small commercial site conveys a differ- 
ent impression than a Federal agency, for example). Other cues include 
editorial style (Cyberpunk-speak) , site organization (blending excerpts 
with press kit), graphic design (techno-chic, tending toward the ominous), 
and related links (to the presumed milieu of the book). 
SEEKINGPROGRESS 
These comparisons are intended to show some cataloging alterna- 
tives presented by networked information, perhaps for adoption into 
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standard cataloging practice. To develop these alternatives further, I con-
clude with recommendations for developers, catalogers, library educators, 
and reference librarians. 
For developers and catalogers, first, continue to develop subject and 
keyword indexing systems; both are useful. Second, enable interlinking 
of existing vocabularies through construction of thesauri. Getty’s *a.k.a.* 
project, described earlier, is an important step in the right direction. 
Another experiment to follow is the graphically oriented “hypertextual 
searcher’s thesaurus” of Johnson and Cochrane (1995). Third, adapt 
metadata standards to reap the indexing benefits of traditional and new 
media. Specifically, adapt MARC to accommodate new media. The use of 
the MARC 856 field for URLs and the use of Web-based catalogs using the 
239.50 standard are positive steps. Fourth, work toward standards for 
metadata (standardized descriptive information embedded into electronic 
works). In the short term, seek the integration of metadata into HTML 
(HyperText Markup Language) (the HTML “meta” tags move toward this 
goal. See http://www.w3.org/TR/WD-htm140-9707O8/struct/global. 
html#edef-META) and SGML (Standard Generalized Markup Language). 
Metadata initiatives are moving along slowly; track the progress in an 
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) draft (http://www.ietf.org/ 
ID.htm1) and in the report of RLG’s January 1997 Metadata Summit 
(http://www.rlg.org/meta9’707.html). 

Finally, to address the issues of transience and fluid boundaries in 
hypermedia, work toward development of persistent identifiers for net- 
worked information. Current initiatives include OCLC’s Persistent Uni- 
form Resource Locator (PURL) service (http://purl.oclc.org/OCLC/ 
PURL/SUMMARY) and the proposal of a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) 
(http://www.doi.org) (for a useful evaluation of DO1by Lynch, see http:/ 
/www.arl.org/newsltr/194/identifier.html) . 
For educators and reference librarians, be conversant in the languages 
of different disciplines. When teaching, encourage users of electronic 
resources to expect changes of interface, syntax, or dates of coverage. 
Concentrate instead on technology-independent methods for seeking and 
evaluating information. After all, media are transient; thinking critically 
about media content is not. 
NOTE’ Commodification through sponsming search terms in popular search engines. When a 
searcher enters one of these terms, the sponsor’s ad displays as a sidebar. For example, 
a search for cars or  Phillies or Planned Parenthoodcould result in links to Honda or ESPN-
or to Operation Rescue. A given query is thus linked, behind the scenes, to a particular 
kind of “related term.” 
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Grounded Classification: Grounded 
Theory and Faceted Classification 
SUSANLEIGHSTAR 
ABSTRACT 
THISARTIC1,E COMPARES THE QUALITATIVE METHOD Of grounded theory 
(GT) with Ranganathan’s construction of faceted classifications (FC) in 
library and information science. Both struggle with a core problem-i.e., 
the representation of vernacular words and processes, empirically discov- 
ered, which will, although ethnographically faithful, be powerful beyond 
the single instance or case study. The article compares Glaser and Strauss’s 
(1967) work with that of Ranganathan( 1950). 
INTRODUCTION 
There are some striking similarities. . .between field work and library 
research. When someone stands in the library stacks, he is, meta- 
phorically, surrounded by voices begging to be heard. (Glaser & 
Straws, 1967, p. 163) 
Classification is an uncovering of the thought-content of a written or 
expressed unit of thought. . . .The reference librarian. . .applies the 
classification scheme in the ultimate stage of library service which is 
effecting contact between the right reader and the right unit of 
thought in a personal way. (Ranganathan, 1951,p. 116) 
The landscape of information retrieval is shifting rapidly (with net- 
worked distributed computing, large-scale digital libraries, and enormously 
powerful search engines). As the introduction to this issue notes, for- 
merly firm boundaries between library and office, catalog and desktop 
are transmogrifying. The change means that a wider range of human 
Susan Leigh Star, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, 501 E. Daniel 
Street, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820 
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activities come under the purview of library and information science. When 
the library and the desktop become seamless, then practices of work orga- 
nization become part of the cataloging and indexing process. This merger 
calls for methodological creativity and cross fertilization between previ- 
ously disparate methodological domains. 
One fruitful direction for this creativity is in blending the methods of 
library and information science (LIS) with those of sociology and anthro- 
pology. LIS brings the strengths of order and sensitivity to domains and 
documents and a long tradition of struggling to find representations that 
are both useful and elegant. Sociology and anthropology bring strengths 
based in the empirical chaotic process of analyzing work, perspectives, 
conflict, and representations that are themselves the site of struggles. 
Some of the tough challenges faced by classification in environments 
such as the World Wide Web or large digital libraries include: how work 
settings and the flow of real-life tasks give rise to information needs and 
strategies; how different vernaculars and representational schemes may 
work together heterogeneously; and how informal and formal classifica- 
tions interact in information retrieval and use (Cochrane, 1993; Svenonius, 
1986). In parallel fashion, some of the cutting edge challenges faced by 
grounded theorists include: assessing the quality and completeness of 
analysis; managing large amounts of unstructured textual data; and ac- 
counting for a basis for theoretical sampling. The two endeavors offer 
each other some aid in meeting their respective challenges. 
Both faceted classification (FC) and grounded theory (GT) began as 
reform movements against powerfully entrenched a priori schemes with 
claims on universality. Grounded theory offers a way to include processes 
and actions in the analysis of vernacular representations (a question in- 
troduced as a core theoretical problem by Ranganathan) . It is at the same 
time a source of theoretical richness for the understanding of intermingled 
types of work. Faceted classification offers a way to assess the structural 
integrity and architecture of a particular theory via facet analysis and other 
analytical tools used in thesaurus construction and assessment; with auto- 
mated thesauri tools, FC is an aid for managing large bodies of text that 
will augment current qualitative methods software. 
After writing the first draft of this article, a colleague brought Clare 
Beghtol’s (1995) superb paper, “‘Facets’ as Interdisciplinary Undiscovered 
Public Knowledge: S.R. Ranganathan in India and L. Guttman in Israel,” 
to my attention. Recursively, of course, our papers are an example of 
undiscovered public knowledge converging. Beghtol draws parallels be- 
tween the work of Ranganathan and that of Louis Guttman, a sociologist 
who developed a faceted theory for the analysis of qualitative data, princi- 
pally as an aide to the analysis of survey research data. 
Though Beghtol(l995) notes that we will never know if proximate or 
remote contact transpired between Guttman and Ranganathan, she maps 
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out ways in which the two systems might profitably cooperate. They are, 
she notes, solving analogous problems of data analysis and management 
(p. 237). For all the structural reasons noted in the introduction above, 
there are now unique opportunities to exploit these previously unlinked 
bodies of research. 
CLASSIFICATION A U  NATUREI, 
The notion that classification schemes are neither innocent nor arbi- 
trary is core to several disciplines. Anthropologists map the complex taxo- 
nomic schemes of a culture as a way of understanding worldview and norms. 
Library researchers, going back to Ranganathan’s original foundational 
work, see classification as core to mapping, in Ranganathan’s words, “the 
universe of knowledge.” Social critics of classification systems argue that 
the choice of categories reflects political choice and (the often silent) 
wielding of bureaucratic exercises of power (Berman, 1984; Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1992; Bowker & Star, 1994, In press; Bowker, Timmermans, & 
Star, 1995). Others have argued for the historical specificity of schemes 
of classification (Hacking, 1995; Young, 1995). 
It has, however, been uncommon for two things to converge: (1) the 
idea that a qualitative social scientist might use the structures of formal 
classification systems asa proactive tool for generating and assessing theory; 
or (2) the idea that the theories and tools of qualitative social science 
might actively guide classification and indexing activities in library and 
information science. In other words, it is uncommon to see information 
systems classification as an ethnographic or theoretical enterprise, even 
where it has sometimes been seen as political. However, there are poten- 
tial benefits to seeking this convergence. This article proposes a compari- 
son of one of the more common qualitative methods-i.e., grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Glaser, 1978) with the con- 
struction of faceted classifications in library and information science (com- 
pare Aitchison, Gilchrist, & Bowden, 1997; Vickery, 1960, 1966). 
BASICDEFINITIONS 
Groundd Theory 
Grounded theory is a method for analyzing data; it is most commonly 
used on naturalistic field data but has also been used to analyze historical 
and documentary data (compare Clarke, 1990; Star, 1989). Barney Glaser 
and Anselm Strauss, who trained several generations of graduate students 
in sociology and nursing, developed grounded theory in the 1960s. The 
method has its roots in symbolic interactionist sociology and American 
Pragmatism, as well as, to some extent, Lazarsfeld’s analysis of variables 
and their valences. (GT is enormously popular as a method in social sci- 
ence analysis. Its use-and some might argue misuse-extends from sim- 
ply “empirical and inductive” to much more formal and thorough appli- 
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cations of the method. A recent volume by students and colleagues of 
Strauss provides a good overview of more thoroughgoing developments 
[Strauss & Corbin, 19971. ) 
Grounded theory relies on several components: 
1. An empirical iterative approach to the collection and analysis of data- 
i.e., data are collected, analyzed, and revised cyclically as checked 
against empirical findings. 
2. 	A constant comparative approach to the development of theory. Simi- 
larities across disparate domains are sought in order to reveal the di- 
mensions present in a situation. Their discovery lends a kind of an- 
thropological strangeness to the analysis of situations otherwise taken 
for granted. In this, less emphasis is placed on the degree to which a 
given variable presents itself in a situation. The best example of con- 
stant comparison comes from Everett Hughes (1970),a long-time col- 
league of Strauss’s, who asked: “why is a priest like a prostitute?” (An-
swer: They both hear confessions in private, outsiders find their work 
somewhat mysterious, etc.) (p. 316). The point was to find the com- 
mon dimensions, thus illuminating something about their work con- 
ditions-not to level the obvious disparities between the cases. 
3. An approach to sampling which is theoretical rather than site or popu- 
lation driven-i.e., emphasis is put on making theories as richly com- 
plex as possible rather than on proving instantiations of hypotheses or 
applications of previous theories. 
4. 	Theory development that works from substantive (close to descriptive) 
through to formal (abstract) levels as constant comparison proceeds 
over time. For example, early grounded theory studies looked sub- 
stantively at dying patients in hospitals (Glaser & Strauss, 1965),de-
tailing the many dimensions of the nursing, medical, and family situa- 
tions. One of the important substantive focuses was: who was aware of 
the status of the dying patient as terminal, and what conditions gave 
rise to these differences in “awareness context?” Years later, Strauss 
(1978) took the awareness context concept and applied it to a variety 
of other circumstances in which awareness of conditions might be im- 
portant, viz., being a spy, coming out as gay, being on either side of a 
bargaining table. The formal theory was developed as the compari- 
sons ranged across substantive cases. 
Faceted Classification 
Faceted classification is “the sorting of terms in a given field of knowl- 
edge into homogeneous, mutually exclusive facets, each derived from the 
parent universe by a single characteristic of division” (Vickery, 1960, p. 
12). Suggested in the 1930sby Ranganathan and codified in his system of 
classification, it has become an important tool in library and information 
science for constructing thesauri, building retrieval schemes for particular 
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groups of users, and in many circumstances for cataloging information. 
Important points are: 
1. the division of fields of knowledge into categories that may express 
different aspects (facets) of the knowledge (especially from the point 
of view of information retrieval). This stands in contrast to schemes 
that would assign each document (book, article, and so on) to a single 
rigid value in a universal hierarchical classification scheme; 
2. 	 the combination of a system of notation, of analysis of knowledge classes, 
and the physical storage and retrieval of documents and parts of docu- 
ments into an integrated system; 
3.  an iterative and evolving set of classifications which may flexibly serve 
the needs of particular groups of users; 
4. 	the importance of comparing and synthesizing analytic facets in order 
to reflect changing knowledge and changing user needs; 
5. a movement away from a flat proliferation of particular (phenorneno- 
logical) aspects of a field of knowledge, toward a synthetic representa- 
tion that includes basic (both abstract and concrete) categories. These 
latter, crucially, remain open to revision. (This article focuses on simi- 
larities between GT and FC. It does not dojustice to all the important 
developments in FC, such as those proposed by the Classification Re- 
search Group in the 1960s on integrative levels, or the work in medi- 
cal classification. A fuller history of classification research would ex- 
amine these contributions.) 
COMMONGROUND 
Both grounded theorists and designers of faceted classifications 
struggle with a common core problem. l’his is the question of how to 
represent vernacular words and processes. In both cases, the categories 
are empirically discovered in an almost self-contradictory fashion. The 
contradiction comes with the attempt simultaneously to represent, on the 
one hand, the local, specific, and empirical and on the other, abstractions 
and generalizations. The difficulty lies in making this representation both 
ethnographically faithful (faithful to the needs of users and particular 
populations), yet simultaneously powerful beyond the single instance or 
case study. Both grounded theory and faceted classification began as re-
form ~novements against powerfully entrenched a priori schemes with 
claims on universality (compare Vickery, 1960). These are unusual in 
that this reform did not consist of abandoning the attempt to formalize 
and systematize . 
This set of conimon core methodological problems has been present 
since well before the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. 
Ranganathan struggled against the rigidities of the dominant universalis- 
tic library classification schemes, many of which originated in the nine- 
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teenth century. Glaser and Strauss (1967) struggled with powerful modes 
of social science research, occurring in the mid-l960s, that relied heavily 
on quantitative methods coupled with functionalist assumptions. 
However, the landscape of information retrieval is shifting rapidly (with 
networked distributed computing, digital libraries, and large-scale and 
enormously powerful search engines). Although from the beginning 
Ranganathan argued for classification of documents by both physical ex- 
istence and the ideas they contain (down to a very fine degree of analy- 
sis), today the nature of documents is in extreme flux and more than ever 
demands such analysis. The boundaries of documents are unclear as 
people modify and distribute them electronically; authorship is changing 
as multiple versions and annotations proliferate (Brown & Duguid, 1996). 
The ability to fracture and use pieces of documents as well means that 
library classification is now linked not only with traditional genres but also 
with work processes, communication, and writing (Levy & Marshall, 1994; 
Levy, 1994; Bishop & Star, 1996). 
The landscape of qualitative research is similarly in flux due to the 
challenges posed by networked information technology. What does it mean 
to “observe” someone’s writing on the Internet or World Wide Web? How 
do we “do fieldwork when actions are taking place in such a geographi- 
cally distributed fashion? How do we understand the links between local 
mixes of online/offline activities and those that appear on the Web? It is 
a two-edged sword-on the one hand, it seems that infinite ready-typed 
field notes lurk out there waiting for the analyst; on the other, little in 
traditional qualitative social science methodology can manage this vol- 
ume of data and geographic dispersion. 
As noted in the introduction to this volume, there has developed over 
the past several years a lively strand of qualitative inquiry in library and 
information science as well as in management information science. 
Dervin’s (1992) sense-making methodology, for example, has been adapted 
in a number of empirical investigations of information use. A Web page 
for qualitative research in information systems is maintained at http:// 
www.auckland.ac.nz/msis/isworld/index.html. 
A comparison of grounded theory and faceted classification offers 
some important cross-fertilization in addressing these situations and lines 
of research. Some of the challenges faced by classification in environ- 
ments such as the World Wide Web or large digital libraries include: how 
work settings and the flow of real-life tasks give rise to information needs 
and strategies; how different vernaculars and representational schemes 
may work together heterogeneously; and how informal and formal classi- 
fications interact in information retrieval and use. 
At the same time, some of the challenges faced by grounded theorists 
include assessing the quality and completeness of analysis, managing large 
amounts of unstructured textual data, and accounting for a basis for 
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theoretical sampling. The two endeavors offer each other some aid in 
meeting this challenge. Grounded theory offers a way to include pro- 
cesses and actions in the analysis of vernacular representations (a ques- 
tion introduced as a core theoretical problem by Ranganathan) and a 
source of theoretical richness for the understanding of’intermingled types 
of work (Straws, 1994). Faceted classification offers a way to assess the 
structural integrity and architecture of a particular theory, via facet analy- 
sis and other analytical tools used in thesaurus construction and assess- 
ment with automated thesauri tools, a means for managing large bodies 
of text that will augment current qualitative methods software (Schatz, 
Johnson, Cochrane, & Chen, 1996). 
CLASSIFICATIONS DEVELOPINGAS THEORY TOOLS 
In an important article, Kwasnik (1992) places the theoretical aspect 
of classification schemes center stage. She states that: 
Classifications are really very much like theories. Like theories, clas- 
sification schemes can provide an explanatory shell for looking at 
the world from a contextually determined perspective. Classifica-
tion schemes not only reflect knowledge by being based on theory 
and displaying it in a useful way. , .but also classifications in them- 
selves function as theories do and seme a similar role in inquiry. (p.63) 
She notes that, in the attempt to impose order and specify relations, 
classification schemes are inherently theoretical, just in the way that sci- 
entific theories are. Kwasnik goes on to use Ranganathan’s faceted classi- 
fication scheme to assess the structure of three scientific classificatory 
enterprises: the periodic table, psychiatric classification as it appears in 
the DSM,3 and classification in software re-use. This novel evaluative use 
of facet analysis hints at a valuable tool for assessing theory construction. 
In Kwasnik’s words: “Classifications have structural properties that lend 
themselves to representing knowledge in a given situation” (p. 80). 
It follows from this that the construction of classification schemes is 
also an inherently methodological enterprise-i.e., one must make choices 
about analytic tools guided both by theoretical concerns, as Kwasnik sug- 
gests, and by questions of reliability, validity, doability, audience, and even 
the ripeness of particular scientific questions. 
An article by Solomon (1991) also indicates the possibility of using 
classification schemes in research, this time specifically from a qualitative 
perspective. He argues that the construction of classification schemes is a 
form of technology development and one that must be closely linked to 
user semantics. Naturalistic methods of inquiry meet the requirements of 
handling what is often found in the field-i.e., ambiguity, multiple mean- 
ings, context dependence, and a gap between what users say and what 
they do (p. 164). In discussing his case study material, Solomon also notes 
that: 
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The experience of the case study suggests that a multiple dimen- 
sional classification is needed to satis$ the diverse interests and in- 
formation needs of the users involved. By faceting the interests and 
concerns of the managers involved, the unidimensional classifica- 
tion becomes less fuzzy and highlights key concerns in the resource 
allocations process: management requirements, scope of effort, re- 
source requirements, and resource characteristics. (p. 169) 
It is important to note that the evaluative component can be both 
used in theory construction (e.g., evaluating the usefulness of the classifi- 
cation scheme in process) ;in theory deconstruction (showing the theory- 
ladenness of all classification schemes) ;and in post-hoc and participatory 
user studies of extant classification schemes such as LCSH (Library of 
Congress Subject Headings) (Rosenberg 8c Borgman, 1992). 
Some parallels between the early mandates of grounded theory and 
of Ranganathan’s vision will now be discussed. 
THEBIGPICTURES 
Critiques 
Both Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) work, TheDiscovevy @Grounded Theory, 
and Ranganathan’s (1950) foundational classification work (especially on 
the Colon Classification) read like manifestos. The enemy in both cases is 
reified rigid attempts at universal descriptions of knowledge that are not 
grounded in people’s needs or experiences. From the grounded theory 
perspective, this meant taking on much of institutionalized American so-
ciology, at that time (as now) largely quantitative, survey-oriented, and 
(then) functionalist: 
The qualitative research is generally labeled “unsystematic,” “impres- 
sionistic,” or “exploratory”. . . These critics, in their zeal for careful 
verification and for a degree of accuracy they never achieve, have 
forgotten both the generation of theory and the need for carefully 
appraising the different degrees of plausibility necessary for 
sociology’s diverse tasks. (Glaser& Strauss, 1967, p. 223) 
Glaser and Strauss go on vehemently to denounce Robert K. Merton 
for his attacks on qualitative methods, basically calling him an “armchair 
theorist.” “His reasoning necessarily leads to the position that data should 
fit the theory, in contrast to our position that the theory should fit the 
data” (p. 261). “Verification” in the grounded theory vocabulary becomes 
a dirty word (later Glaser will extend this even to the word “scholarship,” 
which he says is no substitute for getting out there and seeingforyourself). 
Similarly, the impetus for Ranganathan’s reform movement within 
library classification was first given as the explosion of knowledge follow- 
ing World War I and the attendant inability of older rigid classification 
systems to adapt and accommodate new and divergent viewpoints. Paral- 
lel with the grounded theory denunciation of verification above, 
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Ranganathan (1950) states that: “Hundreds have seen the attempts to 
represent specific subjects by arbitrary symbols without any organic rela- 
tion to the ideas represented. Practically in all such cases a breakdown 
has come sooner or later” (p. 47). 
Later, Reese (in Vickery, 1966) notes that faceted classification schemes 
are “mission-oriented rather than discipline oriented.. . . designed for 
user groups whose interests cut across the traditional fields” (p. 14). Fac- 
eted classifications do not follow pre-set categorization schemes deriving 
from disciplinary status-quo; rather, they demand semantic sensitivity and 
are designed to incorporate novel-that is to say, grounded-user needs. 
Vickery (1966) notes: “Afaceted classification differs from the traditional 
in that the facets so distinguished are not locked into rigid, enumerative 
schedules, but are left to combine with each other in the fullest freedom, 
so that every type of relation between terms and between subjects may be 
expressed” (p. 13). 
ANOPENUNIVERSEOF KNOWLEDGE 
Both grounded theory and faceted classification see the universe (s) 
of knowledge as potentially infinite, open, and evolving. Ranganathan 
(1965) says: 
For in the true Tree of Knowledge, one branch is grafted to another 
at many points. Tivigs too get grafted in a similar \my aniong them- 
selves. Any branch and any twig are grafted similarly with one an- 
other. The trunks too become grafted among themselves. Even then 
the picture of the Tree of Knowledge is not complete. For the Tree 
of Knowledge grows into more than three dimensions. A two dimen- 
sional picture of it is not easily produced. There are classes studded 
all along all the twigs, all the branches, and all the trunks. (pp. 32-33) 
A similar complexity is clear in all the grounded theory work, both in 
terms of interconnectedness and openness: “One of our deepest convic- 
tions is that social phenomena are complex phenomena. . . this is why 
grounded theory methodology emphasizes the need for developing many 
concepts and their linkages in order to capture a great deal of the varia- 
tion that characterizes the central phenomena studied during any par- 
ticular research project” (Strauss, 1987, p. 6). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that: 
The theorist’s task is to make the most of his insights by developing 
them into systematic theory. His sociologist’s perspective is never 
finished, not wen when he writes the last line of his monograph- 
not even after he publishes it, sinct. thereafier he often firids himself 
elaborating and amending his theory, knowing more now than when 
the research was formally concluded. (p. 256) 
Some of the practical problems posed by both these approaches in- 
clude developing schema for management of notation, managing the pro- 
liferation of codes (classes), responsible abstraction, and ongoing revisions. 
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PARALLELS SOMEKEY TECHNICALIN APPROACHES: DETAILS 
The openness and centrality of complexity to both grounded theory 
and Ranganathan’s faceted classifications approaches have made these 
both attractive and often difficult to learn. There is a constant tension 
between faithfulness to empirical detail and a desire to make the com- 
plexity usable via abstraction. Both FC and GT are techniques with long 
histories, schools of practice, and subtleties of interpretation far beyond 
the expository capabilities of this discussion. The following details are 
not exhaustive but are suggestive of key parallels in technical approach 
between the two systems. The GT examples rely heavily on Glaser (1978), 
perhaps providing the most formal statement of GT problems of coding 
and classification. 
Constant Comparison and Analytic Synthesis 
Both grounded theory and faceted classification have strong compo- 
nents of comparison and synthesis. From the GT point ofview, as with the 
Hughes example of the priest and the prostitute, the comparison of even 
seemingly discrepant phenomena may illuminate valuable dimensions. 
Glaser (1978) notes: “Actually apparent non-comparability is irrelevant, if the 
variable to be compared has a value in each group. Comparing on the basis of 
properties of groups has the purpose of generating theory. . . . Comparing 
the apparently non-comparable increases the broad range of groups and 
ideas available” (p. 42) (emphasis in original). 
Compare this with Vickery’s (1960) discussion of FC: “[Flrom the 
theoretical point of view, faceted classification breaks free from the re- 
striction of traditional classification to the hierarchical, genus-species re- 
lation: by combining terms in compound subjects it introduces new logi- 
cal relations between them, thus better reflecting the complexity of knowl- 
edge” (p. 13). As Aitchison, Gilchrist, and Bowden (1997) note, FCs are 
designed so that new concepts may be built by combining existing class 
marks rather than by exhaustive enumeration (p. 55). 
Levels of Formalaty 
Both grounded theory and faceted classification (especially in 
Ranganathan’s original formulation) emphasize orthogonal, but simulta- 
neous, operations of coding categories. In GT, “[s]ubstantive codes con- 
ceptualize the empirical substance of the area of research. Theoretical 
codes conceptualize how the substantive codes may relate to each other as 
hypotheses to be integrated into the theory” (Glaser, 1978, p. 55). Sub-
stantive codes are arrived at by asking questions of the data that will result 
in classes, such as “of what is this an example?” Often constant compari- 
son (or simply lateral thinking) will act to generate a class in this fashion 
(Strauss, 1987, p. 272). 
In grounded theory, the substantive gives rise to the theoretical by 
asking questions of relationships between substantive categories. This is 
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exactly the interrogation made in analyzing a faceted classification scheme: 
Is this category broader or narrower than that? Which is the more basic? 
(Aitchison, Gilchrist, & Bowden, 1997). These questions are necessary to 
support the analytico-synthetic approach of Ranganathan. 
“CoringOut” and Basic Class$cations 
L4shumans demand both simplicity of representation and the ability 
to combine and recombine, the problem noted above of simultaneous 
specificity and abstraction appears for both grounded theory and faceted 
classification as a very tricky mapping problem. Ranganathan (1965) says, 
on mapping these relations: 
The multi-dimensional universe of knowledge has to be transformed 
into a one-dimensional universe. Here arises an insoluble problem. 
It is well known that in the transformation of an n-dimensional space 
into a space of smaller number of dimensions and into a one-dimen- 
sional space or line in particular-or its equivalence, in the mapping 
of an n-dimensional space on a space of small number of dimensions 
and on a line in particular-many of the Immediate-Neighborhood- 
Relations among the classes are necessarily lost. (p. 33) 
A similar mapping problem in grounded theory is called the core 
category problem, arrived at through open coding of field data. In this 
process, rapidly generated classes are related to each other, then recur- 
ring instances become core categories. As the data are coded and re- 
coded and relationships specified, they are said to become saturated. This 
means that the mapping problem is solved through specifying a series of 
relationships, with the result of eventual convergence. In faceted classifi- 
cation, this is phrased as moving from the phenomenal to the seminal 
level. In grounded theory, more than one core category can originate 
from the same data over time, resulting in different focuses or emphases; 
it is not a matter of one underlying truth or form but rather the fashion in 
which relationships are specified. This is also true in the construction of 
FCs in the sense that multiple special thesauri may rely on the same data 
sources. 
Both Ranganathan (1965) and Glaser (1978) argue that moving 
down to very fine points in the data helps the discovery of these classes. 
“In the view of the Postulate of Fundamental Categories, we should de- 
scend down and down, and allow the various subjects and ideas to become 
absorbed and reassembled, reabsorbed and again reassembled, and SO 
on; until we find only five ultimate generic ideas-standing out” 
(Ranganathan, 1965,p. 198). These categories, often cited in library sci- 
ence, are personality, matter, energy, space, and time (PMEST)-basic 
attributes of all knowledge. 
Similarly, Glaser (1978) recommends “fracturing the data”-i.e., look-
ing at data line by line (pp. 57-58). Simultaneously, he notes that there 
are also several core (he lists eighteen) theoretical codes which can be 
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used, similar to the PMEST categories, to “maintain [a] conceptual level 
in writing about concepts and their interrelationships” (p. 7 3 ) .Although 
more fine-grained than the PMEST category system, there are again in- 
teresting resonances as these families also cover space, time, and charac- 
ter. Glaser (1978) lists eighteen families of theoretical codes including: 
Process-stages, phases, transitions, ranks, etc.; Degree-limits, ranges, 
amounts, etc.; Dimensions-elements, pieces of, properties of, slices, seg- 
ments, etc. (part-whole relations) ;and Ordering (including temporal or- 
dering) (for a complete discussion of the families, see pp. 7482). 
CROSS-FERTILIZATION 
Why are the parallels between grounded theory and faceted classifi- 
cation of interest? Earlier in this discussion it was mentioned that changes 
in the nature of information retrieval, networked computing, and thus of 
qualitative research all make the search for ways of ordering classes and 
categories more urgent. Automated thesauri and retrieval systems have 
made important advances in the direction of recognizing deep semantic 
similarities, often explicitly addressing problems in faceted classification 
(e.g., Schatz et al., 1996; Pollitt, 1997; Pollitt, Smith, & Braekevelt, 1996). 
At the same time, badly needed are the theoretical developments that will 
both help model complex data and be useful in naturalistic settings. This 
author suggests that FC may provide a helpful tool to analyze and con- 
struct grounded theories. 
There are several software packages that support the analysis of 
qualitative data. Two were specifically targeted at grounded theory analy- 
sis-it., NUDIST and Atlas/ti. Without going into extensive compari- 
son, both support flexible document coding. Atlas/ti captures many fea- 
tures of the discussion above in supporting flexible coding structures 
and bundles of codes for data collected using grounded theory (for a 
demo see http://www.cs.tu-berlin.de/-muhr/atlasti.html).It is thus pos- 
sible to use Atlas/ti to build a thesaurus from one’s own field notes and 
interrogate its structure as one would a faceted classification. As we under- 
stand the theory-ladenness of classification schemes, we may also come to 
understand more about the classification schemes embedded in our 
qualitative theories and methods. 
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NOTES 
Beghtol notes a possible indirect or remote connection between the work of George 
Kelly, a psychological methodologist, and both Guttman and the classification commu- 
nity (p.  214). Another parallel exists here in my own work. As an undergraduate psy- 
cholow major, I wrote my honors thesis using a combination of Kelly’s Repertory Grid 
Method and Kuhn’s notion of paradigm. This work reminded one of my advisors of the 
work of Glaser and Strauss, and they directed me to The Discovery of.Grounded Theory. 
Some years later I became Strauss’ student. On reading a draft of this paper, a col-
league in Britain sent me a helpful message pointing out the similarities between 
grounded theory and Repertory Grids (personal construct theory, and directing me to 
a Web site a t  the University of Calgary dedicated to the latter [ h t t p : / /  
ksi .cpsc.ucalgary.ra:80/~~~/](Mike Hales, e-mail communication to the author, 29 
October 1996). 
An important exception, of course, is the work of anthropological linguists and taxono- 
mists which Falls into this category, and I do not mean to exclude their important contri- 
butions. However, much of their work does not develop theories in the sense that I am 
using the term in this paper, which should be clear from the context below. Rather, the 
findings are used as primary data from which theories are developed, as in structuralist 
anthropology In any event, i t  would also be important For friture work to compare the 
process of anthropological taxonomy with some of the LIS tools discussed. 
The Dingnostic and Stnlistiral Monual, the major classification for psychiatry. 
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Mapping Beyond Dewey’s Boundaries: 
Constructing Classificatory Space for’ 
Marginalized Knowledge Domains 
HOPEA. OLSON 
ABSTRACT 
CLASSIFICATIONSARE BOUNDED SYSTEMS THAT marginalize some groups 
and topics by locating them in ghettoes, diasporized across the system. 
Other marginalized groups and topics are totally excluded from these 
systems, being outside of their territorial limits. Because classifications 
are locational systems, spatial analyses borrowed from various disciplines 
have potential to identify and address their problems. The philosophical 
basis for the analysis in this article is Lorraine Code’s (1995) conception 
of “rhetorical spaces” as sites where topics can be taken seriously as legiti- 
mate subjects for open discussion. In existing classifications, there is rhe- 
torical space for most mainstream social and scholarly knowledge domains 
but not for marginalized knowledge domains. Geography offers concepts 
for building a theoretical framework to ameliorate the biases of classifica- 
tion. This article describes such a framework and how it is applied using 
techniques such as Gillian Rose’s (1993) “paradoxical spaces,” which are 
simultaneously or alternately in the center and at the margin, same and 
other, inside and outside to develop a more complex and meaningful clas- 
sification for women and other marginalized groups. The project described 
here operationalizes these theoretical openings by applying them to the 
Dewey Decimal Classification as both critique and and as techniques for 
change. 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of bias in classification can be linked to the nature of 
classification as a social construct. It reflects the same biases as the culture 
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that creates it. Existing literature has critiqued the most widely used 
classification in the world, the Dewey Decimal Classification (DOC?, for its 
treatment of women, Puerto Ricans, Chinese and Japanese Americans, 
Mexican Americans, Jews, Native Americans, the developing world (in- 
cluding Africa, the Middle East, and Melanesia), gays, teenagers, senior 
citizens, people with disabilities, and alternative lifestyles.’ To look at 
these biases with a fresh eye, a theoretical construct capable of reveal-
ing the complexities of classification and its social construction was 
sought. The theoretical framework that subsequently evolved draws on 
the spatial metaphors that have become so prevalent in cultural criti- 
cism in recent years. 
As Lorraine Code (1995) points out: 
[use of’] spatial nietaphors picks up a late-twentieth-century concern 
with location: with territories, mappings, positionings where resources 
are variously available, subjectivities are variously enacted, and iden- 
tities are constructed and continually reconstructed in the enactings; 
and where hierarchies of power and privilege always contribute to 
shaping these processes. . . . (p. ix) 
In this spirit, this discussion will move from a description of the construc- 
tion of classification to the development of spatial imagery as a metaphori- 
cal mechanism with the ability to discover the processes by which power- 
ful and privileged discourses shape information and with the potential to 
inform change. What will then evolve will be a multidisciplinary theoreti- 
cal framework based on spatial conceptions in the context of a specific 
project, concluding with suggestions for further research. 
THEORETICALMODELSFOR THE 
SOCIALCONSTRUCTIONOF CLASSIFICATION 
The idea of classification as a social construct is not new. A. C. Foskett 
(19’71) suggests that classificationists are the products of their times. 
Therefore, since classifications are the products of classificationists, clas- 
sifications also reflect the biases of their times. Examining the ideologi- 
cal construction and present needs for reconstruction of the former 
Soviet classification (Sukiasian, 1993) or the Confucian, and later Maoist, 
classification in China (Studwell, Wu, & Wang, 1994) makes it easy to 
see that classifications reflect philosophical and ideological presump- 
tioris of their cultures and not only the times but also the places. Classi- 
fications arrange concepts according to accepted cultural discourses 
whether those discourses are Leninist or Maoist communisms, the Seven 
Epitomes of Confucian doctrine, or Dewey’s apparent reversal of Francis 
Bacon’s classification scheme. 
Allocation of 80 percent of DDCs religion section (the 200s) exclu-
sively to Christianity and the existence of a separate section for American 
literature (the 810s) when all other literatures are arranged by language 
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is not surprising given the origins of this classification. Finding the topic 
“concubinage” under customs in 392.6 where it is gathered with topics 
such as chaperonage and dating or “suttee” in 393.9 and all combined 
with funerals and wakes has a certain ethnocentric logic. The other ma- 
jor North American classification, the Library of Congress Clussijication(LCC), 
exhibits similar biases. For example, the allocation of space and the se- 
quence of development of Class K for law, with separate volumes for indi- 
vidual North American and European countries, was published in the 1960s 
and 1970swith only one volume appearing in 1993covering Asia, Eurasia, 
Africa, Pacific Area, and Antarctica. In each of these ca6es, there is a 
tendency to simply accept that these powerful discourses operate, and 
that change is too expensive and impractical. 
INSEARCHOF A THEORETICALMODEL 
Building a theoretical framework or model to analyze and address 
the biases of classification in a practical way requires a model capable of 
revealing the complexities of classification and the discourses that con- 
struct it. Developing this framework or model requires examination of 
the characteristics of classification, testing various conceptions against those 
characteristics, and reflexively reworking the model. 
Two major characteristics of classification are that it gathers similar 
information together and places it in proximity to related information. If 
there is to be only one ordering of information, then it is useful for classi- 
fication to reflect the relationships perceived in the wider society. Be-
cause the relationships between concepts can be drawn in a variety of 
ways, classifications will give more advantageous space in the overall struc- 
ture to some concepts than to others. As the literature cited earlier sug- 
gests, classification tends to reflect the most mainstream version of these 
relationships. Classificatory structures are developed by the most power- 
ful discourses in a society. The result is the marginalization of concepts 
outside the mainstream. 
Classifications are also closed systems in that they represent some 
concepts and not others. No classification will ever be all inclusive. Since 
classifications are notationally controlled vocabularies, these inevitably have 
limits. Legal scholar Drucilla Cornell (1992) has suggested that any sys- 
tem or structure has limits, and that replacing one system with another 
will simply define different limits rather than being all inclusive. A system 
of any kind is defined by what it is not and, because systems tend to be 
dynamic, like classifications, the definition of what the system’s limits are 
is always deferred (p.  2) .  It is an instance of Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstructive concept of d@&ance that limits are constructed by their 
exclusions and are in a state of constant flux because they are socially 
constructed. The question for classification then becomes, What is left 
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beyond the limit? What is excluded? Given Foskett’s observations on 
classificationists, it comes as no surprise that the limits of classifications 
are also constructed by the powerful discourses within a society, and that 
what is excluded is what is further from the mainstream. 
Further, library classifications have responded to the needs of li- 
braries to classify published works into a browsable collection. There-
fore, what exists in published form will dictate, to a greater or lesser 
degree, what is included in a classification. Even a classification that 
does not limit itself to literary warrant will be irresponsible if it ignores 
the published record. Since what gets published is also limited by pow- 
erful social discourses, it too tends to produce a corpus largely repre- 
senting mainstream thought. 
The result of these factors is classification, which might be seen as a 
dense mainstream core of aptly juxtaposed concepts with marginal con- 
cepts scattered around the edges or not represented at all. This conjures 
up concentric circles of degrees of representation quality forming a dis- 
tribution-similar to Zipf‘s, Lotka’s, or Bradford’s-of: a few core con- 
cepts best represented, a middle ground adequately represented, and a 
large periphery of poorly represented marginal concepts with some con- 
cepts outside of the limits not represented at all (see Figure 1).This ini- 
age of Zipf‘s core ofword occurrences or Lotka’s core of publishedauthors 
or Bradford’s core of journals effectively documents the distribution of 
what currently exists. It also suggests the effectiveness of a spatial 
conception of classification. However, it does not provide a metaphor for 
analyzing the historical discourses that have shaped the present nor does 
it offer suggestions for changing the stat.us quo. 
Figure 1 .  Degrees of Representation Quality. 
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This distribution does, however, probably correlate with how rep- 
resentative mainstream views actually are-i.e., they show only what is 
concentrated at the perceived center and how that puts others in the 
margins. The core does not consist of many different entities. Putting 
this distribution into social terms creates a small core surrounded by 
margins. If one takes all so-called “special interest groups” out of the 
social equation, there is little left in the mainstream. In North Ameri- 
can society, taking away women, African Americans, Hispanic Ameri- 
cans, French Canadians, Native peoples, Asian Americans, lesbians and 
gay men, people with disabilities, anyone who is not Christian, working 
class and poor people, and so forth, one is left with a very small “core.” 
An image that shows the complexity of these overlapping categories is 
that of a huge Venn diagram with many sets limited by Boolean ANDs. 
The white AND male AND straight AND European AND Christian AND 
middle-class AND able-bodied AND Anglo mainstream becomes a very 
small minority (Figure Z),  and each set implies what it is not. The 
implication of this image is that not every person, not every discourse, 
not every concept, has equal weight. Some discourses simply wield 
more power than others. Different discourses have different levels of 
power to construct our realities. The Venn diagram helps to represent 
the discourses constructing classification. However, Venn diagrams 
operate on the basis of dualities. Something either is or is not in the 
circle (fuzzy sets could help somewhat in this respect). Further, as the 
sets overlap, these estimate only quantity and not the shape or relative 
location of the dominant. 
MAPPINGAS METAPHOR 
Zipf-like distributions and Venn diagrams are descriptive representa- 
tions of a phenomenon. They do not contain the potential to inform 
change. A more powerful device that does have this potential is meta-
phor. Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse (1986) suggest that: 
Metaphor is potentially revolutionary. . . . Scientific revolutions are, in 
fact, metaphoric revolutions, and theoretical explanation should be seen 
as metaphoric redescription of the domain of phenomena . . . . Meta-
phor causes us to “see” the phenomena differently and causes the mean- 
ings of terms that are relatively observational and literal in the original 
system to shift toward the metaphoric meaning. . . . Meaning is consti- 
tuted by a network, and metaphor forces us to look at the intersections 
and interaction of different parts of the network. (p. 156) 
The diagrams in Figures 1and 2 are spatial representations but not 
spatial metaphors. To redescribe classification through theoretical expla- 
nation, to explore its network of interactions and intersections, requires a 
more complex device. 
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Figure 2. Representation of Classification Complexity in Overlapping Categories. 
To see classification differently, spatial metaphors were chosen begin- 
ning with maps. Whether maps of the earth’s surface or maps of knowl- 
edge, which we call classifications, these are socially constructed repre- 
sentations. Werner Bies (1996) notes that cartographical and architec- 
tural images are particularly prolific as metaphors for classification (p. 4). 
He suggests that the way we organize knowledge is “an essential part of 
the cultural memory” just as is the knowledge itself (p. 7). Therefore, 
analyzing the metaphor as well as the system will reveal the construction 
with greater clarity. Use of a metaphor is itself part of the social construc- 
tion. To take this a step further, it is suggested that understanding this 
cultural metaphor can help us understand the construction ofclassification. 
Mapping is not a new metaphor for classification. To look at the 
metaphor of mapping and the way it is used in knowledge organization, 
the discussion will now turn to two of the fathers of knowledge or infor- 
mation organization, Berwick Sayers and B. C. Brookes. In his classic work, 
Manual of Classijkation, Berwick Sayers (1926) states categorically that: “A 
classification scheme is really a map of knowledge. . . . A general classifica- 
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tion is, then, a map of the universe within and without the mind of man; it 
covers all things we may have known, know or can know. In the language 
of metaphysics it covers all being” (pp. 65-66). Sayers is using the meta- 
phor of the map to suggest the vastness that classification can cover. He is 
making a presumption that a boundless system is actually possible and 
that a universal classification can exist. This presumption is at odds with 
Drucilla Cornell’s idea, described earlier-i.e., that systems are defined 
by their limits. The contrast between Sayers and Cornell is that of empiri- 
cist versus poststructuralist. Sayers implies that there is a single knowable 
reality that classification can represent in its entirety. Cornell suggests 
that there are multiple realities such that no system can represent reality 
in its totality. 
In the fourth edition of his work, Sayers (1967) goes further to say 
that: 
[A classification’s] task is to provide for the field of knowledge or 
part of it, as comprehensive and clear a statement as the cartogra- 
pher is able to make of a territory of the earth. For just as a map 
makes clear the relationship between place and place so a classifica- 
tion strives to show the relationship of each branch of knowledge to 
the other branches. (p. 32) 
That is, the map as a metaphor works because it is comprehensive (in- 
cluding everything), clear, and shows relationships. In this sense, the map 
works from a poststructural view as well since the map isjust as constructed 
as the classification. 
B.C. Brookes’s (1980) perception, expressed in one of his articles on 
the foundations of information science, adds the characteristic of objec- 
tivity. Brookes suggests that a map is an objective representation of a 
landscape, independent of the perspective one would have in the view 
from a window. One “objective map accommodates all possible subjective 
views of the same scene” (p. 270). 
Together, then, Sayers and Brookes suggest that classifications can be 
all-encompassing, accurate, and objective relational representations of 
knowledge or information-just as maps are. However, there is no reason 
to think that maps have any of these characteristics. Maps are no more 
objective or free of perspective than classifications, in spite of their basis 
in accurate measurement as indicated by Brookes. Maps are just as cultur- 
ally bound as classifications and classificationists’ reliance on cartographic 
imagery as being neutral and has allowed the continued existence of the 
illusion that classification can also be neutral. Examining the limitations 
of maps can help to define what questions we should ask ourselves about 
classification. 
Maps have always determined the limits of our worlds. In 500 B.c., 
Hecatzus created a map of the earth as a disk representing the world 
known to him, with the Mediterranean (from the Latin; middle + land or 
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earth) at the center. It is like the Zipf-like diagram in Figure 1. What is at 
the center is what he knew best. In addition, Hecatzus’s map defines the 
outer limits of the earth’s disk as being the ocean beyond Europe, Ethio- 
pia, and India. Present classification schemes are somewhat like maps of 
the earth as a disk-i.e., limited to a cultural perspective. 
A major characteristic of classification is that it is meant to place re- 
lated concepts in proximity to each other. This factor suggests that classi- 
fication is a spatial ordering. Certainly, thinking of its use for shelving 
books in a library, one can recognize its existence in what amounts to one- 
dimensional linear space. A book on a shelf can be to the left of one book 
and to the right of another but cannot sit next to a third. Maps also 
determine the perceived dimensions of spaces. Like the two-dimensional 
projections of the three-dimensional earth classifications, these must dis- 
tort all knowledge in its infinite multidimensionality into a linear arrange- 
ment suitable for creating a browsable list or locations on shelves. For 
example, traditional map projections, like the Mercator projection, skewed 
the size of different parts of the world relative to each other. Therefore, 
the European and North American colonial powers in the temperate lati- 
tudes appear much larger than countries of the South that are closer to 
the equator (for further explanation and an interesting alternative, see 
Map of the World, n. d.) ,  in the same way that traditional classifications 
have allocated more space to mainstream topics and less to marginal topics. 
Maps of the same area may be differently constructed depending on 
cultural discourses. Maps by Native North Americans assisting European 
explorers included rivers, mountains, and other physical features relative 
to each other and to the settlements of different tribes (see, for example, 
three maps on plate 59 in the Historical Atlas of Cunada, 1987). These 
maps did not divide up the entire space into discrete units like euro-settler 
maps. The latter tradition, which we still follow, divides the “pie” into 
separate pieces that take up the whole space. There is no common space 
left. Each piece of the terrain “belongs” to someone, reflecting a particu- 
lar cultural concept of property. Every inch is part of a jurisdiction. In 
looking at classification as a sort of mapping, we see how similar discrete 
domains with boundaries are created. Each concept is limited by its defi- 
nition, and the definition is the boundary of what is or is not a given 
concept. The definition marks the territory. Since the different territo- 
ries or categories in this type of map are ideally mutually exclusive, defini- 
tions that criss-cross each other cause problems that need to be dealt with 
by breaking them into facets and creating hierarchical arrangements- 
i.e., cities within states, states within countries, and countries within conti- 
nents. However, going back to the contrast between Native American 
maps and conventional political maps, it is apparent that even this ap- 
proach of mapping by dividing up territories is not a universal concept- 
it is culturally bound. 
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CONSTRUCTING SPACESPARADOXICAL 
This idea of the social construction or mapping of information is very 
interesting in and of itself, but of what use is it? We know that classifica- 
tions are not perfect, and that they reflect social biases. Can spatial meta- 
phors of mapping help address these biases? Can these be theoretically 
revolutionary as Arbib and Hesse (1986) suggest above? 
To test the power of the metaphor, an explanation of the develop- 
ment of a theoretical reason drawn from spatial constructions of a range 
of poststructural and feminist theorists will be given. The specific project 
that has been a vehicle for evolving these ideas is an effort to map the 
terminology of a marginalized knowledge domain to a mainstream classi- 
fication, the Dew9 Decimal Classification. The project takes the terms of a 
widely used feminist vocabulary, A Women’s Thesaurus (Capek, 1987), and 
links these to numbers in DDC. This approach is a way of linking the 
margins and the center to create a sort of network or web instead of con- 
centric circles with no overlaps. According to Arbib and Hesse (1986), 
the network creates the meaning. This project constructs a network of 
intersections different from those in the original DDC so that it creates 
meaning differently. To enable this network of links, Dennis Ward, a col- 
league in the School of Library and Information Studies, University of 
Alberta, is developing Windows and World Wide Web interfaces to reflect 
the theoretical framework. 
DDCis a good representation of mainstream thought. It has not been 
left to the peculiarities of its nineteenth century origins. For example, it 
is a long time since it located the status of women in 396 between eti- 
quette and outcast races as it did in earlier editions. However, it does still 
show the basic structure it inherited from Melvil Dewey’s milieu. It is not 
limited by literary warrant, but revisions are often based on how literature 
is used in the disciplines represented in DDC such as recent revisions in 
public administration and the life sciences. Therefore, DDC continues to 
represent mainstream arrangements effectively and is constructed by vari- 
ous mainstream voices and notjust one dominant discourse. 
In comparison, the concepts represented in A Women’s Thesaurus and 
the relationships between those concepts cross different disciplines, set- 
ting up an alternative structure that is fundamentally different. It is a 
structure developed in the margins-i.e., in the marginalized knowledge 
domain of women’s studies and feminist thought. 
By linking these two modes of representation, some might consider 
this as trying to fit round pegs into square holes or comparing apples and 
oranges or some other similar metaphor. However, continuing with these 
spatial metaphors, it is suggested that what is actually being done is con- 
structing paradoxical spaces. Paradoxical space is a concept developed by 
feminist geographer Gillian Rose (1993). It is simply a practice that allows 
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existence on both sides of a limit simultaneously or alternately. It is both 
inside and outside, center and margins. In this way, it does not put a new 
structure in place of the old but puts a different spin on existing concepts 
that come to coexist with concepts from the margins (p. 140). 
An everyday example of paradoxical space is the concept of separate 
spheres, public and private, associated with men’s roles and women’s roles. 
The private sphere represented by the white bourgeois concept of “home” 
and the public sphere represented by the paid workplace have been sites 
of paradoxical space in a variety of ways (Rose, 1993, pp. 52-56; Haraway, 
1991, p. 170). Female-intensive professions like nursing, home econom- 
ics, teaching and, of course, librarianship brought the ethic of care from 
the private women’s sphere to the public male sphere in the nineteenth 
century. Later in this century, the necessary revisions of white middle- 
class feminism came to recognize that the private sphere, the home, is a 
workplace not only for the women who live there, but also for the women 
who leave their own homes to work in the homes of others. These women 
are mostly women of color who bring a very different perspective to the 
idea of the private sphere as a place for women’s work. Recognition of 
the widespread existence of wife abuse also upsets the idea of the private 
sphere as the place where women are in control. Technology is now reviv- 
ing the old cottage model of exploitation in the home. The electronic 
cottage and telecommuting bring the public sphere and its values into the 
private sphere (see, for example, Fulton, 1997). These examples of the 
fuzzy boundaries between public and private make both into paradoxical 
space. It is no longer possible to define the limits between public and 
private. “Home” is not a simple concept- it never was except in our naive 
constructions of it. However, we can still understand concepts like “home” 
because paradoxical spaces can exist. 
QUALITY SPACEOF CONSTRUCTED 
We can also purposely create paradoxical spaces. In this project, I 
have worked with research assistants to link the concepts from A Women’s 
Thesaurus to DDC, creating paradoxical space. As we began, the idea 
worked reasonably well and seemed to have potential but, aswe progressed, 
it became apparent that some concepts mapped to positions qualitatively 
better than others. In seeking some way to analyze the qualities of the 
links, what was first considered was their coextensiveness. Coextensiveness 
is considered here in spatial terms: the “shape” of the topic and the “shape” 
of the representation are the same, or, asJessica Milstead (1984) puts it, 
coextensiveness is “the extent to which the index term reflects the precise 
content of the item of information . . . ” (p. 143). Milstead suggests the 
limitations of coextensiveness for classification when she opposes the pre- 
determined pigeonholes of classification to the potential coextensiveness 
of thesauri. Most classification constructs pigeonholes, which are pre- 
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formed without reference to the subjects of particular documents. There- 
fore, documents are put into the pigeonhole “closest in size to the sub- 
ject” (p. 144). Coextensivenessis based on the subjects of individual docu- 
ments while pigeonholing is based on the structure of the system. 
Coextensiveness became a useful measure for this project in a sort of 
Goldilocks-and-the-three-bears way. Some matches between feminist top- 
ics and DDCnumbers were too broad, others were too narrow, and others 
were just right. Of course the analogy did not hold up because some were 
overlapping in an associative, rather than a hierarchical, manner and other 
concepts simply had no number to represent them at all. The coexten- 
siveness problems were especially acute in the treatment of topics from 
the gendered perspective implied by a feminist thesaurus that required 
our assessment of Coextensiveness to be split into general and gendered 
forms (the basic approach of the research and the variables are discussed 
by Olson & Ward, 1997a, 1997b). 
However, even more problematic, and far more theoretically interest- 
ing, were problems of gathering and proximity. Classification gathers works 
on a particular topic or group of topics and places them in close proximity 
to related topics. What became interesting as we progressed with map- 
ping A Women’sThesaurus to DDC was that the gathering and proximity 
sometimes created odd, and even unfriendly, environments. To address 
this idea, feminist philosopher Lorraine Code’s (1995) concept of rhe- 
torical space was used: 
Rhetorical spaces . . . are fictive but not fanciful or fixed locations, 
whose (tacit, rarely spoken) territorial imperatives structure and limit 
the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within them with a reason- 
able expectation of uptake and “choral support”: an expectation of 
being heard, understood, taken seriously. They are the sites where 
the very possibility of an utterance counting as “true-or-false” or of a 
discussion yielding insight is made manifest. Some simple examples 
will indicate what I mean the term to achieve. . . . Imagine trying to 
make a true statement about whether it is more convenient to fly 
into Newark or La Guardia airport in the year 1600. The statement 
would not be false but meaningless: it could neither be true nor false 
within the available discursive possibilities. Or imagine trying to have 
a productive public debate about abortion in the Vatican in 1995, 
where there is no available rhetorical space, not because the actual 
speech acts involved would be overtly prohibited, but because the 
available rhetorical space is not one where ideas on such a topic can 
be heard and debated openly, responsively. . . .what I want this ter- 
minology [rhetorical space] to do [is], namely to deflect the focus of 
philosophical analysis away from single and presumably self-contained 
propositional utterances pronounced by no one in particular and as 
though into a neutral space; and to move it into textured locations 
where it matters who is speaking and where and why, and where such 
mattering bears directly upon the possibility of knowledge claims, 
mor a1 p r onoun c e me n ts , descrip t ion s of “re al i ty ” ach ievi n g 
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acknowledgment, going through. Often in such spaces discourse 
becomes a poiesis, a way of representing experience, reality, that re- 
makes and alters it in the process. And the making is ordinarily a 
communal process, dependent for its continuance on receptive con- 
ditions, on engaged responses both favourable and critical. (p.x)  
Code proposes a new concept in spatial imagery that helps explain what 
goes wrong for marginalized topics in classification. Even more than 
coextensiveness, rhetorical space helps explain why the mapping of classi- 
fication supports mainstream biases. To demonstrate, key phrases will be 
taken from Code’s defining quotation and will be elaborated on in rela- 
tion to classification and in light of other feminist and poststructuralist 
theorists’ work. 
1. “Rhetorical spaces. . . are fictive but not fanciful or fixed. . . . ” That is, 
they are constructed, made-up (fictive), but not arbitrary (not fanci- 
ful) and dynamic (not fixed). This is also true of classifications. Clas- 
sifications are not innate or natural but are constructed. Their con- 
struction has some logical basis, and they change as discourses con- 
tinue to act upon them. 
2. “[Tlerritorial imperatives structure and limit . . .”. The spaces have 
boundaries. They are limited by the way they are constructed and by 
the imperatives of the discourses that construct them. Again they are 
like classifications which are limited systems, including some concepts 
and excluding others. As Cornell suggests, limits define systems and 
spaces. 
3. 	“[Bleing heard, understood, taken seriously. . .”. What is limited 
when positive rhetorical space is lacking is voice. Voice is a given for 
mainstream discourses, but for marginalized discourses it is something 
more vital. As bell hooks (1989) puts it: 
Moving from silence into speech is for the oppressed, the colonized, 
the exploited, and those who stand and struggle side by side. . . a 
gesture of defiance that heals, that makes new life and new growth 
possible. It is that act of speech, of “talking back,” that is no mere 
gesture of empty words, that is the expression of our movement from 
object to subject “the liberated \roice.” (p. 9) 
So a positive rhetorical space allows marginalized discourses to be heard 
as legitimate statements-i.e., to be acknowledged as worth listening 
to. Cornell (1992) proposes a responsibility for those who control a 
system to make its limits permeable so that they can approach an ethi- 
cal relationship with those who are excluded (p. 62). The permeabil- 
ity of the limits allows the voices of the excluded-the oppressed, the 
colonized, the exploited-to be heard in the system. Those of us with 
authority must constantly throw the system off balance to maintain 
this permeability (p. 80). 
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4. 	Code intends the idea of rhetorical space “to deflect the focus of philo- 
sophical analysis from single and presumably self-contained utterances 
pronounced by no one in particular as though into a neutral 
space . . . ” (p. 10). This apparently neutral space is like postmodern 
theorist Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) “transparent space” which denies the 
existence of anything excluded from its mapping because it appears 
to be all there is. “Transparent space” is the illusion that location is 
neutral-i.e., that mapping territory can be a true representation of 
some essence of reality as B.C. Brookes (1980) suggests. However, 
there is an implied exclusion defining the transparent space that is 
hidden by it. Because space has boundaries and always includes and 
excludes something, it cannot be neutral. Making the exclusions vis- 
ible means identifying the space’s boundaries to allow recognition of 
what is outside those boundaries. It is identifying the implied oppo- 
site of a deconstructive binary opposition. It shows the constructed 
nature of the space. It moves the discourse “into textured locations 
where it matters who is speaking and where and why, and where such 
mattering bears directly upon the possibility of knowledge claims” (p. 
x). Transparent space is difficult to discern because of its apparent 
neutrality. The efforts at neutrality that are made in classification can 
mask exclusions. 
5. 	“[P]oiesis, a way of representing experience, reality, that remakes and 
alters it in the process.” Poieszs is a creative and creating production. 
In poiesis, we understand that the representation of reality is the con- 
struction of reality. The representation of information, through clas- 
sification, is part of the construction of information. Classification 
remakes and alters information by constructing a particular context 
for it-gathering, scattering, and juxtaposing topics in relation to each 
other. How broadly or narrowly topics are represented will enhance 
or mask their visibility. In these ways, classification produces informa- 
tion in a creative process. This process of poiesis is a locational one. 
Feminist sociologist Elspeth Probyn (1990) proposes that: 
Through location knowledges are ordered into sequences which are 
congruent with previously established categories of knowledge. Lo-
cation, then, delineates what we may hold as knowable and, follow- 
ing Foucault, renders certain experiences “true” and “scientific” while 
excluding others. (p. 178) 
She continues on to point out that this act of creation or construction 
determines not only what is knowable, but whose voices are heard. So 
the creation of classification creates the space in which some 
knowledges are central and others are peripheral. 
6. This creation of reality is “a communal process, dependent for its con- 
tinuance on receptive conditions, on engaged responses both 
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favourable and critical.” That is, both the context and the process 
affect the construction of reality. It could be called reflexive or holis- 
tic. It is akin to the death of the author and the ascendancy of the 
reader in literary criticism. The author does not create the text. It is 
created in the process of reading and depends upon the “receptive” 
and “engaged” reader for its meaning and existence. It involves inter- 
pretation, in the case of classification, by classifiers and users. In this 
sense it places responsibility for the construction of information not 
just on classificationists who write classifications but also on the indi- 
viduals and institutions who use classifications. 
OPERATIONALIZINGTHE THEORY 
To operationalize the concept of rhetorical space, our research project 
examines the DDC context of individual concepts from A Women’s Thesau- 
rus by looking at: 
1. What other topics share the number? 
2. How is the number described? 
3. What is the hierarchical context? 
4. What topics sit on either side? 
Two examples from our pilot study illustrate how the variable of rhetorical 
space works to reveal whether or not feminist topics can be taken seri- 
ously in DDC. 
The first topic is colonialism. The following entry from A Women’s 
Thesaurusimplies the scope of this term: 
Entry from A Women’s Thesaurus: 
colonialism 
UF imperialism 
NT neocolonialism 
RT apartheid 
cultural imperialism 
decolonization 
developing nations 
. . .  
Colonialism appears in the index to DDC and points unequivocally to the 
number 325.3. This concept is not excluded from DDC. However, its 
rhetorical space is not as neutral as it at first appears. The following entry 
from DDCshows how 325.3 is defined and what it includes: 
Entry from DDC’ 
325.3 	 Colonization 
Class here exercise of political dominion over distant 
territories 
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DDC Index Terms: 
Colonialism 
Colonization 
The location of colonialism with colonization is an example of transparent 
space. It seems neutral but is actually one-sided, showing colonization from 
the point of view of the colonizing power as opposed to the people and 
culture being colonized. Colonialism is linked to this number not in its 
caption but only as a reference from the DDC relative index. The entry 
describes the colonized territories as “distant” from the colonizing pow- 
ers, not the other way around. Colonies are not distant in the view of 
colonized people. 
The following summary shows the hierarchical and sequential con- 
texts of 325.3 that reinforce the perspective of the imperial power observ- 
ing the colony: 
Summary from DDC: 
300 Social sciences 
320 Political science (Politics and government) 
325 International migration and colonization 
325.1 	 Immigration 
325.2 	 Emigration 
325.3 	 Colonization 
325.4325.9 	 International migration to and colonization in specific 
continents, countries, localities in modern world 
In categories 325.4325.9, the geographic subdivisions that combine “mi- 
gration” and “colonization” move from colonizing country “to” colony in 
its subdivisions and define colonization as “in” the colonized locale and 
not “by” the colonizers. As with the description of 325.3, the geographic 
subdivision is entirely from the perspective of the imperial power. Coloni- 
zation involves movement-being colonized does not. The location of 
colonialism in the established category of colonization fulfills Probyn’s 
(1990) prediction that the voices of hooks’ colonized become peripheral. 
A further indication of this marginalization is found by looking higher 
up the classificatory hierarchy. The DDC principle of hierarchical force’ 
dictates that what is true for 325 is also true for its subdivisions including 
325.3: 
Entry from DDC 
325 International migration and colonization 
Including involuntary population transfer, population exchange 
Class movement of people associated with a specific event in 
history with the event in 909 or 930-990; class interdisciplinary 
works on international movement of people in 304.82 
248 LIBRARY TRENDS/FL4LL 1998 
While colonialism involves people from the imperial power going to the 
colonized territory, its disruptive nature often causes other niovements of 
people-most notably the scattering of colonized peoples that form 
diaspora. For people moving away from the site of colonization as part of 
the diasporas that often result from colonialism, the instructions under 
category 325, International migration and colonization, suggest two options. 
First, movement of people associated with a specific event in history is to 
be classed with the event in the 900s. This option has at least two prob- 
lems for representing postcolonial diasporas: first, it is difficult to pin down 
colonization as a specific event because it  tended to happen over a diffuse 
period of time not conducive to classification and, second, by putting these 
movements into history, we would take them out of the present day where 
their results, typically including racism, must be addressed. 
The second option is to use the number for interdisciplinary works 
on international movement of people in 304.82: 
Entry from DDC 
304.82 	 International movement 
Class international emigration in 304.809; class 
international immigration in 304.83-304.89 
The number 304.82 is a subdivision of movement of people under 
the broader concept of social behaviors, thus taking this issue out of the 
political realm of colonialism. It does allow for geographic subdivision in 
either direction-the country to which people went or the country which 
they left. The latter applies to the postcolonial diaspora, but it uses the 
less preferred number. Preference will be given, according to DDC's rule 
of zero,4 to international immigration rather than emigration. There-
fore, people leaving India for other places in general will be classified 
with movement from India, but people leaving India for specific destina- 
tions will be classified with movement toward each of those places (such 
as movement toward England) thus diasporizing the diaspora. 
These details about the siting of colonialism in DDC help to reveal that 
the apparently neutral transparent space is actually skewed toward a main- 
stream interpretation because it has been constructed by a mainstream 
discourse. 
A second example is the poor representation in mainstream schemes 
of the concept of unpaid labor. The heading in A Women'sThesaurus is: 
Entry from A Women3 Thesaurus: 
unpaid employment 
UF nonwage labor 
BT employment 
NT unpaid household labor 
RT economic value of women's work 
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homemaking 

unpaid labor force 

valuing children 

volunteer work 

The term unpaid Pmployment in A Women5 Thesaurus is a subdivision of em-
ployment. However, when we try to classify it in the same way in DOC, we 
find that the relative index sends us to 331.125, Labor actively employed 
Entry from DDC 
331.125 	 Labor actively employed 
That portion of the total available supply of labor 
employed at any given time 
Including types of employment 
Class here utilization of human resources, employment, 
comprehensiveworks on employment and compensation 
DDC Index Terms: 
Employment 
Human resources-utilization-economics 
Occupations-active employment 
The “class here” note indicates that the number includes “comprehensive 
works on employment and compensation” implying only paid labor. This 
implication is confirmed by hierarchical force since 331.125 is a subdivi-
sion of 331.12: 
Entry from DDC 
331.12 	 Labor market 
The activities of and opportunities for buying and selling 
labor 
The phrase “buying and selling” confirms that only paid labor is included. 
The same is true if we look at the labor force: 
Entry from DDC 
331.11 	 Labor force 
All who are employed or available for employment 
Class here human resources, manpower and womanpower, 
labor supply, size of labor force 
The scope note indicates that this definition of labor force includes “all 
who are employed or available for employment” which is not likely meant 
to include people who are available for becoming housewives and 
househusbands. If the latter are part of the labor force under this defini- 
tion, it is more likely as people available for paid employment. 
Some conventional types of unpaid employment are represented in 
other places in the classification with the result that they are not treated 
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as labor. Homemaking; one of the related terms to unpaid employment in A 
Women’s Thesaurus, is located in home economics, which is a subdivision of 
technology: 
Entry from DDC 
640 	 Home economics and family living 
Class here management of home and personal life, domestic arts 
and sciences 
DDC Index Terms: 
Domestic arts 

Domestic sciences 

Home economics 

Homemaking 
Homes 

Homes-home economics 

Household management 

Summary from DDC 
600 Technology (Applied sciences) 
640 Home economics and family living 
640.4 Specific aspects of household management 
640.41 Helpful hints and miscellaneous recipes 
640.42 Management of money 
640.43 Management of time 
640.46 Household employees 
640.49 Survival housekeeping 
While this is an excellent place to put information about the processes 
and production of homemaking, acknowledging it as appropriate to be 
adjacent to agriculture or engineering, it does not include the aspect of 
the people who do this labor except in a subdivision for household em- 
ployees, the people who are paid to do housework. 
Another example of unpaid labor is voluntarism, which is defined as 
one aspect of social participation along with encounter groups and sensi- 
tivity training: 
Entry from DDC 
302.14 Social participation 
Including communalism, competition, cooperation, 
encounter groups, sensitivity training, voluntarism 
While anyone who has done volunteer work may appreciate its links to 
encounters and sensitivity, this location treats voluntarism as “social par- 
ticipation” and not as labor. While it is important not to belittle the value 
of social participation in a world in which governments are cutting back 
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essential social services which then fall to voluntary agencies, the labor of 
voluntarism also becomes a key to economic well-being. 
A way of addressing this problem is to create a paradoxical space by 
locating the general concept of unpaid employment alongside paid em- 
ployment. While these are two different topics, they may sit adjacent to 
each other to create viable rhetorical space and give legitimate voice to 
the unpaid labor performed everyday around the world. One option would 
be to tuck it into other generalizations of the labor force, say in the gap 
between “qualifications and personal characteristics” and “systems of labor”: 
Summary from DDCwith potential addition: 
300 Social sciences 
330 Economics 
331 Labor economics 
331.1 Labor force and market 
331.11 Labor force 

331.110” < Zero Subdivisions> 

331 [.111] Geographic distribution 

331.114 Qualifications and personal characteristics 

d Economic basis of labor 

d Unpaid labor 

d Paid labor 

331.117 Systems of labor 
331.1172 Free labor 

331.1173 Compulsory labor 

331.118 Labor productivity 
331.119 Labor force by industry and occupation 
Here a section with a title something like “economic basis of labor” with 
the subdivisions “unpaid labor” and “paid labor” (with the mainstream 
interpretation coming second to upset the hierarchy a bit) could set this 
topic alongside basic concepts of the labor force. Because this number 
would be hierarchically encompassed by “labor force,” the definition of 
the latter would have to be adjusted to include unpaid labor as would 
331.1, Labor economics, in a reversal of hierarchical force-the subdivision 
driving the definition of the dominant concept. Mapping a marginal con- 
cept in the midst of a mainstream concept will not alone create positive 
rhetorical space. However, careful placement of such interpolations will 
make transparent space visible and will create paradoxical spaces where 
discussion of issues can continue openly. 
CONCLUSION 
Following Drucilla Cornell’s concept of systems’ limits, there would 
be no point in abandoning our existing classifications in the hope of achiev- 
ing that objective map described by B.C. Brookes. All systems will exclude 
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and marginalize in some way. However, it is possible to shift between 
mainstream and margin in our mapping, creating paradoxical spaces and 
defining the limits differently. With a new theoretical framework, it is 
possible to make changes in our mapping akin to the changes made when 
Pythagoras determined that the earth is round and not flat. 
The new theoretical framework developed throughout this article is 
offered as a new way of mapping knowledge in classification. It has potential 
for both analysis and amelioration. The categories of classification-be- 
cause they typically reflect a cultural mainstream-appear neutral, objec- 
tive, and transparent. This makes marginalizations and exclusions diffi- 
cult to identify. Therefore, to analyze the problems of classification in 
relation to marginalized knowledge domains, the framework poses three 
assumptions drawn from feminist and poststructural literature examined 
in this discussion. First, classification, like any map, is constructed by domi- 
nant cultural discourses. Second, classification, like any system, has con- 
structed boundaries or limits that result in exclusions. Third, the con- 
struction of classification is a form of location that defines and sequences 
what is accepted as knowledge, thus marginalizing as well as excluding. 
Regarding classification as a text and reading it with these three assump- 
tions in mind will make what was transparent and invisible opaque and 
visible, elucidating the biases and the discourses that construct and en- 
force them. 
To ameliorate the biases of classification, this framework proposes 
that the limits of a classification be made unstable and permeable to allow 
the voices of those who have been excluded to be heard. In this way, the 
classification approaches an ethical relationship with previously silenced 
voices. Further, to address the marginalizations within classification, this 
theoretical stance advocates the creation of paradoxical spaces that are 
neither mainstream nor marginal but are both simultaneously or alter- 
nately. By mapping A Women’sThesaurus to DOC, this project creates such 
spaces. The same concept can offer other ways of deconstructing and 
reconstructing not only the limits but also the structures of classification. 
The creation of paradoxical spaces can become a poiesiei.e., that 
alters representation in ways that make boundaries permeable. In the 
next stage of this project, suggestions will be made for revision, supple- 
ments will be devised, and optional practices offered to further develop 
paradoxical spaces for women’s studies and feminist thought in DDC. It 
will allow for more dimensions and, thus, more creative connections be- 
tween places/spaces/concepts than have hitherto been available. Fur-
ther, we hope that it will be a prototype for a poieszs applicable to other 
marginalized knowledge domains. With care, paradoxical spaces will ap- 
pear throughout classifications, thereby keeping them from stagnating 
and keeping them vital and exciting. 
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NOTES 
‘See, for example, Afolabi (1992) on Africana; Hamdy (1980) on Arabic materials; Iwuji 
(1989) on Africa; Lochhead (1985) on women; McConnell (1984, 1985a, 1985b) on 
Melanesia; Milstead Harris & Clack (1979) on nearly all of these groups; Mowery (1989) 
on Mexican Americans; Pacey (1989) on Africa; Steinberg (1974) on women; and Wolf 
(1972) on gays and lesbians. 
*Entries and summaries from DDCare from the electronic version, Deweyfor Windows. They 
have been edited in format. The relative index terms are included only when they are 
relevant to the discussion and related Library of Congress Subject Headings have been omit- 
ted. Other omissions are shown by ellipses. Emphasis is mine to facilitate interpreta- 
tion. 
“‘Hierarchical force (DDC Glossary). The principle that the attributes of a class as defined 
in the heading and in certain basic notes apply to all the subdivisions of the class, and to 
all other classes to which reference is made” (Deweyfor Windows). 
4“Rule of zero (DDC Glossary). The rule instructing that subdivisions beginning with zero 
should be avoided if there is a choice between 0 and subdivisions beginning with 1- 9 
in the same position in the notation. Similarly, subdivisions beginning with 00 should 
be avoided when there is a choice hetween 00 and 0” (Dewqfor Windows, 1996). 
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The Kindness of Strangers: Kinds and Politics in 
Classification Systems 
GEOFFREYC. BOWKER 
ABSTRACT 
THISARTICLE OFFERS A FORMAL READING of a classification scheme of in- 
ternational scope and long duration: the International Classijication ofDis- 
eases (ID). The argument is made that this classification scheme retains 
many traces of its own administrative and organizational past in its cur- 
rent form. Further, it is argued that such traces operate normatively to 
favor certain kinds of narrative of medical treatment while denying oth- 
ers. It is suggested that the ICD, like other large-scale classification sys- 
tems, is able to do its work so effectively precisely because these traces 
permit a coupling of classification scheme and organizational form. 
INTRODUCTION 
In so far as the coding scheme establishes an orientation toward the 
world, it constitutes a structure of intentionality whose proper locus 
is not the isolated, Cartesian mind, but a much larger organizational 
system, one that is characteristically mediated through mundane 
bureaucratic documents such as forms. (Goodwin, 1996, p. 65) 
In the digital libraries that are being constructed today, a burgeoning 
number of formal classification systems are being inscribed deep into the 
infrastructure of the information system. 
In this discussion, some medical classification systems with a long 
history will be examined-notably the International Classijiication of Diseases 
( I D - P C M ,1996; ICD-l0,1992), in operation since the 1890s-in order to 
discern the relationship between the use of the classification as an infor- 
mation storage and retrieval mechanism and its use to encode multiple 
political and ethical agendas. 
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One classic division between kinds of classification system is that drawn 
by Taylor (1995), who distinguishes between Aristotelian classification and 
prototype classification. The prototype classification was defined by ex- 
perimental psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1978). This distinction is going 
to be an important one throughout this discussion and will be explored in 
some detail. An Aristotelian classification works according to a set of bi- 
nary characteristics, which the object being classified either presents or 
does not present. At each level of classification, enough binary features 
are adduced to place any member of a given population into one, and 
only one, class. So we might say that a pen is an object for writing within a 
population consisting of pens, balls, and bottles (Taylor, 1995). We would 
have to add in one more feature in order to adequately distinguish pens, 
for example, from pencils, balls, or bottles. A technical classification sys- 
tem operating by binary characteristics is called monothetic if a single set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions is adduced (“in the universe of poly- 
gons, the class of triangles consists of figures that have three sides”), 
polythetic if a number of shared characteristics are used (in our example, 
the pen could be described as thin, cylindrical, used for writing, has a ball 
point, and so forth) (Blois, 1984). Desrosi2res (1993) indicates a typical 
breakdown between monothetic and polythetic classifications in the work 
of statisticians. He associates the former with Linnaeus and the latter with 
Buffon (who engaged in local classification practices, just using the set of 
traits needed to make a determination in a specific instance) and writes: 
“These local practices are often carried out by those working in statistical 
centers, according to a division of labor whereby the chiefs are inspired by 
Linnaean precepts but the working statisticians apply, without realizing it, 
Buffon’s method” (p.  296 [authors’ translation] ) . Aristotelian models- 
monothetic or polythetic-have traditionally informed formal classifica- 
tion theory in a broad range of sciences, including biological systematics, 
geology, and physics. 
Rosch’s (1978) prototype theory argues that, in daily life, our classifi- 
cations tend to be much fuzzier than we might at first think. We do not 
deal with a set of binary characteristics when we decide that this thing we 
are sitting on is a chair. Indeed, it is possible to name a population of 
objects that people would in general agree to call chairs that have no two 
binary features in common. 
According to prototype theory, there is a broad picture in our minds 
of what a chair is, and this picture is extended by metaphor and analogy 
when trying to decide if any given thing that we are sitting on counts. We 
call up a best example and then see if there is a reasonable direct or meta- 
phorical thread that takes us from the example to the object under con- 
sideration. Prototype theory has been powerfully developed within the 
field of sociolinguistics by George Lakoff (1987) and John Taylor (1995). 
One finding of the theory is that different social groups tend to have quite 
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different prototypes in mind when classifylng something-e.g., a piece of 
furniture. Thus, when surveyed, a group of Germans came up consis- 
tently with a different set of best examples than a group of Americans 
(Taylor, 1995, pp. 4457). For the Americans, chair and sofa are best fits 
for furniture, for the Germans, asked about mobel, it was bed and table. 
An important implication of the theory is that there are levels at which 
we most easily and naturally distinguish between objects in the world, and 
that supervenient or subvenient levels tend to be more technically de- 
fined. Looking at a picture of a Manx coon cat, a nonexpert will say that 
this is a picture of a cat. An expert might call it either a Manx coon cat or 
a vertebrate. 
This distinction between two main types of classification is a very use- 
ful one. However, there are a number of reasons for saying that it is not 
an absolute distinction-indeed, one could say that we all probably have a 
personal prototype of the ideal Aristotelian classification system, but that 
no one system in practice fully meets a single set of Aristotelian require- 
ments. We stress “in practice” here, since it is practice that this discussion 
is largely about. Turning to an example from the workplace, it is possible 
to begin to see how practice and location mediates such divisions. In the 
medical arena, it emerged from a survey of physicians in 1979 in the United 
Kingdom that general practitioners “had a constant tendency to regard a 
wider range of phenomena as disease” than the hospital physicians, who 
in turn were more inclusive than the lay public-the perceived need for 
medical intervention being the determining axis (Prins, 1981, p. 176; 
Campbell, Scadding, & Roberts, 1979). An influential factor, Prins notes, 
seems to have been whether or not medical intervention was required. 
For the lay public, “measles” and “mumps” might be prototypical diseases, 
but “arthritis,” a card-carrying ICD-10 (1992) disease, might be seen rather 
as a condition. 
Sowhy do we seem in practice prototypical even if in principle Aristo- 
telian? For two main reasons: (1)because each classification system is 
tied to a particular set of coding practices, and (2) because classification 
systems in general (we are not making this as an ex cathedra pronounce-
ment) reflect the conflicting contradictory motives of the sociotechnical 
situations that gave rise to them. 
PRACTICES 
Consider the International Classvication of Diseases (ICD-9-CM, 1996; 
ICD-10, 1992). When originally drawn up, it had a maximum of 200 cat- 
egories, not because this was the number of diseases in the world but 
because this had been the number of lines on Austrian census forms. If 
too many diseases got identified, then there would be no way of maintain- 
ing and analyzing registers of causes of death as the technology would not 
hold more information. 
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In addition to this inheritance, there is a practical Occam’s razor. 
When doctors come to code causes of death, they are frequently faced 
with a set of difficultjudgments (that may require an autopsy and further 
diagnostic work). They can simply go for the easiest solution-i.e., by 
using a generalized “other” category They can then get back to dealing 
with their live patients (Fagot-Largeault, 1989). So the classical beauty of 
the Aristotelian classification gives way to a fuzzier classification system 
that shares inpractice key features with commonsense prototype classifica- 
tions-i.e., heterogeneous objects linked by metaphor or analogy. 
The powerful habits of practice with respect to the humble tasks of 
filling out forms are often neglected in studies of classifying. Goodwin 
( 1996) provides an elegant description of working student archaeologists 
matching patches of earth against a standard set of color patches-the 
Munsell color charts. He notes that earlier cognitive anthropological work 
on color assumed a universal genetic origin for color recognition but failed 
to examine the kinds of practices that informed the ways in which color 
tests were designed and carried out in the course of this research. Goodwin 
(1996) notes: 
Rather than standing alone as self-explicating textual objects, forms 
are embedded within webs of socially organized situated practices. 
In order to make an entry in the slot provided for color an archae- 
ologist must make use of another tool, the set of standard color 
samples provided by a Munsell chart. This chart incorporates into a 
portable physical object the results of a long history of scientific in- 
vestigation of the properties of color. The version of this chart that 
archaeologists bring into the field has been tailored to the distinc- 
tive requirements of their work situation. (p. 66) 
The archaeologists constantly compare the pieces of earth against the chart, 
negotiate with each other, and transform their everyday terms for the earth 
into the formal numbered categories on the chart. The uncertainties 
they face along the way are removed once the numbers are selected and 
reported: “The definitiveness provided by a coding scheme typically erases 
from subsequent documentation the cognitive and perceptual uncertain- 
ties that these students are grappling with, as well as the work practices 
within which they are embedded” (Goodwin, 1996, p. 78). 
CONTRADICTORY OFEQUIREMENTS 
CLASSIFICATION IN GENERALSYSTEMS 
Classification systems in general inherit contradictory motives in the 
circumstances of their creation. This is very clearly illustrated by items in 
the ICD covering such charged ethical or religious issues as abortion or 
stillbirth. Over the years, defining the moment of birth differed radically 
from Protestant to Catholic countries and with technological changes. The 
final definitions given in the ICD directly reflect the charged political and 
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ethical atmosphere of the subject, distinguishing, for example, legal and 
illegal abortion as separate categories. In this sense, the ICB can also be 
read as a kind of treaty, a bloodless set of numbers obscuring the behind- 
the-scenes battles informing its creation. This dryness itself contains an 
implicit authority, seeming to rise above uncertainty, power struggles, and 
the impermanence of the compromises. 
Indeed, one might observe that technical classification schemes are 
constructed in such a way as to fit our commonsense prototypical picture 
of what a technical classification is. Thus when the International Com- 
mittee for the Nomenclature of Viruses, to which we shall return, floated 
the idea of using “sig1as”-a series of code letters attached to the virus 
name to indicate its characteristics-Matthews (1983) describes the re- 
sponse as follows: “Leading virology journals were only lukewarm to try 
out cryptogram ideas. Among comments from this period: ‘Why should 
they be given funny names? Are we not exposing ourselves to the laughter 
of the general public? Do we want to join the ranks of old-fashioned 
botanists and zoologists so soon?”’ (pp. 13-14). A good technical classifi- 
cation should not only be correct in Aristotelian terms, it should, in good 
prototypical fashion, look and feel scientific. This is not an isolated case. 
The developers of the Nursing Interventions Classification (NIC) have 
made similar observations-e.g., they initially did not classify “leech 
therapy” not because it was not a scientific intervention but because it did 
not look and feel like one. With respect to the ICD, there has been a long 
debate within the patient community about naming chronic fatigue syn- 
drome, for example (as there was for AIDS). Consider this discussion 
among patients suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome: 
Many patients feel that one of the greatest burdens of having chronic 
fatigue syndrome is the name of the illness. The word “fatigue” (which 
many patients refer to as the “ Fword) indicates everyday tiredness. 
It reinforces negative perceptions that remain with the public and 
most medical doctors, despite a decade of steady, gradual research 
advances.( Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Electronic Newsletter, 20 February, 
1997) 
One option was to name it after Darwin, but it was felt that, although he 
had the scientific cachet, he did not necessarily have the disease. Inversely, 
Florence Nightingale’s diagnosis is more certain but less prestigious: 
Nightingale’s. (A general note: no historical figure has been defini- 
tively diagnosed with CFS/M.E. Purists may object to choosing any 
person in history, who may not have actually had the disease, as the 
basis for an eponym.) Florence Nightingale is a widely respected and 
world-renowned figure who founded the International Red Cross and 
the first formal school for nursing. For decades she had an undiag- 
nosed, severely debilitating, illness with symptoms similar to CFS. 
Despite Nightingale’s considerable talents and her personal charac- 
ter, many doubted that she had a physical illness. Her illness was 
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quite controversial. A 1996 paper by D.A.B.Young that appeared in 
the British MedicalJournalindicates that Nightingale’s illness was likely 
to have been chronic brucellosis (a disease with symptoms similar 
but not identical to CFS). Patient groups have promoted Nightingale’s 
birthday, May 12, as International CFIDS/M.E. Awareness Day, and 
Nightingale is a familiar symbol to those who know this disease. 
However, some argue that women’s diseases often have difficulty in 
getting recognized and accepted. Choosing Nightingale’s name as 
an eponym might add to, rather than offer relief from, current name- 
associated problems. ( ChronicF a h p e  SyndromeElectronic Newsletter, 20 
February 1997) 
More generally, Taylor, from a linguistic perspective, and Durkheim and 
Mauss (1968) (for whom primitive social classifications “seem to link, with- 
out any discontinuity, with the first scientific classifications” [p.821) from 
an anthropological one have observed that our technical classifications 
grow out of, and have to answer to, commonsense socially comfortable 
classifications. It just would not be socially feasible to call a donkey a fish 
no matter how good your scientific grounds. 
There is no great divide between folk and scientific classifications. 
Below, we discuss one particular fault line between the two: a fracture that 
is constantly being redefined and changing its nature as the plate of lived 
experience is subducted under the crust of scientific knowledge. This 
fault line is the ways in which temporal experience-i.e., history, experi- 
ence, development, memory, evolution-is registered in, and expressed 
by, two formal classification systems-the ICD and the INV. The crack 
comes when the messy flow of bodily and natural experience must be 
ordered against a formal neat set of categories. We will trace this particu- 
lar faultline across the two classification schemes. It is the case that all 
complex classification schemes in fact have multiple sets of faults and frac- 
tures arising from similar tensions. On a meta level, the system of faults 
and tensions forms a kind of texture of any given organizational terrain; 
mapping this texture is a major research challenge for the field of social 
informatics. 
THEINTERNATIONAL OF DISEASESCLASSIFICATI N IS A 
PRAGMATICLASSIFICATION 
In order to communicate information in the aggregate, it must first 
be classified. At any time over the past 100years, one can find complaints 
about the Tower of Babel that afflicts the storage and communication of 
medical knowledge.’ David Rothwell (1985) notes that: 
More than two hundred statistical systems are being used by the 
United States government to monitor health, occupational and 
environmental conditions through the country. Despite the incred- 
ible amount of information accumulated, there is no method of co-
ordinating these data into a single coherent database, a national 
health information system. (p. 169) 
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Mark Musen (1992) complains: 
The medical-informatics community suffers from a failure to com- 
municate. The terms that WMR uses to describe patient findings 
generally are not recogni~ed by Medline. The manner in which Iliad 
stores descriptions of diseases is different from that of Dxplain. 
Therapy plans generated by ONCOCIN are meaningless to the HELP 
system. . . . Each time another developer describes yet another for- 
malism for encoding medical knowledge, the number of incompat- 
ibilities among these different systems increases exponentially. (p. 
435) 
Musen indicates that there is no clear relationship between “the Unified 
Medical Language System [UMLS] advanced by the National Library of 
Medicine and the Arden syntax proposed by the American Society for 
Testing and Materials as a standard for representing medical knowledge” 
(p. 436). The ICD, he points out, originated as a means for describing 
causes of death; a trace of its heritage is its continued difficulty with de- 
scribing chronic, as opposed to acute, forms of disease. This is one basis 
for the temporal faultlines that emerge in its usage. The UMLS origi- 
nated as a means of information retrieval (the MeSH scheme) and is not 
as sensitive to clinical conditions as it might be (p. 440). 
The two basic problems for any overarching classification scheme in a 
rapidly changing and complex field can be described as follows: first, any 
classificatory decision made now might, by its nature, block valuable fu- 
ture developments. Ifwe decide that all instances of Sudden Infant Death 
Syndrome are to be placed into a single box (IcD-l0,1992, vol. 1,R95, p. 
890), then we are not recording information that might be used by future 
researchers to distinguish possible multiple social or environmental causes 
of the syndrome. We are not making it impossible to carry out such stud- 
ies, but we are making it difficult to retrieve information. Second, in- 
versely, if every possible relevant piece of information was stored in the 
scheme it would be entirely unwieldy. 
The decision not to collect is the most difficult for any classification 
on these grounds, whether it be the acquisition department of a library, 
the curator of an art museum, or the collector of information for vital 
statistics. There are always practical budget and storage issues. These are 
balanced against two other factors: (1) the need for a well ordered and, in 
some sense, parsimonious repository that can be used, and (2) the side 
bets that are made about what material will be useful in the future. This 
latter is particularly difficult. 
Collectors and curators of all sorts must become future forecasters 
and decide the boundaries of what will be useful for the future. There is 
no perfect answer, only a set of practical tradeoffs. This is a problem that 
has plagued museums of natural history, for example. Fossils found in 
the nineteenth century might come along with general information about 
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the depth at which they were discovered and the surrounding geological 
features (though they often did not). Even if this information was in- 
cluded, it was never as precisely noted as would be useful for geologists 
and paleontologists today since there was just no conception at that stage 
of the kinds of dating techniques that are used today. The museum is 
then faced with the choice between recording as much as possible now 
(which is very expensive and possibly not useful anyway) and having the 
collection perhaps last longer into the future or recording a judicious 
amount now (which will keep the administrative costs down) and having 
the collection possibly be not so useful in the future. The latter has gen- 
erally been the de facto choice and is generally a reasonable one to have 
made since new criteria of relevance just cannot be predicted. 
Different designers of the classification system have different needs- 
and the shifting ecology of relationships between the disciplines using the 
classification will necessarily be reflected in the scheme itself. As with the 
insurance company example above, these relationships must be resolved 
in order to make a usable form, often obscuring power relationships in 
the process. As Goodwin (1996) notes: “A quite different kind of 
multivocality, one organized by the craft requirements of a work task rather 
than the genres of the literary academy, can be found in mundane bu- 
reaucratic forms” (p. 66). But one must dig to find the voices. The pro- 
cess of filling out the forms may further obscure them. For example, the 
designers of the ICD recommend that its classification scheme be inter- 
preted economically: 
The condition LO be used for single-condition morbidity analysis is 
the main condition treated or investigated during the relevant epi- 
sode of health care. The main condition is defined as the condition, 
diagnosed at the end of the episode of health care, primarily respon- 
sible for the patient’s need for treatment or investigation. If there is 
more than one such condition, the one held most responsible for 
the greatest use of resources should be selected. . . . ( Z C D - l O ,  1992, 
vol. 2 ,  p. 96) 
This reflects a constant condition of the use of the ICD; it has been rec- 
ommended throughout its history that priority should be given to coding 
diseases that represent a threat to public health. This goal is clearly a 
good one; equally clearly it can discriminate selectively against the report- 
ing of rare noncontagious conditions. 
Faced with these problems, the WHO has been consistently pragmatic 
in its aims and clear in its explanations of the ICD. From the time of the 
ninth revision on, it has been recognized explicitly that “the ICD alone 
could not cover all the information required and that only a ‘family’ of 
disease and health related classifications would meet the different require- 
ments in public health” (IDC-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 20). This “family” is pic- 
tured in ICD-10 (see Figure I ) .  
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Figure 1. Diagram of Family of Disease and Health Related Classifications (Source: 
IW-10, 1992, V O ~ .2, p. 4). 
The family itself is a diverse one: there are various standard modifica- 
tions of the ID. The most significant is the ICD-PCM (1996) where CM 
stands for “clinical modification.” This has a complex history, originating 
in the development of modifications of the IDfor use in hospital infor- 
mation systems. It is now the classification of record in a wide variety of 
medical settings and is used for billing, insurance, and administration as 
well as in-patient medical records. This institutional entrenchment has 
made it very difficult for ID-10  (1992) to be fully adopted in the United 
States with the clinical modification necessarily lagging behind the pro- 
duction of the classification itself. 
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When we observe the ways in which culture and practice interweave 
in the text of the ICD, we are not unmasking a false pretender to the 
crown of science. We are drawing attention to an explicit positive feature 
of ICD design: “The ICD has developed as a practical, rather than a purely 
theoretical classification. . . . There have . . .been adjustnients to meet the 
variety of statistical applications for which the ICD is designed, such as 
mortality, morbidity, social security and other types of health statistics and 
surveys” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 12). The preamble to the classification 
defines a classification of diseases as “a system of categories to which mor- 
bid entities are assigned according to established criteria” (ZCD-10, 1992, 
vol. 1,p. 1). A statistical classification, such as the ICD, “must encompass 
the entire range of morbid conditions within a manageable number of 
categories” (ICD-10,vol. 2, p. 1). It is not meant to be a net to capture all 
knowledge but a workable epidemiological tool. This practical goal does 
not make it less scientific, of course; all classification systems are devel- 
oped within a context of’organizational practice. The goal of the ICD’s 
designers is to create what Latour (1988) has called immutable mobiles- 
inscriptions that may travel unchanged and be combinable and compa- 
rable. Indeed, the term “immutable mobile” might almost have been in 
the designers’ minds when they wrote: 
The purpose of the ICll is to permit the systematic recording, analy- 
sis, interpretation, and comparison of mortality and morbidity data 
collected in different countries or areas and at different times. The 
ICD is w e d  to translate diagnoses of diseases and other health prob- 
lems from words into an alphanumeric code, which permits easy stor- 
age, retrieval, and analysis of the data. (ZCll-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 2) 
The ICD has become the international tool for “standard diagnostic classi- 
fication for all general epidemiological and many health management 
purposes” (p. 2 ) .  
The world has changed since the ICD was first introduced, and the 
classification scheme has evolved to try to encompass these changes. The 
ICD is thus both highly responsive and tightly constrained. A large-scale 
change in the way that people die (Israel, Rosenberg, & Curtin, 1986, p. 
161) has led to an alteration in one line in the internationally recom- 
mended Death Certificate. This is, of course, one of the main bureaucratic 
uses ofthe ICL)-i.e., the recording and compiling of causes of death from 
bureaus of vital statistics via coroners, hospitals, doctors, or priests: 
In considering the international form of medical certificate of cause 
of death, the Expert (hmmittee had recognized that the situation of 
an aging population with a greater proportion of deaths involving 
multiple disease processes, and the effects of associated therapeutic 
interventions, tended to increase the number of possible statements 
between the underlying cause and the direct cause of death: this 
meant that an increasing number of conditions were being entered 
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on death certificates in many countries. This led the committee to 
recommend the inclusion of an additional line (d) in Part 1 of the 
certificate. (ICD-10,1996,vol. 1,p. 18) 
Thus there is now one more blank line on the form to indicate multiple 
causation (see Figure 2). 
Cause of Death Approximate  
interval 
between o n s e t  
and death 
I 
Disease or condition directly (a).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
leading to death* 
due to (or as a consequence of') 
Anterpdent  causes  (b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Morbid conditions, if any, 
giving rise to the above cause, due to (or as a consequence of') 
stating the underlying 
condition last (c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

I1 
Other significant conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  

Contributing to the death, but  

not related to the disease or 

condition causing it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  

* This does not mean the mode ofdying-e.g., heart failure, respiratory failure. It 
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(otherwise there would have been too many cases). The National Tuber- 
culosis Association’s ( 1955) edition of Diagnostic Standards and Classijica- 
tion of Tuberculosis notes that new laboratory tests had made it more diffi- 
cult to decide whether a particular case of TB was active or inactive- 
activity could now be seen at sites previously considered inactive, and yet 
one would not necessarily want to call the “new” active sites cases of TB 
since they very well may not progress to the point of needing treatment. 
The committee cites the 1955 version of the book: 
The Committee, however, recognizes the fact that all classifications 
are ephemeral. They are useful only as long as they serve their pur- 
pose. The purpose of a clinical classification of tuberculosis is, how- 
ever, a most important one. On it depend such matters as legal re- 
quirements for isolation, medico-legal considerations with respect to 
compensation for disability, standards for the return of patients to 
work, and similar matters. (p. 6) 
For another example, the discovery of the lentiviruses led to the descrip- 
tion of a new set of disease entities-i.e., slow acting viruses from which 
one could suffer asymptomatically for extended periods. 
In the interests of creating a working infrastructure, Aristotelian prin- 
ciples are deliberately violated: 
C15 Malignant neoplasms of oesophagus 

Note: Two alternative subclasszfications are pven:  

.0 - .2 by anatomical description 

.3 - .5 by thirds 

This departure from the principle that categories should be mutual& exclusive is 
deliherale since both forms of terminology are in use, but the resulting anatomical 
divisions are not analogous (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 190). 
Where the state of the art is unclear, so is the scheme itself: 
Note: The terms used in categories C82-C85 for non-Hiodgkin’s lym- 
phomas are those of the Working Formulation, which attempted to 
find common ground among several major classification schemes. 
The terms used in these schemes are not given in the Tabular List 
but appear in the Alphabetical Index; exact equivalence with the 
terms appearing in the Tabular List is not always possible. 
Includes: morpholqgy codes M959M994 with behauiour code /3. 
Excludes: secondary and unspecified neoplasm of (ymph nodes (C77.4. 
(ICD-10, 1992, v01. 1, p. 215) 
There are several specialty-based adaptations of the ICD originating in 
different national or international bodies (dermatology, stemming from 
the British Association of Dermatologists, and, under development, 
rheumatology and orthopaedics from the International League against 
Rheumatism) (ICD-IU, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 5-6). 
The 1 0  is also directly responsive to changes in the world. Diseases 
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themselves die (smallpox), are superseded (Gay-Related Immune Disor- 
der becomes AIDS), are newly born (radiation sickness with the discovery 
of radium), or fall into disrepute (hysteria or neurasthenia). Since this is 
a statistical classification, a disease with no incidence is of no interest. 
Thus smallpox was still well defined within ZCD-PCM (1996): 
050 Small@ox 
Excludes: arthropod-borne viral diseuses (060.0-066.9) 
Boston exanthem (048) 
50.1 Variola major 
hemorrhagic (pustular) smallpox Malignant smallpox Purpura 
variolosa 
50.1 Alastrim 
Variola minor 
50.2 Modzfied smalkox 
Varioloid 
050.9 Small@ox, unspeczfied (ICD-9-CM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 11). 
By the time ZCD-10 was developed, this had collapsed into “ B 0 3  Small-
pox” with a footnote: “In 1980 the 33‘dworld Health Assembly declared 
that smallpox had been eradicated. The classification is maintained for 
surveillance purposes” (ICD-10,1992, vol. 1,p. 150). Or again, malnutri- 
tion is defined in relativistic fashion-as the population changes so does 
the definition: 
The degree of malnutrition is usually measured in terms of weight, 
expressed in standard deviations from the mean of the relevant ref- 
erence population. When one or more previous measurements are 
available, lack of weight gain in children, or evidence of weight loss 
in children or adults, is usually indicative of malnutrition. When 
only one measurement is available, the diagnosis is based on prob- 
abilities and is not definitive without other clinical or laboratory tests. 
In the exceptional circumstances that no  measurement of weight is 
available, reliance should be placed on clinical evidence. (ICD-10, 
1992,vol. 1, p. 290) 
In these cases, then, the fact that the world is changing is reflected di- 
rectly in the classification scheme. Another source for this recognition is 
of course the development of accident categories that also display in their 
explanations a historical cultural specificity. For example, this set of acci- 
dent categories describes a series of tumbles more common in the indus- 
trial world than for a nomadic tribe: 
E884 Other fall from one leuel to another 
E884.0 Fall from playground equipment 
Excludes: recreational machinery (E919.8) 
E884.1 Fall from cliff 
E884.2 Fall from chair 
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E884.3 Fall from wheelchazr 
E884.4 Fall from bpd 
E884.5 Fullfrom other furniturp 
E884.6 Fall from commode 
Toalet 
E884.9 OthPrfall from one leuel to another 
Fall from: Fall from: 
embankment stataonary uphacle 
haqstack tree (ICD-PCM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 289). 
There is a relatively impoverished vocabulary for talking about natu- 
ral accidents-the ICD is richest in its description of ways of dying in de- 
veloped countries at this moment in history. It is not that other accidents 
and diseases cannot be described, but these cannot be described as well. 
Differentiating insect and snake bites, for example, is very important for 
those living in the rural tropics. However, while arthropods, centipedes, 
and chiggers are singled out under “bites” in the ICD index, snakes are 
only divided into venomous and nonvenomous, as are spiders.’ Clearly 
this makes sense to some extent, given that this is a pragmatic classifica- 
tion. There is only a point in making fine distinctions between types of 
accident if those distinctions might make a difference in practice to some 
agency-medical or other. Simultaneously, those agencies have tradition- 
ally been more accountable to Western allopathic medicine and to the 
industrial world than to traditional systems. 
So the ICD bears traces of its history as a tool used by public health 
officials in developed countries. It also reflects changes in the world at 
large-either the eradication of diseases or culturally charged changing 
understandings of certain conditions. Further, it is very much an en- 
trenched scheme. There is a natural reluctance to make changes since 
each renders a previous set of statistics incomparable and hence less useful. 
The first and last entries in the ICD describe a sociotechnical trajec- 
tory. The first disease in the ICD over the years has been cholera, 
unsurprising since cholera was the issue that, in the 185Os, brought 
participants to the table in an attempt to deal with this international threat. 
As we noted in the introduction, this threat was exacerbated by the devel- 
opment of steamship technology, which allowed cholera sufferers to carry 
the disease further before dying. The last condition given in the book 
takes us to the other end of the sociotechnical arc-i.e., the creation of 
cyborgs. The last condition listed in the ICD is Z99, “Dependence on 
enabling machines and devices, not elsewhere classified,” with the very 
last entry, 299.9, being “Dependence on unspecified enabling machine 
and device” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 1175). By some standard, we all now 
qualify for the 299.9 condition. 
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The original sequence produced by William Farr (1885) is reproduced 
in the latest ICD: 
The ICD is a variable-axis classification. The structure has devel- 
oped out of that proposed by William Farr in the early days of inter-
national discussions on classification structures. His scheme was 
that, for practical epidemiological purposes, statistical data on dis- 
eases should be grouped in the following way: 
epidemic diseases 

constitutional or general diseases 

local diseases arranged by site 

developmental diseases 

injuries. (p. 232) 

This pattern can be identified in the chapters of I D 1 0  (1992). It has 
stood the test of time and, though in some ways arbitrary, is still regarded 
as a more useful structure for general epidemiological purposes than any 
of the alternatives tested (ICD-10,1992, vol. 1,p. 13). 
This classification scheme, then, makes no exaggerated claims to time- 
less truth. On the contrary, its designers have attempted to paint a fluid 
picture of the world of disease-one which is sensitive to changes in the 
world, to sociotechnical conditions, and to the work practices of statisti- 
cians. 
THEREARE MANYAIDSTO STORYTELLINGIN THE ICD 
The classification system that is the ICD does more than provide a 
series of boxes in which to place diseases; it also encapsulates a series of 
stories, which are the preferred narratives of the ICD's designers. Certain 
attributions of intentionality are easy to make, others are rather difficult. 
Some ways of life are clearly considered to be well led, others are called 
into question. Sometimes context is important, sometimes it can be ig- 
nored. Stories also come and go, narratives fade in importance (viz. the 
example of AIDS moving, in medical terms, from a specifically gay-linked 
disease to a more general one). If one should have doubts about how to 
encode a given story, one can turn to volume 2 (ICD-10, 1992) of the 
classification, which gives an extensive set of rules for the interpretation 
of causes of death. In this section, we will observe the various aids to 
storytelling to be found within the ICD. 
The Setting 
Frequently, when diseases were first named, they took on the name of 
their first scientific describer, of a famous victim, or of the place where 
they occur. Each of these kinds of naming strategy tells a simple story to 
accompany the classification. Throughout the history of classification sys- 
tems over the past 200 years, such specifications have progressively been 
winnowed away to make way for new kinds of context and new kinds of 
description now considered more interesting and relevant. 
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What is known by many sufferers as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 
(Lou Gehrig’s Disease) is coded by the ICD-I0 (1992) as G12.2: Motor 
Neuron disease (p. 398). (With the famous physicist Stephen Hawking 
now suffering from the disease, it may in future be more well known to 
the lay public as Hawking’s Disease, as baseball player Lou Gehrig brought 
it to public awareness the first time.) In the index to the ICD, the Parisian 
neurologist Charcot can lay claim to an arthropathy (tabetic) ,a cirrhosis, 
a disease (tabetic arthropathy), and a syndrome. In the body of the text, 
Charcot’s name tends to slip away-i.e., Charcot’s syndrome becomes “173.9 
Peripheral vascular disease, unspecified”; there is no mention of Charcot 
(p.504). The 173s (Other peripheral vascular diseases) are an interesting 
category. They show the various forms of modality (173.0 is still proudly 
“Raynaud’s syndrome,” 173.1 is “thromboangiitis obliterans [Buerger]” 
(p. 503), 173.8 is “Other specified peripheral vascular diseases” and in- 
cludes “Acroparaesthesia-i.e., simple (Schultze’s type) or vasomotor 
(Nothnagel’s type)” (p. 504). In general, as the modalities get deleted, 
the name of the person goes from being the name of the disease to a 
bracket after the name, to an entry in the index, until finally it slides 
gracefully out of the index onto the scrap heap of history. A similar pro- 
cess occurs with deletion of detail and the uncertainties of discovery in 
any scientific publication, as Latour and Woolgar (1979) noted in their 
classic Laboratory Lqe. 
Places follow a similar path to abstraction and formal representation. 
The ideal ICD disease is not tied to a particular spot. It is rather identified 
with a particular causal agent. However, up to and including ICD-9-CM 
(1996), leishmaniasis was a classification that told a travelers’ tale-i.e., 
not only do we know what you got sick of but where you got sick: 
085 Leishmaniasis 
085.0 Visceral [kalaazar] 

Dumdum fever Leishmaniasis: 

Infction by Leishmania: dermal, post-kala-azar 

donovani Mediterranean 

infantum visceral (Indian) 

085.1 Cutaneous, urban 

Aleppo boil Leishmaniasis, 

Baghdad boil cutaneous: 

Delhi boil dryform 

Infection by Leishmania late 

tropica (minor) recurrent
~ 
Ulcerating 
Oriental sore 
085.2 Cutaneous, Asian desert 

Infection by Leishmania tropica major 
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Leishmaniasis, cutaneous: 
Acute necrotizing 
Rural 
Wet form 
Zoonotic form 
085.3 Cutaneous, Ethiopian 

Infection by Leishmania ethiopica 

Leishmaniasis, cutaneous: 

Dffme 

Lepromatous 

085.4 Cutaneous, American 

Chiclero ulcer 

Infection by Leishmania mexicana 

Leishmaniasis tegumentaria dqfusa 

085.5 Mucocutaneous (American) 

Espundia 

Infection by Leishmania braziliensis 

Uta 

Leishmaniasis, unspecified (ICD-PCM, 1996, p. 16) 
Similarly, for ICD-10 (1992), we can still find Delhi boil in the index, 
but the main entry itself is a svelte: 
B55 Leishmaniasis 
B55.0 Visceral bishmaniasis 
Kula-azar 
Post-kalu-azar dermal leishmaniasis 
B55.1 Cutaneous leishmaniasis 
B55.2 Mucocutaneous leishmaniasis 
B55.9 Leishmaniasis, unspectjied (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 166) 
S o  we go from primacy being given to a place (Baghdad boil) to pri- 
macy being given to a kind of place (urban cutaneous) to primacy given 
to a universal agent. Gradually the narrative of travel inscribed in the 
patient's code, present earlier, is deleted. 
The loss of eponymy and place markers can, of course, be read as a 
story of the advance of science-the replacement of the local and specific 
with the general; the thing with the kind; the mutable immobile with the 
immutable mobile; and the concrete instance with the formal abstraction. 
However, another line of argument also deserves attention. As we have 
already seen, the ICD also reflects historical states of the world. The world 
has changed. With the huge increase in international travel over the past 
century and a half, it is more rare for a disease to be tied to a particular 
location-diseases themselves tend to spread to kinds of location. The 
malaria map of the world hanging on the wall at the WHO headquarters 
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in Geneva shows the expected tropical venues-and small red circles 
around major airports-as mosquitoes are transported from the tropics. 
We are, as a world, becoming more “abstract” in this way. 
Similarly, research now is not attributed to single great figures who 
can claim sole responsibility for a discovery. Medical work was always done 
in teams, but these have become larger, involving complex social and in- 
stitutional relationships of attribution as Gallo and Montaignier would be 
the first to remind us (in Grniek, 1990). A typical scientific article has so 
many authors that the death of the individual scientific author seems cer- 
tain. In general, the ICE1has gone from being the holder of a set of stories 
about places visited, heroic sufferers, and great doctors to holding an- 
other set of stories. 
The Context of Diseuse 
As people and places have moved out of eponymous and loconymous 
classification, they are replaced by a general set of categories-what we 
are calling the kindness of strangers. By this we mean that the classifica- 
tion system indicates a shift from our being individuals experiencing the 
world to our being kinds of people experiencing kinds of places. The 
constructions of social and natural science and of the legal world have 
nioved in. Broken legs and ski resort locations co-evolve as do cancer 
rates and toxic waste dumps. The classification system, as we shall see in 
this section, has become a site which holds these constructions together 
and, through excluding other kinds of story, makes them more real. With 
the ICD providing the main legitimate means for describing illness, the 
social, economic, and political stories woven into its fabric become, by 
extension, the main legitimate narrative threads for the science of medi- 
cine. 
Although particular places have moved out, two places have come to 
play a more significant role in the classification system-i.e., the labora- 
tory and the “sociological home.” The latter appears in the extra catego- 
ries developed for ICD-9 as supplemental codes, which in ICD-10 (1992) 
have become fully integrated-what we might call the context codes. Thus 
housing is one of the conditions that can be broken down and described 
as part of the classification. In ICD-PCM (1996) it is described as follows: 
V60 Housing, household and economic ciycumstances 
V60.0 Luck of housing 
Hobos Trunsients 
Social miffrants Vagabonds 
Tramps 
V60.1 Inadequate housing 
Lack of heating 
Restriction of space 
Technical defects in home preventing adequate care 
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V60.2 Inadequate material resources 
Economic problem Poverty NOS 

V60.3 Person living alone 

V60.6 Person lzving in residential institution 

Boarding school resident 
VGO.8 Other specified housing or economic circumstances 
V60.9 Unspecified housing or economic circumstances. (vol. 1,p. 267). 
The related code in ICD-10 (1992) is expanded to include discord with 
neighbors and lack of adequate food (vol. 1,p. 1152). In both, the name 
of the city gives way to the name of the social category and social condition. 
These context codes define what is considered to be medically rel- 
evant in one’s material surroundings. They make it easy to structure stud- 
ies in these terms (e.g., what effect does poor housing have on the inci- 
dence of tuberculosis). Simultaneously, they do make it much more diff- 
cult to deal with unrecognized contexts (what effect does conspicuous 
consumption have on cholesterol levels?). It is not impossible to do these 
latter studies, but the information is not “tohand” in the way that it is for 
medically sanctioned contexts. The reason for stressing this point is that 
it can be taken as a sign of the correctness of allopathic medicine that it 
has isolated the basic variables that must be taken into account in the 
development of public health policy or medical science. However, it is 
important to note that, although the ICDis a powerful tool, in this sense it 
also, as infrastructure, enforces a certain understanding of context, place, 
and time; it makes a certain set of discoveries (which validate its own frame- 
work) much more likely than an alternative set outside of the framework 
(since the economic cost of producing a study outside of the framework 
of normal data collection is necessarily much higher). 
This sort of convergence is an important feature of large-scale net- 
worked information systems. Star, Bowker, and Neumann (In press) de- 
fine convergence as: 
Convergence. . . is the double process by which information artifacts 
and social worlds are fitted to each other and come together. On the 
one hand, a given information artifact (a classification system, a da- 
tabase, an interface, and so forth) is partially constitutive of some 
social world. That is to say, the sharing of information resources and 
tools is a dimension of any coherent social world-be it the world of 
homeless people in Los Angeles sharing survival knowledge via street 
gossip, or the world of high-energy physicists sharing electronic pre- 
prints via the Los Alamos archive. On the other hand, any given 
social world itself generates many interlinked information artifacts. 
The social world creates through bricolage, a (loosely coupled but 
relatively coherent) set of information resources and tools. People 
without houses also log into the Internet, and physicists indulge in 
street gossip at conferences-as well as engage in a whole set of other 
information practices. Put briefly, information artifacts undergird 
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social worlds, and social worlds undergird these same information 
resources. We will use the concept of convergence to describe this 
process of mutual constitution. 
With these processes of convergence, the site of the medical work 
itself has gained in importance. The classification of tuberculosis, canoni- 
cally difficult to diagnose accurately (compare Latour, In press), retains 
the story of what has been done in the laboratory as well as what has OC-
curred in the body. 
A1 5 Respiratory tuberculosis, bacteriologically a n d  histologically 
confirmed 
A15.0 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed by sputum microscqby with or 
without culture 
Tuberculous: 
bronchiectasis 
fibrosis of lung I 
pneumonia } confirmed by sputum microscopy with or 
} without culture 
pneumothorax I 
A15.1 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed by culture only 
Conditions listed in A15.0, confirmed by culture only 
A15.2 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed histologically 
Conditions listed inA15.0, confirmed histolopally 
A15.3 Tuberculosis of lung, confirmed by unspeczfied means 
Conditions listed inA15.0, confirmed but unspecified whether bactm'olog2cally 
or histologically. ( Im-10,1992, vol. 1,p. 113) 
In this case, the disease itself is always classified in terms of the work 
that has been done in the medical laboratory. Again, as new technologies 
are invented, historical shifts occur, as with the relationship between epi- 
lepsy and the EEG machine as diagnostic many decades ago. 
The doctors themselves enter the story at the moment of classifica- 
tion, the patient rarely does. This comes out clearly if we compare mi- 
graine and epilepsy in ICD-PCM (1996). Epilepsy is a condition that is 
defined by the doctor in the context of laboratory and so is a real condi- 
tion: 
345 Epilepsy 
The following fifth-digzt subclassafication is for use with categories 3450,. 1.. 4- 
.9: 
0 without mention of intractable epilepsy 
1 with intractable epilepsy (ICD-PCM,1996, vol. 1,  p. 80) 
So here the question is whether or not the patient objectively has intrac- 
table epilepsy in the opinion of the doctor. The determination of 
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intractable migraine relies on the voice of the patient and so is marked as 
a suspicious designation: 
346 Migraine 
Thefollowing filth-digat subclassijkation isfor use with category 346: 
0 without mention of intractable migraine 
I with intractable migraine, so stated (ICD-PCM,vol. 1,p. 80) 
The laboratory context then is the “real” context of the disease; the classi- 
fication serves to reinforce the separation of the patient from ownership 
of their condition. We should note at this point that we are not arguing 
that this makes the ICD a tool for evil and oppression. On the contrary, 
what we are trying to do is work out what kind of a tool it is-i.e., what 
work it does and whose voice appears in the unfolding narrative. 
The legal context is often enfolded into the classification system. Thus 
the classification of blindness considers the American system of medical 
benefits: 
369 Blindness and low vision 
Note: visual impairment refers to a functional limitation of the eye (e.g., 
limited visual acuity or visualfield). It should be distinguished from visual 
disability, indicating a limitation of the abilities of the individual (e.g., lim- 
ited reading skills, vocational skills), and from visual handicap, indicating a 
limitation of personal and socioeconomic independence (e.g., limited ability, 
limited employment). 
The leuels of impairment defined in the table on page 92 are based on the 
recommendationsof the WHO Study Group on Prevention of Blindness (Geneua, 
November 6-1 0, 1972: WHO Technical Report Sm‘es 51S), and of the Interna- 
tional Council of Ophthalmology (1976). 
Note that definitions of blindness vary in different settings. 
For international reporting WHO defines blindness as profound impairment. 
This definition can be applied to blindness of one eye (369.1, 369.6) and to 
blindness of the individual (369.0). 
For determination of benefits in the USA, the definition of legal blindness as 
severe impairment is often used. This definition applies to blindness of the 
individual only. 
369.0 Profound impairment, both eyes 
369.00 Impairment level not further specijiied 
Blindness: 
NOS according to WHO definition 
both eyes 
369.3 Unqualqied visual loss, both eyes 
Excludes: blindness NOS: 

legal [USA definition] (369.4) 
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WHO definition (969.00) 
369.4 Legal blindness, as dt?fined in USA 
Blindness NOS according to USA definition 
Excludes legal blindness with specfication of impairment level 9369.01-369.08, 
369.11-369.14, 369.21-369.22). (ICL-PCM,1996, vol. 1,p. 91) 
Note in the above example that “blindness of the individual” might be 
psychogenic-i.e., due to brain damage or other organic cause outside 
the eye itself. The problem of localized versus “whole organism” condi- 
tions forms a serious source of coding problems. For example, depend- 
ing on one’s theory of cancer, it would be an immune disorder affecting 
the whole person or a localized phenomenon to be surgically removed 
with many gray areas in between for the different types of cancer. 
In the example above, the legal definition can take precedence over 
the cultural and social. Thus cannabis dependence has its own category, 
while the culturally profoundly different absinthe and glue addictions are 
combined: 
304.3 	 Cannabis depmdpnce 

Hashish Marihuana 

Hemp 

304.6 Other specvied drug dependence 
Absinthe addiction Glue sniffing 
Excludes: tobacco dependence (305.1)(ICD-PCM,1996,vol. 1,pp. 69-70) 
Few would argue that glue sniffing and absinthe addiction are similar 
phenomena. The Former leads to more serious physical conditions 
than “cannabis dependence” (a category many would challenge) and 
yet does not rate its own category. Absinthe addiction is, one suspects, 
a hangover from earlier days. Because the origins of the ICD were 
French and absinthe abuse an important problem in Paris in the nine- 
teenth century, it persists. These accidents of history, practice, and 
crime contain many clues to re-narrativizing the ICD. E970 to E979 in 
ICD-9-CM (1996) is an interesting set; it covers injuries caused by legal 
interventions: 
Legal Intervention: 
Includes: injuries inflicted by the police or other law-enforcing ugents, andud- 
ing military on duty, in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest 
lawbreakers, suppressing disturbance, maintain order and other legal action 
legal execution 
Excludes: injuries caused by civil insurrections (E990.0-E999)(ICD-PCM,vol. 
1, p. 304) 
This set includes state executions. Note that civil insurrections, where the 
definition of legal intervention is on the table, are classified together with 
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war. The definition of legal, of course, may be subject to its own retro- 
spective reconstruction, as in the case of Rodney King. 
Abortions, which may be to all intents and purposes the same medi- 
cally, are marked differently in the ICD according to their legality: 
635 Legally induced abortion 
Includes: abortion or termination of pregnancy: 
elective 
legal 
therapeutic 
Excludes: menstrual extraction or regulation (V25.3) 
636 Illegally induced abortion 
Includes: abortion: 
criminal 
illegal 
self-induced (ICD-g-CM, 1996, vol. 1,  p. 154) 
Each type of abortion (spontaneous or 634, legally induced, illegally in- 
duced, unspecified, failed attempted, or 638) has the same set of compli- 
cations attached-i.e., nine difficulties, each accorded a digit (one of the 
most closely coded category sets in the ICD). When the issue arises, then, 
the ICD privileges the voice of the doctor and the laboratory over the 
voice of the patient and legal discourse over cultural and social discourse. 
One can read another order of social history from the nature of the si- 
lences in the story as well. 
In general, the ZCD carries with it its own context. This is a common 
feature of classification systems. One way of reading these is that they 
provide a stabilizing force between the natural and the social worlds. They 
hold in place sets of arrangements that allow one to read the natural as 
stable and objective and the social as tightly linked to it. For the ICD, this 
means describing disease in a way that folds the socially and legally con- 
tingent into the classification system itself and so naturalizes it. Inversely, 
the disease entity out there in the world is brought into the laboratory 
where the social and organizational work of its stabilization can best be 
guaranteed. 
CUTTINGUPTHE WORLD 
In order to tell stories of the sort with which we are most familiar, one 
needs objects in the world that can be cut up spatially (compare Berg & 
Bowker, 1997) and temporally into recognizable units. Narrative struc- 
tures are typically formed with a moving timeline, protagonists, and a dra- 
matic structure unfolding over time. The ICD does in fact operate this 
kind of dissection, which we will discuss later. In the last section, we saw 
the constitution of a context within the ICD, in this section we will see the 
constitution of actants to populate that context and those stories. 
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Time Story 1: The Life Cycle 
Temporally, the classification system provides a picture of acute 
(temporally bound) episodes within an otherwise well-ordered life. It is 
notoriously bad for describing chronic diseases; the interest is on the epi- 
sode of treatment (Musen, 1992). Let us go through some temporal units 
presented by the ICD. Birth is extremely important and is very closely 
defined: 
Live birth is the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of 
a product of conception, irrespective of the duration of the preg- 
nancy, which, after such separation, breathes or shows any other evi- 
dence of life, such as heating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical 
cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the 
umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached; each prod- 
uct ofsuch a birth is considered livehorn. (Zrn-10, 1992,vol. 2 ,p. 129). 
Time flows very quickly for the newborn, and so temporal units vary ac- 
cordingly: The neonatal period commences at birth and ends 28 com-
pleted days after birth. Neonatal deaths (deaths among live births during 
the first 28 completed days of life) may be subdivided into early neonatal 
deaths, occurring during the first seven days of life, and late neonatal 
deaths, Occurring after the seventh day but before 28 completed days of life. 
Age at death during the first day of life (day zero) should be re-
corded in units of completed minutes or hours of life. For the sec- 
ond (day l ) ,third (day 2) and through 27 completed days of life, 
age at death should be recorded in days. (ZCD-10, 1992, vol. 2 ,  p. 
131) 
Given the bump in mortality that occurs around birth, this is notsurprising. 
When adult life begins, things start to slow down. Adults are defined 
in ZCD-9-CM (1996, p. xiii) as people between 15 and 124 years old. If you 
make it to 125,you are “hors de categorie.” 
In the middle period, adulthood, there are some indications of what 
constitutes a good life. It should be well-ordered and rhythmic. Things 
should happen at the right time. Thus sexual development has its own 
timing: 
259 Other Endocrine disorders 
259.0 Delay in sexual deuelopment and puberty, not elsewhere classified 
Delayrd puberty 
259.1 Precocious sexual deuelopment and puberty, not elsewhere classzfied PED 
Sexual precocity: 

NOS 

constitutional 

cryptogenic 

idiopathic (Z[D-PCM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 51) 

Similarly, problems with temporal regulation of menstruation are well- 
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defined-i.e., too early, too late, too frequent, not frequent enough. Natu- 
ral rhythms should not be upset. 
A relatively recent temporal problem addition here is jet lag: 
307.45 Phase-ship disruption of 24-hour sleep-wake cycle 

Irregular sleep-wake rhythm, nonorganic origin 

Jet lag syndrome 

Rapid time-zone change 

Shifting sleep-work schedule. (ICD-9-CM, 1996, vol. 1,p. 71) 

The reference to the “nonorganic origin” highlights that this is a situa- 
tion-bound condition: the context (iet travel or night shift work) is di- 
rectly folded into the disease. 
To an outside observer, there is remarkably little reference to the 
process of aging. An adult is a timeless being who should be healthy; 
disease is not, in general, indexed by age. Further, the body is not present 
as something that gets used up and worn out; such stories have to be 
superadded (indeed the category of being “worn out” was in earlier addi- 
tions of the ICD but has since been removed). 
Ifyou rent a house, your agreement with the landlord includes a “fair 
use” or “normal wear and tear” category; it is expected that the house 
depreciates over time and this is written into the legal code. There are 
only two references to normal wear and tear in the whole ICD. First, one 
can, as an adult, step out of the well-ordered life and suffer from prema- 
ture or delayed senility, puberty, birth, and aging. Among the conditions 
under “delay” are delayed birth, development (including intellectual, learn- 
ing, reading, sexual, speech, and spelling), menstruation, and puberty. 
In this case, the cycle structure is the same, but the patient is taking the 
steps too early or too late. Second-and there is only one example of 
this-you could use your body badly. The only specific instance of this, 
however, is that you can grind or otherwise mismanage your teeth: 
521 Diseases of hard tissues of teeth 
... 
521.1 	Excessive attrition 

Approximal wear: Occlusal wear (ICD-9, vol. 1,p. 125) 

In ICB-10, abrasion of teeth carries with it an illuminating set of con- 
texts: dentifrice, habitual, occupational, ritual, and traditional. Occupa- 
tional abrasion in earlier times included the hazard “tailor’s tooth,” for 
example, where the teeth were abraded due to biting off the thread for 
hand sewing. In principle, the timeless adult could do many things exces- 
sively. There are categories for excessive thirst, secretion, salivation, sex 
drive, sweating, and binocular convergence among others. However, that 
superfluity is, only in this one case, indexed against an aging body. Note 
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that there are, of course, diseases associated more broadly and often im- 
plicitly with excessive wear and tear-e.g., cirrhosis of the liver associated 
with alcoholic excess. But here we are concerned directly with the repre- 
sentation in the classification system. 
This curious invisibility of aging as wear and tear is one way in which 
the ICD stabilizes context and disease entity-the human body as the sub- 
strate of both is outside the flow of time. The hunian adult body becomes 
the unmarked category-i.e., the cipher against which laboratory, social, 
and natural time can be coordinated. Indeed we could go one step fur- 
ther and see the adult male body as the unmarked category-since there 
are many more diseases restricted to women than restricted to men; there 
are sixteen categories or clusters of categories that apply only to males 
and forty-two that apply only to females (ICB-10,1992,vol. 2, p. 26). Femi- 
nist critics of medicine have long remarked on the relative pathologizing 
of the female body (Ehrenreich & English, 1973). 
Nobody Dies of Old Ape.‘ To finish with the life cycle before moving on to 
other temporal features, we should note that death itself is remarkably 
poorly defined in comparison to life. One can scarcely die of old age 
(Fagot-Ldrgeault, 1989). The closest that one may get comes under a 
banner disclaimer: 
ILL-DEFINEDAND U V K N O W  CAUSE OFMORBIDITYAND MOR7ALITY 
(797- 7 99) 
797 Senilily without mention of psychosis 
Old age 
Senile: 
Senescence debility 
Senile asthenia exhaustion 
Excludes: senile psychoses (290.0-290.9)(ICD-9, 1996, vol. 1,p. 215) 
The ICDs life cycle for humans, then, is as follows: a spurt of intense activ- 
ity at birth; timeless adulthood, when one is afflicted with a range of woes 
that carry their own temporalities (more on this anon); and an inglorious 
ill-defined end. The effect of this is, paradoxically, to make the individual 
an undefined tabula rasa onto which various diseases are inscribed. From 
this blank sheet, one can read various stories (with the aid of the ICD), 
restoring first context and then interpretation (which we shall deal with 
in the next section). 
Time Story 2: The Virus 
Diseases themselves change over time. HIV, for example, mutates 
rapidly in the individual so that no two people suffer from the “same” 
disease nor may the disease be the same even within a person. This ex- 
treme variability of the object world is a problem for any classification 
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system. The case of virus classification illuminates many features of cat- 
egorizing difficulties and the strategies used to control them. We look 
here at some of the work of the International Committee on Taxonomy of 
Viruses (ICTV) (Murphy et al., 1995) so as to see how diseases that are 
present differently in every individual, and often vertiginously mutate, 
can be usefully classified. 
Throughout the history of virology, there have been acerbic debates 
over just what are viruses. The great virologist Lwoff, echoing Gertrude 
Stein no doubt, declaimed in 1953that “viruses should be considered as 
viruses because viruses are viruses” (Matthews, 1983,p. 7). Viruses them- 
selves have moved from scientific category to scientific category. In the 
early twentieth century, the central definition of a virus was entirely nega- 
tive. As Waterson and Wilkinson note, a virus was any disease organism 
which could be filtered through one of the “filter candles” developed for 
the purpose. This was a useful definition in that it excluded all other 
known disease agents; however, it did not guarantee the homogeneity of 
the category itself as Andrewes noted in 1930 when describing animal 
viruses: 
judgment must be suspended . . . in the case of the invisible viruses 
or so-called “filter-passing” organisms. Here our ignorance is almost 
complete; they are possibly a heterogeneous group but in the case of 
creatures which we cannot see and whose very existence is, in many 
cases, a matter of inference only, it is idle to talk of classification in 
the usual sense. (Matthews, 1983, p. 4) 
So there was no one definition, or rather, the ultimate encompassing re- 
sidual category. Here be dragons. 
Equally, there was no one discipline studying the matter of virus clas- 
sification. There was no study of virology per se until the 1980s. There 
was an apmom assumption, entrenched in disciplinary specialties, that ani- 
mal and plant viruses were not the same. This was disproved in the 1940s 
when it was shown that some plant viruses could also affect insects 
(Matthews, 1983, p. 7). Groups that were not used to working together 
were forced to cooperate, and they did not necessarily like it. As with the 
numerous and passionate battles between cladistics and numerical tax- 
onomy in biology (Duncan & Stuessy, 1984),there was a series of strong 
virological arguments that have left their traces in the literature. The 
arguments can be read in two ways. They are simultaneously about a 
struggle for professional authority on the part of the various disciplines 
involved and an attempt to find a single language with which to talk about 
the complex temporal and spatial properties of viruses. 
The role of the classification systems in knitting together (or not) the 
specialties is clear in all accounts of virus taxonomy. Matthews (1983) 
notes, “in the period 1966 to 1970 there was considerable controversy 
regarding some of the rules, which developed into a serious rift between 
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most of the plant virologists, and some animal virologists” (p. 13). He 
comments on Fenner’s presidency of the ICTV in the period 1970-1976: 
In retrospect perhaps the major contribution made by Fenner dur- 
ing his Presidency was to keep the plant virologists working within 
the ICTV organization. This really meant stopping the insistence of 
Lwoff‘s supporters 011a hierarchical classification and Latinized bi- 
nomials, and also, as noted earlier, deleting the rule regarding new 
sigla. In addition, Fenner exerted pressure to ensure that following 
two vertebrate virologists, a plant virologist should be the next Presi- 
dent of the  ICTV (p. 20) 
Murphy et al. (1995) note that even today: “Virus taxonomy is a polarizing 
subject when it comes up in hallway conversations.” They go on to praise 
the ICTV for its work of 
true international consensus building, and true pragmatism-and it 
has been successful. The work of the Committee has been published 
in a series of reports, the Reports ofthe International Committee on Tax-
onomy of Viruses, The Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses. These 
Reports have become part of the history and infrastructure of mod-
ern virolog. (p. v) 
We see then that the development of the classification system is an occa- 
sion for the construction of the community for which that system will act 
as information infrastructure. The system is built as a political compro- 
mise between specialties. The kinds of truth and the kinds of stories that 
it can contain by their nature recognize this. As Murphy et al. (1995) 
state, the resulting classification system is in some sense arbitrary: 
Today, there is a sense that a significant fraction of all existing viruses 
of humans, domestic animals and economically important plants have 
already been isolated and entered into the taxonomic system. . . . 
[The] present universal system of virus taxonomy is useful and us- 
able. It is set arbitrarily at hierarchical levels of order, family, sub- 
family, genus, and species. Lower hierarchical levels, such as subspe- 
cies, strain, variant, etc., are established by international specialty 
groups and by culture collections. (Murphy et al., 1995,p. 2) 
The apposition of specialty groups (professionalization work) and culture 
collections (naturalization work) is unsurprising; Murphy et al. (1995) 
offer it in a different form later in the same work: “Unambiguous virus 
identification is a major virtue of the universal system of taxonomy. . . and 
of particular value when the editor of a journal requires precise naming 
of viruses cited in a publication” (p. 7). 
Thus a first temporality associated with viruses is that the field itself 
has formed and changed rapidly, much like the organisms that it studies. 
This is an unsurprising echo, as the fact that the viruses transgress spatial 
boundaries and mutate enormously rapidly has contributed to the change. 
So what is the problem with correlating virus time with laboratory 
time? The overwhelming difficulty has been that it is extremely difficult 
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for viruses to produce the kind of “genetic classification” whose genealogy 
Patrick Tort (1989) has so brilliantly traced across the social and natural 
sciences of the nineteenth century. A genetic classification is one that 
classifies things according to their origins-rocks might be metamorphic 
or sedimentary; languages might be Indo-European or Nilotic. Viruses 
have multiple possible origins-i.e., they look and feel the same since 
they pass the filter test and make you sick, but they got that way along 
multiple paths. This is an old problem in medical philosophy and diagno- 
sis-a cure does not necessarily reflect a cause, and there may be many 
paths to a single symptom. 
Ward (1993) gives four theories for viral origins. First, it is possible 
that some viruses “evolved from autonomous, self-replicating host cell mol- 
ecules such as plasmids or transposons, by acquiring appropriate genes 
that code for packaging proteins” (p. 433). In this picture, they are simple 
chemical combinations that have acquired the replication habit of their 
material substrate. Second, “some viruses arose by degeneration from 
primitive cells in a manner similar to that proposed for the evolution of 
cellular organelles such as mitochondria and chloroplasts from bacteria” 
(p. 434). Here they are complex organisms that devolved. Third, “some 
RNA viruses are descendants of prebiotic RNA polymers” (p. 433). Ac-
cording to this theory, viruses might have co-evolved with life itself. Fi-
nally, there is the possibility that “some viruses evolved from viroids or 
virusoids, although it is equally possible that these small RNA, rather than 
being progenitors of viruses, are recent degenerative products of the more 
complex self-replicating systems” (p. 434). Where you do not have a 
single origin story, you cannot have a single biological classification sys-
tem. Viruses have been classed into families and then into increasingly 
controversial supervenient categories (only one “order”-the 
Mononegavirales-has been approved to date by the ICTV) . The super- 
venient categories frequently have the inconvenience of separating viruses 
that had been considered grouped together. With the lack of a single 
origin, the central class of virus “species” has been defined: “A virus spe- 
cies is a polythetic class of viruses constituting a replicating lineage and 
occupying a particular ecological niche” (Van Regenmortel, 1990,p. 49). 
A “polythetic” class is a class that is defined by the congruence of 
multiple characteristics no one of which is essential. The attribution of 
occupation of a particular niche is essential for dealing with obligate para- 
sites. This relatively loose definition opens up  a space for the 
professionalization work that needs to be done in conjunction with the 
alignment of competing temporalities (of the virus and of the laboratory). 
There has, in recent years, developed a line of argument that with ge- 
nome sequencing it will be possible to produce a coherent history of vi- 
ruses that will make the species concept more historically accurate. This 
reflects a wider trend across many social and natural sciences to recover 
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the origin-in geology, the tide has turned against uniformitarianism 
(Allegre, 1992); in philosophy, Foucault’s archeology has grown up in 
opposition to the postmodern denial of origins. However, even toddy a 
strictly genetic classification of viruses is possibly leading to category death: 
if mammalian viruses are descended from mammals, snake viruses 
from snakes, and honeybee viruses from honeybees, the group “vi- 
rus” would cease to have any formal classificatory validity. It could 
be retained as a nonclassificatory group, analogous to the group of 
“animals with wings,” but if it is not a monophyletic group, there is 
no doubt how cladism would deal with it; it presents no philosophi- 
cal difficulty: thc taxonomic category “virus” should be exploded. 
(Ridley, 1986,p. 51) 
The demotion to a nonclassificatory group would again have profcssional 
consequences. 
We see with the history of virus classification, then, that there has been 
a deliberate effort to create something that looks and feels like other bio- 
logical classifications, even though the virus itself transgresses basic catego- 
ries (it jumps across hosts of different kinds, steals from its host, mutates 
rapidly, and so forth). This has been somewhat of a deliberate political 
decision on the part of the international virus community: you need such 
classification systems in order to write scientific papers, provide keywords 
for indexing and abstracting, and compare results. Even in this most phe- 
nomenologitally difficult of cases, the world must still be dissected into rec- 
ognizable temporal and spatial units-partly because that is the way the world 
is and partly because that is the only way that science as we know it can work. 
STORIESOF CARVINGUP THE BODY: 
THEVERMILIONBORDEROF THE LIP 
In Regzonc of the Mznd, Leigh Star (1989) examined the ways in which 
researchers, seeking to localize cerebral functions, cut up the brain into 
meaningful units. The process is a messy one since brains themselves 
come in many shapes and sizes. During thc early days of research, a dia- 
gram of a “typical” monkey brain, with minutely locdlited and labeled 
regions, is transposed onto a representation of a human brain in an at- 
tempt to produce a standardized diagram. Human brains are of d much 
different size than monkey brains. Nevertheless, the need for standard- 
ized representations was so urgent that the physiologists overlooked this 
source of uncertainty, among others (Star, 1985). A similar problem oc- 
curs with the dissecting of bodies for medical purposes. Stefan Hirschauer 
(1991) has noted this for the practice of the surgeon’s trade; Berg and 
Bowker (1997) have discussed the same phenomenon with respect to the 
development of medical records. 
The ICD bears traces of this sort of uncertainty, most notably at limi- 
nal sites (those with borders that are unclear or are used in several different 
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categories), and with respect to roving categories like neoplasms (the can- 
cer may overlap the ICD categories). We can use the vermilion border of 
the lip, also known as the “lipstick area,” as a tracer for this. An early 
appearance in ICD-9-CM is as follows: 
4. Malignant neoplasms overlapping site boundaries 
Categories 140-195 are for  the classz@ation ofprimary malignant neopla.rms 
according to their point of origzn. A malignant neoplasm that ouerlaps two 
or more subcategories within a three-digit rubric and whose point of origzn 
cannot be determined should be classified to the subcategory .8 “Other” For 
example, “carcinoma involving tip and ventral surface of tongue” should be 
assz<ped to 141.8. O n  the other hand, “carcinoma of tip of tongme, extend- 
ing to involve the ventral surface” should be coded to 141.2, as the point of 
origin, the tip, is known. Three subcategories (149.8, 159.8, 165.8) have 
been provided for  malignant neoplasms that overlap the boundaries of three- 
digit rubrics within certain systems. Overlapping malignant neoplasms that 
cannot be classvied as indicated above should be assigned to the appropriate 
subdivision of category 195 (Malignant neoplasm of other and ill-defined 
sites), 
140.0 Upper lip, vermilion border 
upper lip: 
NOS 
external 
lipstick area. (ID-9-CM, 1996,vol. 1, p. 26) 
The “NOS” in this classification stands for “not otherwise specified”-a 
protean modifier throughout the classification. 
If we consider ICD as a prototype classification system, we can see the 
way of treating the vermilion border as part of a general strategy of distin- 
guishing central members of certain categories from outliers. The vermil- 
ion border is strictu sensu part of the skin of the lip, but it is not a good 
member of that category: 
173.0 Skin of lip 

Excludes: vermilion border of lip (140.0-140.1, 140.9) (ICD-PCM, 1996, 

vol. I ,  p. 32) 

Equally, it is definitely skin but is a special subcategory: 
238.2 Skin 
Excludes: anus NOS (235.5) 
skin of genital organs (236.3, 236.6) 
vermilion border of lip (235.1) (ICD-9-CM, 1996, vol. 1, p. 45) 
Or again, it is definitely soft tissue but is an outlier: 
239.2 Bone, soft tissue, and skin 
Excludes: 	 . . . 

. . .  

vermilionborderof lip (239.0). (ICD-PCM,1996,vol. 1, pp. 45-46) 
286 LIBRARY TRENDS/FALL 1998 
In ICO-10,its marginality is explicit: 
DOO.0 Lip, oral cavity and  pharynx 
Aryepiglottic fold: 
NOS 
hypopharyngeal aspect 
Marginal zone 
Vermilion border of lip. (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 1,p. 222) 
This multiple reference to the vermilion border ofthe lip is a typical ICD 
naming strategy. If a region of the body might fall under several catego- 
ries, its membership in a special category is explicitly marked. 
In principle at least, the world itself-that messy, sprawling, 
sociotechnical system-should be divided into regions of relevant causal 
occurrence. The ICDs work here is necessarily far from complete. Here, 
however, is one typically precise definition of a liminal zone in the outside 
world: 
A public highway (trafway) or street is thr entire zuidth between property 
line,$(or other boundary lines) of ermy way orplace, of which any part is open 
lo thr use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic as a matter of right or 
custom. A roadiuay is that part of the public highway drsigned, improved, and 
ordinarily usrd, for vehicular travel. (ICD-9,1996,vol. 1, p. 274) 
The ICD records accident statistics, including the place or mode. Such 
precision is needed for the compilation of, for example, effective safety 
statistics. This drive for precision is in principle unending-how much of 
the social and natural worlds would have to be described within the ICD in 
order to produce an exhaustive system? 
The point here is not that these are bad definitions of lipstick areas 
and streets. It is that they are ineluctably arbitrary ways of cutting up the 
world. The goal with a classification system is to produce homogeneous 
causal regions. Homogeneous causal regions are zones without effective 
subdivision. For the vermilion border, there is no real distinction between 
upper and lower; for streets, there is no real distinction between tarred 
and gravel. There is no possiblity, in principal, that this can be other than 
a bootstrapping operation. All research work that explores medical cau- 
sality has the ZCD or a similar system as its base referent and so necessarily 
assumes the ICDs set of homogeneous regions in order to design its tests, 
experiments, or projects. It is analytically always possible to act otherwise 
and carve the world up differently into other kinds of causal regions. Latour 
(1987) reminds us of this in Science in Action. He posits the thought ex- 
periment: How would someone challenge the basic premises of quantum 
mechanics? No one would deny that it is possible that these premises are 
wrong nor that an experiment might be designed to prove this. However, 
the economic and administrative cost of doing so would be huge. Who 
would fund the proposal? Who would referee the papers? How, in short, 
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would the inertia of the networks involved be overcome? In the same way, 
it is always possible (and somewhat more common than in the quantum 
mechanics case) to challenge basic ICD categories. However, it is in prac- 
tice much easier to hypostatize and duplicate them for local usage. 
Exceptions occur when particular categories are linked with social move- 
ments and social problems; an outstanding example of this occurred with 
the de-medicalization of homosexuality in the DSM-3after challenges from 
the gay community (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). 
We have seen in this section that medical classifications split up the 
world into useful categories. They do not describe the world as it is in any 
simple sense. They necessarily model it. This modeling within classifica- 
tion systems of all sorts is where the real work gets done in terms of the 
enfolding of social, political, and organizational agendas into the scien- 
tific work of describing nature-in this case, in the form of disease entities. 
INTERPRETATION INTO THE ICDIS ALSO ENFOLDED 
We saw in the last section how the ICD divides the world into standard 
Aristotelian units of time and place and, in doing so, how it produces 
favored readings of the body and of the world at large. The WHO goes 
one step further. It not only provides, through the ICD, a set of possible 
stories, it also provides, bundled up in the classification system, explicit 
rules for the interpretation of those stories. 
In order to follow this through, we need to look at the form of the 
standard international death certificate (see Figure 2 above). Ann Fagot- 
Largeault (1989) has done a wonderful philosophical analysis of this docu- 
ment; our own description will not attempt to be as complete. It is the 
death certificate that constitutes the archetypical use of the ICD-indeed, 
until ICD-5, the classification only covered causes of mortality and did not 
seek to represent morbidity. The death certificate itself has as a major 
heading, “Cause of Death.” It is split into sections, “Cause of Death,” 
“Approximate interval between onset and death,” and other contributing 
factors or significant conditions. 
It is a difficult task to summarize a complex series of conditions to a 
single cause of death, and the work of interpretation begins on the form 
itself. A single cause is favored for very practical reasons. In the first 
place, it is hard enough to compile statistics at all, and the task could get 
overwhelming if multiple causes were allowed. Further, a single cause of 
death provides the lowest common denominator over multiple collection 
systems-from medical examiners in a large hospital to medical parapro- 
fessionals in the underdeveloped rural areas. Finally, as the ICD’s devel-
opers point out, the goal of the classification system is not to describe 
complex phenomenologies but to prevent death: 
From the standpoint of prevention of death, it is necessary to break 
the chain of events or to effect a cure at some point. The mosteffective 
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public health objective is to prevent the precipitating cause from o p  
crating. For the purpose, the underlying cause has been defined as 
“(a) the disease or injury which initiated the train of morbid events 
leading directly to death, or (b) the circumstances of the accident or 
violence which produced the fatal injury.’’ (ICB-10,1992, vol. 2, p. 31) 
This statement revealingly indicates a recognition by the system’s devel- 
opers that reality is indeed more complex than their registration system 
can describe. All the analytic points made to date in this discussion can 
be read into this one statement: the ICD is a pragmatic classification (“the 
most effective public health objective” [p. 31]), and it divides the world 
spatially and temporally into causal zones that underwrite preferred sto- 
ries (“itis necessary to break the chain of event .at some point” [p.311). 
The cause of death as given on the death certificate by the attending 
physician is frequently not, as Fagot-Largeault (1989) points out, the cause 
of death that is entered into the statistical record. The classifications en- 
tered on the certificate are themselves systematically re-coded so as to 
constrain the kinds of story that the statistics tell. 
One standard algorithm is that precision always beats no precision 
(this is an echo ofJohn King’s [personal communication] wonderful ob-
servation about technical arguments in the policy domain: “[N]umbers 
beat no numbers every time”). On a deeper epistemological level, the s u h  
stitution of precision for validity is often a needed expedient in getting 
work done (Star, 1989; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). It may also become a kind 
of gatckeeping tool in theoretically defining a ground of knowledge. It 
functions as follows in the ICD 
Where the selected cause describes a condition in general terms and 
a term that provides more precise information about the site or na- 
ture of this condition is reported on the certificate, prefer the more 
informative term. This rule will often apply when the general term 
becomes an adjectiv?, qualifying thr more precise term. 
“Example 57: I (a) Meningitis 
Tuberculosis 
Code to tuberculous meningitis (A17.0). The conditions are stated 
in the correct causal relationship.” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 48) 
This is doubtless a very reasonable rule. However, it is significant that it 
sets in motion a process that begins placing mediating layers between what 
the doctor says and what gets reported. 
In general, these mediating layers refashion the story that the act of 
classification permits. The records clerk is given the license to change the 
doctor’s classification in such a way that i t  will reflect the best current 
medical theories: 
Rule?. If the condition selected by the General Principle3 or by Rule 
1 or Rule 2 is obviously a direct consequcrice of another reported 
condition, whether in Part I or Part IT, select this primary condition. 
( I D - l o ,1992, vol. 2, p. 34) 
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Thus, for example, 
[w]here the selected cause is a trivial condition unlikely to cause 
death and a more serious condition is reported, reselect the under- 
lying cause as if the trivial condition had not been reported. If the 
death was the result of an adverse reaction to treatment of the trivial 
condition, select the adverse reaction. (KB-20,1992,vol. 2, p. 45) 
Derrida (1980) reminds us that it is through what is excluded as trivial 
that we can frequently understand systems of thought by pointing directly 
at what is important. Similarly, this opening of the door to an undeter- 
mined attribution of triviality is one significant moment, hidden in the third 
volume of a massive classification system, where the work of reifying cur- 
rent categories is done. Only certain causal chains will be permitted at the 
moment of classification. This in turn naturally impacts the interpretation 
at the other end of “raw data” in the form of epidemiological statistics: 
The expression “highly improbable” has been used since the Sixth 
Revision of the ICD to indicate an unacceptable causal relationship. 
As a guide to the acceptability of sequences in the application of the 
General Principle and the selection rule?, the following relationships 
should be regarded as “highly improbable.” (ICD-10,1992,vol. 2, p. 67) 
After this passage, there follows a series of unacceptable chains. For ex- 
ample, a malignant neoplasm cannot be reported as “due to” any other 
disease than HIV; haemophilia cannot be “due to” anything, and no acci- 
dent can be reported as due to any other cause-except epilepsy (ICD-10, 
1992, vol. 2, p. 68). 
An acceptable string of classifications in a death certificate is one which 
fits into an internally consistent chain that reflects current medical knowl- 
edge. In the process of arriving at such a chain, all qualifiers should be 
removed: “Qualifying expressions indicating some doubt as to the accu- 
racy of the diagnosis, such as ‘apparently,’ ‘presumably,’ ‘possibly,’ etc., 
should be ignored, since entries without such qualification differ only in 
the degree of certainty of the diagnosis” (ICD-10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 88). 
In the process of achieving this certainty, multiple causality often has 
to be arbitrarily collapsed into unicausality-here by a principle of first 
come first served: 
If several conditions that cannot be coded together are recorded as 
the “main condition,” and other details on the record point to one 
of them as the “main condition” for which the patient received care, 
select that condition. Otherwise select the condition first mentioned. 
(ICD-20, 1992,V O ~ .2, p. 106) 
Any working classification system will have such standard rules attached. 
Such rules are theoretically interesting for several reasons. First, the ICD 
developers have explicitly recognized that it is not enough to control the 
classification (the name of the disease). They also have to attempt to 
exercise control over the language game in which the classification is 
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inserted-this indeed is the purpose of the rules contained in volume 2. 
This attention to both the base level and its meta-level is a bureaucratic 
necessity that simultaneously conjures the wild world of the patient’s body 
into the ordered world of medical knowledge. Second, the rules them- 
selves serve to systematically reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, even where 
these are integral to the attendant physician’s depiction of the situation 
of the patient. Those who see the patients are aware of this uncertainty; 
those who apply the rules also know of it; those who read the final statis- 
tics are shielded from it. The patients live it. Finally, there is of course a 
potential infinite regress in the control of, first, the name of the disease, 
then on rules for using these names and so forth. The final level at which 
regress occurs is in the presentation of results. The WHO recognizes 
that, when dealing with small populations, you can get wild fluctuations of 
information on mortality or morbidity from year to year. In order to achieve 
stability and certainty at this level, one needs to sacrifice precision: to go 
up to broader ICD rubrics, aggregate data over a longer period, use the 
broadest of the recommended age groupings and aggregate areas (ICB-
10, 1992, vol. 2, p. 137).’ The regress itself to ever higher levels of control 
marks the fact that the world is always slightly out of reach-it cannot be 
contained in the classification system, or the system plus set of rules, or 
the system plus set of rules for interpretation plus set of rules for change, 
or the system plus set of rules for interpretation plus set of rules for change 
plus set of rules for presentation. 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of this discussion, we looked at two basic kinds of classifi- 
cation system-i.e., Aristotelian and prototype. We have seen in the course 
of our analysis that medical classification systems are “naturally” proto- 
typical and that they nevertheless have to appear Aristotelian in order to 
bear the bureaucratic burden that is put on them. This burden is to act as 
a gateway between the world of the laboratory and the hospital (with 
precisely defined closed environments) and the workaday world. As we 
consider the stories embedded in the system, from the point of view of 
work and practice, we understand that both the “intuitive” and the “tech- 
nical” are always present in systems such as the ZCB. 
The way in which this gateway function is provided is twofold. First, 
the Aristotelian classification embeds within itself a set of implicit narra- 
tives that align the artificial categories of the ICI) with the real world. 
Second, the rules for interpretation and presentation sit on top of the ICD 
and nudge its categories along prepared legitimate pathways. This com- 
bination of embedded and supervenient narrative provides the “give” 
through which the prototypical classification can be made to look and 
feel Aristotelian. 
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Increasingly, we will see work classifications and formal library classi- 
fications merging in the digital library of the future-the UMLS, which 
includes both the ICD and classifications of nursing work, among others, 
is a good example. In this discussion, the argument has been made that, 
as this happens, we need to pay due attention to the political and ethical 
undergirding of classification systems before they become so deeply 
inscribed in our information infrastructure that they are lost to sight (while 
their consequences propagate). 
NOTES’ One finds similar complaints today about the World Wide Web to the point where a 
special electronic journal has been founded: Journal of Internet Cataloging: The Interna- 
tional Quartmly of Di,ptal Organization, Classification, and Access. Retrieved September 25, 
1998 from the World Wide Web: htrp://jic.libraries.psu.edu/. See also Marcia Bates’s 
(In press) excellent article on incomparability between Web search engines. 
Ironically, the slogan, “nobody dies of old age” was an anti-ageist aphorism first popular 
in the 1980s and used by groups such as the Grey Panthers. It was meant to imply that 
the social invisibility of old people led to them being medically invisible or overlooked 
as well. It is an interesting example of the inversion of the prototypical and Aristotelian 
aspects of death. ’ The general Principle is: “when more than one condition is entered on the certificate, 
the condition entered alone on the lowest used line of Part I should be selected only if 
it could have given rise to all the conditions entered above it.” (p. 34)
‘	Recommended age groupings and rrgional groupings are: 
<1, 1-4, 5 year groups from 5-84, 85+ 
<1, 1-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75+ 
< I ,  1-14, 15-44, 45-64, 65+ (128) 
“Classification by area should, as appropriate, be in accordance with: 
each major civil division; 
each town or conurbation of 1,000,000 population and over, otherwise the largest town 
with a population of at least 100,000; 

a national aggregate of urban areas of 100,000 population and over; 

a national aggregate of urban areas of less than 100,000 popu1ation;a national aggregate 

of rural areas.” (p. 128) 
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The Dynamics of Classification Systems as Boundary 
Objects for Cooperation in the Electronic Library 
HANNE AND ELINK.JACOBALBRECHTSEN 
ABSTRACT 
THENOTION OF THE CLASSIFICATION SCHEME as a transitional element or 
“boundary object” (Star, 1989) offers an alternativc to the more tradi- 
tional approach that views classification as an organizational structure 
imposed upon a body of knowledge to facilitate access within a universal 
and frequently static framework. Recognition of the underlying relation- 
ship between user access and the collective knowledge structures that are 
the basis for knowledge production indicates the dynamic role of classifi- 
cation in supporting coherence and articulation across heterogeneous 
contexts. To this end, it is argued that the library should be an active 
participant in the production of knowledge, and that this role can be ef- 
fected by the development of classificatory structures that can support the 
needs of a diverse information ecology consisting of a complex web of 
interacting agents, users, and technologies. Within such an information 
ecology, a classificatory structure cannot follow a one-size-fits-all paradigm 
but must evolve in cooperative interaction between librarians and their 
user groups. 
INTRODUCTION 
A bibliographic classification system is intended to provide both an 
overall structure for a document collection and a set of concepts that will 
guide the information searcher into the knowledge domains encompassed 
by the collection. Traditionally, classification research has approached 
these objectives by developing schemes based on a one-size-fits-all-search-
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ers paradigm-i.e., We have created a standard system, because, deep down, 
all users are the same. Such classificatory tools often fail to fulfill their 
function of supporting the searcher’s access to, and navigation through, 
the domain structure. In most databases, including catalogs on the Web, 
the searcher may find it difficult to comprehend the organizational struc- 
ture that has been imposed upon the materials. This is not due simply to 
the often exotic notations of a scheme or to the surface characteristics of 
the classificatory data. Rather, the problem is often a product of a lack of 
match between the structure imposed upon the retrieval system by the 
classification scheme and the user’s individual knowledge structures and 
search strategies. 
Classification research has responded to this problem by collecting 
the terminology of individual users and compiling the results to generate 
larger, broader, and, it is hoped, more successful sets of access points for 
users-i.e., If we design an end-user thesaurus, that should do the trick. 
In his recent book on information seeking and subject representation, 
Hj~rland (1997) argues that such endeavors to compile end-user vocabu- 
laries are generally conducted without recourse to an underlying theory 
of k’nowledge. Because failure of the classificatory structure to support 
user access is generally interpreted as a mechanical question of matching 
between different individual knowledge structures-i.e., among those of 
the searcher, the author, and the librarian as mediator (compare, for ex- 
ample, Ingwersen, 1992)-the underlying relationship between user ac- 
cess and the collective knowledge structures that are the basis for knowl- 
edge production has not been widely recognized. 
From the perspective of the sociology of science, Star (1989) has ar- 
gued that the Turing test, which is intended to measure the degree to 
which an expert system is able to perform as a human expert in its interac- 
tion with individual users, should be replaced by a “Durkheim test,” where 
the system is evaluated on its ability to support the goals of a specific com- 
munity of users. Star points out that scientific work is not all one piece 
but is distributed and heterogeneous, with differing viewpoints emerging 
only to be reconciled within the existing knowledge base. In her view, 
information systems should not be designed simply to represent consen- 
sus but to accommodate the dissent that can be expected to appear among 
the various communities participating in their use. To this end, she brings 
forward the concept of boundary objects as a method for resolving prob- 
lems of heterogeneity in knowledge production and use or, in terms of 
library and information science (LIS) ,problems of variation or inconsis- 
tency in the representations by information producers, information me- 
diators, and information users. 
In this article, we will investigate how classificatory structures can act 
as transitional elements or boundary objects (Star, 1989) to support co- 
herence and articulation in the heterogeneous and sometimes distributed 
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contexts where knowledge is produced and mediated. In particular, we 
will review, within the context of the library, two perspectives put forward 
by Hjarland (1997) and by Star (1989) that analyze information systems 
as dynamic social constructs. We will build an analogy between a scientific 
enterprise and the library as an active participant in the general produc- 
tion of knowledge and use this analogy to develop a view of modern clas- 
sification research that engages the library directly in the development of 
classificatory structures that can accommodate information searching by 
heterogeneous user groups. Following Nardi and O’Day (1996),we re- 
gard the library as a diverse information ecology, comprising a complex 
web of interacting human agents, users, and technologies. And we will 
argue that, within such an information ecology, a classificatory structure 
cannot follow a one-size-fits-all paradigm but must evolve in cooperative 
interaction between librarians (and other information intermediaries) and 
their user groups. In this context, we draw on examples of information 
systems in Danish public libraries-i.e., the Book House (Pejtersen, 1980) 
and Database 2001 (Albrechtsen, 1997). 
CLASSIFICATION FROMRATIONALISM ANDSYSTEMS: 
EMPIRICISM CONSTRUCTIVISMTO SOCIAL 
Hjmrland (1997) argues for a philosophical and sociological orienta- 
tion for classification research. In his view, the problem of the searcher’s 
uncertainty is a function of relative task uncertainty in the user’s problem 
domain. Because information searching takes place within a particular 
social framework-e.g., an academic discipline-task uncertainty in search- 
ing is often the result of the relative task uncertainty within the discipline 
itself. Albrechtsen and Hjarland (1994) have earlier shown how such task 
uncertainty within knowledge domains may be a function of various social 
factors involved in the production of knowledge, such as the degree of 
interdisciplinarity or maturity within a domain. Such uncertainties will 
not only be manifest in the searchers’ difficulty in formulating queries for 
IR-systems but will also be inscribed in the relative plasticity and variety of 
the concepts and terminology applied within the domains. 
Classification research has too often neglected such broader social 
backgrounds that inform information searching and knowledge organiza- 
tion and has relied, more or less implicitly, on either a one-size-fits-all 
paradigm (rationalism) or on the accumulation of data about user behav- 
ior (empiricism). While the rationalist approach argues that we just need 
to get everyone to understand this, the empiricist counters that we just 
need to get more data about users and proceeds to collect more or less 
meaningful sets of “facts” on the individual user’s relative success mea- 
sured as the number of “hits” resulting from a series of search queries. 
Figure 1 divides the different approaches to classification research 
and practice into two broad epistemological categories: Rationalism/ 
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Empiricism on the one side and Historicism/Social Constructivism on 
the other. Both rationalism and empiricism are based on assumptions 
regarding the nature of truth and the objectivity of knowledge. From 
the empiricist approach, knowledge is reduced to sensory observations 
or facts. In classification research, empiricism is the prevalent episte- 
mology in bottomup thesaurus construction based either on user war- 
rant or on terminology warrant, particularly when the process lacks 
grounding in a theory of knowledge. In contrast, rationalism strives to 
reduce knowledge to an all-embracing structure of concepts that is in- 
tended to be universally comprehensive. It is, for example, the episte- 
mological foundation for Ranganathan’s notion of universal facets. Ra- 
tionalism is also closely related to more sociopolitical actions undertaken 
by a particular agency or from a specific disciplinary viewpoint-i.e., ac-
tions which are intended to impose one view of knowledge on all re- 
search and practice within that domain. In a paper discussing the role 
of dialogue in the development of classificatory structures, Jacob and 
Albrechtsen (1997) have shown how the American Psychiatric 
Association’s construction ofDSM-IV(American Psychiatric Association, 
1994),the international classification for mental disorders, used dialogue 
to create a device for marginalizing and eliminating the viewpoints of 
competing professions such as psychology (see also Kirk 8c Kutchins, 
1992). In short, both empiricist and rationalist approaches to classifica- 
tion are primarily looking for invariant structums that can be imposed on 
encyclopedic knowledge (universalist approaches) or data compiled from 
local observations (e.g., grounded theory approaches). 
In contrast to these more formalized structure-seeking approaches to 
classification, social constructivism, or historicism, offers a view of knowl- 
edge as a product of historical, cultural, and social factors, where the fun- 
damental divisions and the fundamental concepts are products of the di- 
visions of scientific/cultural/social labor in knowledge domains. Accord- 
ing to a social constructivist epistemolo~gy, the concepts and the structures 
are inseparable in a classification system, and hence the schemes must 
reflect the development, variety, plasticity, and use of both within a par- 
ticular knowledge domain. This implies that scheme designers are not 
primarily looking for ways to impose one single structure on knowledge, 
including one set of all-embracing facets. Rather, the designers should 
operate as “epistcmic engineers,” attempting to articulate and represent 
the dynamics of knowledge in such a way that the searcher can proceed 
from the topic of his initial query to other related perspectives on the 
same topic or to related materials within the same knowledge domain. In 
this manner, epistemic engineering of classificatory schemes can provide 
for multidimensional classification schemes where the concepts are rep- 
resented in a variety of different conceptual structures, functioning to 
articulate the multiple discourses performed in different domains. In the 
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Figure 1. Division of the Approaches to Classification and Research. 
role of epistemic engineer, then, the scheme designer operates as an ac- 
tive participant in the process of knowledge production and mediation. 
Such involvement on the part of the classificationist is particularly 
evident in areas of interdisciplinary research that engage participation 
from many different professions. The HIV/AIDS vocabulary, developed 
by Huber and Gillaspy (1996), provides an illustrative example of such 
involvement on the part of the scheme designers. This system, which was 
not intended as a classification per se but as a mediating vocabulary, was 
developed to support dialogue between the different communities involved 
with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, including clinical and medical researchers, 
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practitioners of alternative medicine, nutritionists, psychotherapists and 
other professionals, as well as those individuals who are either living with 
the disorder themselves or are caring for someone who has contracted 
the disease. The HIV/IVDS vocabulary is built on a theory of knowledge 
generation that explicitly eschews the standard life cycle for knowledge 
production in medicine-a knowledge cycle that proceeds in a top-down 
fashion from theory developed at universities and other research institu- 
tions, to applied clinical research, to daily clinical application. Rather, 
according to the epistemological view driving the HIV/AIDS vocabulary, 
research in lived experience must necessarily feed into basic clinical re- 
search. Accordingly, this scheme was not developed solely as a tool for 
retrieval of information in the database of the local community, but as a 
tool for facilitating communication both within and across diverse inter- 
est groups, from the so-called layman to the cloistered scientist. In its role 
as communicative facilitator, the scheme is also hospitable to adaptations 
and extensions as an indexing language in local contexts. For instance, 
specific drug names are not articulated in the scheme but are left to local 
instantiations of the indexing language. In Star’s (1989) terms, the HIV/ 
AIDS scheme serves as a boundary object precisely because it supports 
cooperation and common understandings among the various interest 
groups touched by this epidemic. 
CLASSIFICATION OBJECTSAND BOUNDARY 
The notion of “boundary objects” was developed by Star (1989) as a 
structure for coordinating distributed work, such as may occur with a scien- 
tific enterprise that not only involves heterogeneous actors, elements, and 
goals but also incorporates different research methods, values, and lan- 
guages. From her field work with scientific communities, Star has found 
that scientists are able to cooperate without consensus or shared goals. They 
can work together successfully because they create objects that function in 
the same way as a blackboard in a distributed artificial intelligence system: 
I call these boundar~  objects, and they are a major method of solving 
heterogeneous problems. Boundary objects are objects that are both 
plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and 
become strongly structured in individual-site use. 
Like a blackboard, a boundary object “sits in the middle” of a group 
of actors with divergent viewpoints. Crucially, however, there are 
dqfwent types of boundary objects depending on the characteristics of the het- 
erogeneous information beingjoined to create them. (Star, 1989,pp. 46-47. 
Emphasis in original) 
Accordingly, Star (1989; Star & Griesemer, 1989) has identified dif- 
ferent types of boundary objects in her various case studies, including: 
repositories-databases, libraries, or museums; 
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ideal types orplatonic objects-diagrams, atlases, or abstract concepts such 
as, for example, the concept of “species” used by both the creators of 
a zoological museum and other interested parties involved in its con- 
struction; 
coincident boundam’es-ommon objects with the same boundaries but 
having different internal contents, such as maps of a geographical area 
that cover the same terrain but are outlined according to different 
knowledge interests such as, for example, the life zones identified by 
biologists contrasted with the trails and collection sites identified by 
museum conservationists; 
standardizedforms-forms created as methods of common communica- 
tion across distributed work groups such as, for example, the forms 
completed during field work or the cataloging formats used for coop- 
eration and networking between libraries where the content fields may 
or may not be part of each repository’s database. 
Unlike the model of the ideal universal computing machine whose 
goal, as proposed by Turing, is to emulate individual human mental ca- 
pacities in all domains, boundary objects are advanced as an ecological 
concept-i.e., a concept that respects local contingencies and the view- 
points of different knowledge interests. In a case study on the formation 
of Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology (Star & Griesemer, 1989), a 
classificatory structure of the species and subspecies of mammals and birds 
in California constituted an important boundary object. Thus the scien- 
tific classification scheme served as a shared conceptual structure and pro- 
vided a shared vocabulary that facilitated communicative exchanges and 
cooperation across the different social and intellectual worlds represented 
by the scientists and the groups of amateurs who were involved in build- 
ing the museum’s collection. 
Although they approach the problem of classificatory structures and 
knowledge access from two different angles, Star’s exposition of the com- 
municative and integrative functions of classificatory structures in the gen- 
eral knowledge production of the sciences is closely related to Hjarland’s 
(1997) discussion of the epistemological positions adopted in classifica- 
tion research and his argument for following a more pragmatic philoso- 
phy of classification. Star builds on case studies and theoretical work in 
scientific communication and knowledge production, while Hjarland 
builds on case studies and theoretical work in the area of information 
searching for knowledge production. Both argue that classifications al- 
ways serve pragmatic purposes in the same way that science serves human 
action. According to Hjarland’s theory, scientific classifications reflect a 
highly abstract and generalized method of knowledge organization, in 
contrast to classifications with more local contingencies, such as catego- 
rizing fruit and vegetables in a supermarket or the amateur horticulturist’s 
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categorization of plants by use or cultural preferences. Such variations in 
taxonomic structure could be argued to reflect different levels of ambi- 
tion among the interested parties and thus to function as boundary ob- 
jects, created and negotiated by different social worlds, with the scientific 
structure functioning as a more specific taxonomy dictated by the needs 
of the scientific community itself. However, with respect to its specific 
role within the praxis of a formal disciplinary community, the scientific 
taxonomy isjust as concrete as the pragmatic systems of classification that 
reflect local contingencies. Indeed, when viewed from a broader socio- 
logical perspective, these latter systems may actually be interpreted as more 
abstract or generalized. 
THEROLEOF CLASSIFICATIONS INFORMATIONIN DIVERSE 
ECOLOGIES 
American anthropologists Nardi and O’Day ( 1996) have introduced 
the concept of “diverse information ecolo~gy” to describe the sociotechnical 
network of heterogeneous materials, people, and practices that consti- 
tutes a modern library: 
What we learned in the library suggests the possibility of a socio-tech- 
nical synthesis, an opportunity to design an information ecology that 
integrates and interconnects clients, hunian agents and software 
agents in intelligent ways congenial to extending information access 
to, potentially, all of humanity. As we design the global information 
infrastructure, the ultimate goal should he to design an ecology, not 
to design technology. (p. 83) 
Because information ecologies are situated within human practice, 
they are dynamic and constantly changing. An information ecology can- 
not be controlled by any one single agency but evolves through the col- 
laboration of heterogeneous socio-technical networks, whose elements 
strive constantly to achieve coherence and wholeness. The notion of an 
information ecology also implies a collective view of information systems 
as striving to meet heterogeneous community goals rather than the goals 
of a single agency or individual. In their study of two research libraries in 
software companies in the United States, Nardi and O’Day (1996) explored 
how the work practices and expertise OflibrdrianS can serve as a model for 
the design of computerized information services. They found that librar- 
ians are exemplary agents who evince particular expertise not only in com- 
municating with users but also in searching for information. These two 
skills are closely interrelated in that the librarian’s search strategy tends to 
evolve in collaboration with the user’s project. Nardi and O’Day propose 
to extend this working relationship between the librarian and the user to 
the collaborative design of information ecologies. 
In an information ecology, a classification system should function as a 
boundary object, supporting coherence and a common identity across 
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the different actors involved. In its role as boundary object, a classifica- 
tion would be weakly structured in common use, while remaining open to 
adaptation in individual communities. Across diverse information ecolo- 
gies, classification schemes would function as discursive arenas or public 
domains for communication and production of knowledge by all commu- 
nities involved. This approach to the development of classification schemes 
also implies that the task of constructing such a scheme would no longer 
be invisible work. This view of classification systems is in line with the 
concept of “coordination mechanisms” in distributed collaborative work, 
as put forward by Schmidt and Simone (1996). More importantly, the 
understanding and appreciation of classification schemes as boundary 
objects and discursive arenas, in cooperation with heterogeneous user 
groups and technology, engages the library as a facilitator of connections 
and ensures its continuing participation as an active contributor in the 
general process of knowledge production. 
In the following discussion, we will illustrate how the role of classifica- 
tion systems is changing within the information system that is the library, 
shifting from reliance on a single standardized or mainstream view of or- 
der, where classification is the invisible precursor to the organization of a 
collection, toward the creation of more diverse information ecologies, 
where the development of a classification scheme takes place within an 
arena of discourse to create a shared order across heterogeneous social 
worlds. 
SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHINGOLD,SOMETHING UNIVERSAL, 
SOMETHINGLOCAL 
As indicated in Figure 2, classification systems have served different 
pragmatic purposes in the history of libraries and information retrieval 
systems. In a recent European study of public libraries in the information 
society (Thorhauge & Segbert, 1997), it was demonstrated that public li- 
braries have progressed through three distinct stages, evolving from manual 
paper-based services, via the automated library, to the current phenom- 
enon of the electronic multimedia library. This progression should not 
be understood to imply that the current status of libraries has been driven 
entirely by technology. Rather, the electronic multimedia library must be 
understood from a more integrated socio-technical point of view, where 
the various actors, including librarians, computer suppliers, and research- 
ers in computing and information science, constitute a heterogeneous 
network of agencies that bring certain technologies to the foreground 
while marginalizing others. In the recent development and use of com- 
munication technology, for example, there is a convergence of hitherto 
separate, even disparate, media and activities. This is apparent in the 
development and application of Web technology, which integrates text- 
based materials, graphic illustrations, and audio materials with interactive 
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features such as online conferences and e-mail. It is characteristic of this 
development that the technology is not only plastic and customizable to 
almost any context of use, rather like a boundary object, but is constantly 
renegotiated and redeveloped through such use. 
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Figure 2. Classification Research and Use in Different Stages of Public Library 
Development. 
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In the recent past, manual paper-based libraries focused on collec- 
tion building. Intermediaries, or librarians, served both as collection build- 
ers and as agents controlling and interpreting the order of the libraries. 
Classification systems were frequently standardized in order to support 
interlibrary cooperation with the result that classification research was 
itself dominated by the development of universal schemes which could be 
adopted by central agencies to control the organization of knowledge across 
libraries. As a result of such standardization, classification became invis- 
ible work performed without regard to the needs of the local community 
of users. And, because maintenance and development of these classifica- 
tion schemes was often based on literary warrant, reflecting only those 
subjects represented in large national collections, they can be interpreted 
as imposing an implicitly empiricist view of knowledge. There was, then, 
at this stage in the library evolution, a mix of rationalist and empiricist 
epistemologies underlying classification research and development. 
The role of the librarian as intermediary was challenged during the 
1980sby the development of online retrieval systems and, in particular, by 
the introduction of online public access catalogs (OPACs) for end-user 
searching. During this decade, classification research was dominated by 
work on thesauri and indexing systems. There were numerous experi- 
ments with automated indexing, including the application of text analysis 
techniques developed in computational linguistics. OPAC development 
was often based on studying users, sometimes in naturalistic settings, but 
generally without prior analysis of their different social worlds or the func- 
tional role of libraries in knowledge production and mediation. Research 
in information retrieval systems was very much oriented by a mechanistic 
conception of human competence in information searching, indexing, 
and classification, thereby neglecting the variety and heterogeneity with 
which human agents (both librarians and users), information sources, and 
technology interact in different settings. Furthermore, as technological 
fixes were thrust to the foreground, displacing the search competence of 
the librarians, the librarian’s role as intermediary between the searcher 
and the collection was gradually becoming margrnalized as invisible work- 
the preliminary work of representing and organizing the collection that 
occurs in isolation from, and therefore without recognition by, the users. 
During the 199Os, the library has increasingly switched its service 
emphasis from building and guarding the collection or offering users ac- 
cess to the collection through the local OPAC to providing local access to 
global information resources available on the World Wide Web. This rep- 
resents a shift from a closed to an open system. In some European public 
libraries, for example, traditionally introverted and bureaucratic organi- 
zations have migrated toward a project-oriented culture, where librarians 
and users cooperate on the development of new services, using the inter- 
active affordances of Web technology and the Internet. In general, such 
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projects have not involved the library schools in Europe, the traditional 
research communities in the library and information sciences. Close co- 
operation between libraries and the conimunity of LIS researchers in Eu- 
rope has yet to be manifested (Albrechtsen & Kajberg, 1997). In the United 
States, communities of LIS researchers have come together in workshops 
and research projects related to the social informatics of what are called 
“digital libraries” but could equally well be termed “electronic libraries” 
(Bishop & Star, 1996). In thi< research area, major topics include how 
knowledge is structured in digital libraries, including cataloging arid clas- 
sification, and how digital libraries are used-i.e., how knowledge is pro-
duced, communicated, applied, and recycled in distributed social worlds. 
Research methods comprise ethnographic studies of communication and 
knowledge production in (digital) libraries as well as comprehensive so-
ciological studies of professional classification schemes in medicine 
(Bowker& Star, 1994) and nursing (Bowker, 1996). Thus it seems appar- 
ent that classification research is gradually evincing a more sociological 
and historical orientation. 
CLASSIFICATIONSAS BOUNDARYOBJECTSIN LIBRARIES: 
LIBRARIANS IN MUTUALDESIGNACTIVITYAND USERS 
Ballerup Public Library is a medium-sized Danish library on the out- 
skirts of Copenhagen. There is, in this library, a tradition of direct col- 
laboration between the librarians and their users. Until recently, a major- 
ity of the librarians regarded themselves as cultural workers-as interme-
diaries between collection and user, very much in line with the traditional 
perspective described above for libraries in the manual stage. In 1995, 
the library started a new project called Database 2001. This project, which 
was evaluated by Albrechtsen (1997), involved the development of an 
enriched multimedia catalog on the Web. In addition to the evaluation 
researcher, the project group for Database 2001 included six librarians 
with different areas of expertise: several in the group were experienced 
intermediaries and online searchers, while others were specialists in cata- 
log design and in the management of the library’s technological resources. 
However, none of the librarians had experience with Web design or Inter- 
net browsing. 
During the development of Database 2001, the project group collabo- 
rated with user groups and colleagues in the library to identify different 
kinds of materials, including books, musical recordings on CD, CD-ROMs, 
and audiotapes of books. Text, pictures, and sound were selected as en- 
richment for the database, the idea being to emulate a kind of virtual 
library on the Web. The menus were designed as graphical layers of icons 
representing both user groups and the kinds of materials available. The 
subject icons in Database 2001, which represent the subject content of 
materials in the database, went through several iterations. In addition, 
ALBRECHTSEN AND JACOB/CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 305 
the interface designed for browsing the menus was customized for both 
children and adults. The librarians arranged evaluation sessions with us- 
ers who represented different user communities and their evaluations were 
very positive; users with different interests were able to use the icon-based 
interface for browsing in the database even though they had very differ- 
ent interests and different goals for searching. 
In the database, documents were indexed using standard call num- 
bers from the Danish variant of the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC) . 
Even though indexing by class number would take advantage of the hier- 
archical structure of DDC and thus would be potentially useful for brows- 
ing by users, the librarians knew from their practice as intermediaries that 
users found it very difficult to understand the standard classification. They 
experimented with a more pragmatic and much more weakly structured 
classification which could reflect the kinds of questions actually posed to 
library staff by the different user groups. For example, for subject brows- 
ing by children, they worked with the seven categories listed below and 
designed a unique icon to be used on the Web site: 
1. computers; 
2. astronomy, nature, animals, environment; 
3. first love, star signs, being young today; 
4. horses; 
5. excitement, humor; 
6. fantasy, science fiction; and 
7. books that are easy to read. 
From a semantic or disciplinary point of view, the separation of sub- 
jects like animals and horses would appear to be “incorrect” or “illogical.” 
For the children, however, this classification worked very well. Category 2 
(astronomy, nature, animals, environment) was intended for a broad group 
of interests, including fact literature, whereas category 4 (horses) was in- 
tended, in particular, for girls interested in novels about horses. There is, 
in Denmark, a special research tradition within children’s librarianship, 
based on Wanting’s (1984) research on how children ask questions in 
libraries, that advocates mediating literature according to the different 
user interests of children. Pejtersen (1994) has also studied children’s 
use of libraries in Denmark and their communication with librarians. In 
her development of the Book House system in the 198Os, Pejtersen used a 
collaborative prototyping approach, engaging librarians, information sci- 
entists, and users in Danish public and school libraries, and subsequently 
designed a special interface of subject icons for browsing of the Book 
House system by children. Database 2001 took advantage of both of these 
research approaches to children’s information searching. 
The Book House (Pejtersen, 1994) is a retrieval system for fiction and 
is based on a general conceptual model that seeks to surround users with 
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an adequate resource space within which to situate their own search spaces. 
The design involves multidimensional representations of different kinds 
of user needs, search strategies, and literary paradigms as well as authorial 
intentions. This multidimensional structure for subject access is intrnded 
to match the different levels of user interest. The system interface is con- 
structed around the metaphor of a “house of books,” guiding the users 
through the rooms of a library where they can browse the collection. Us-
ers can also switch between different search strategies, including analytical 
search in the multidimensional database structure, visualized as icons for 
each dimension, and browsing of subjects, visualized as icons in a picture 
gallery. The design of these icons involved classification experiments us- 
ing both word association experiments and evaluations of suggested icons 
in Danish public libraries. 
The icons for browsing subjects in the Book House and in Database 
2001 serve similar functions-to provide the users with an overview of the 
subjects included in the databases. Because the Book House system builds 
on the central design metaphor of rooms in a library, it provides a single 
uniform interface. Database 2001, in contrast, is realized as a mixture of 
interfaces that include the Web layer of icons, designed by the librarians; 
a more or less standard search client offering conventional text-based 
searching; and a database structured according to a standard cataloging 
format that uses traditional call numbers to represent the subject content 
of the documents. While the Book House is a general system for fiction 
retrieval, which in its present form cannot be customized by individual 
libraries to support the idiosyncratic needs of specific user communities, 
Database 2001 is a localized experiment with system design and classifica- 
tion drawing upon a range of technologies that reflect the heterogeneity 
of tools used in today’s libraries, from conventional customizable applica- 
tions such as the closed systems of the database and the search client to 
the open systems supported by interactive Web technologies. 
COLLABORATIVE AND THE AGENCYD VELOPMENT OF 
LIBRARIES 
Both the Database 2001 project and the Book House system were 
realized using a collaborative approach among librarians, users, research- 
ers, and technicians. In this way, users were involved in negotiating clas- 
sificatory structures and the design of subject icons in the interfaces of 
the two systems. Because the Book House was a new approach for inter- 
face and database design in the 1980s, it had to be developed technically 
from scratch. Database 2001, on the other hand, was able to take advan- 
tage both of the design ideas generated during development of the Book 
House system and of the possibilities for integrating modern Web capa- 
bilities within existing technology. The process of designing an interface 
adapted for local needs quite naturally involved local experiments with 
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classification. In Database 2001, the graphic Web layer and its icons were 
intended to represent both the users’ needs and the existing technology. 
Decisions regarding the subject icons, as well as those pertaining to the 
search client and the database, were determined as much by the users as 
by the demands of the Web technology itself. Thus the icons employed in 
the graphic interface constitute an integrated system of boundary objects 
that mediate among the library, the users, and the technology. In this 
way, Database 2001 exists as an open system in that it makes the library 
available not only to local users but to other users as well through the 
medium of the technology. Without the interface of icons, the system 
would have been technically open but conceptually closed. 
Design of the Book House and Database 2001 involved heterogeneous 
human actors, elements, and goals, which are also found in Star’s (1989) 
description of a scientific enterprise. Star draws upon the example of a 
scientific enterprise to put forward a more collective concept of design 
than the psychological approach generally employed for the design of A1 
systems. Traditionally, design of library systems is based on a consensus 
model, or a one-size-fits-all approach. Multidimensional classifications 
providing different views of concepts in 1R systems are still the exception 
(Albrechtsen & Hjmrland, 1994;Jacob, 1994). But in the Book House 
system and in Database 2001, classificatory structures can perform as bound- 
ary objects by accommodating both the heterogeneous information needs 
and the various search strategies of different user interests as well as dif- 
ferent knowledge communities. 
Figure 3 juxtaposes some important boundary objects developed in 
the Book House and Database 2001 with Star’s typology in order to illus- 
trate the analogy between boundary objects in a scientific enterprise and 
the creation of a library system. Obviously, this analogy between the li-
brary and a scientific enterprise, even when supported by parallel struc- 
tures, does not establish that what goes on in a library is isomorphic to 
what goes on in a scientific enterprise. Hj~rland (1997) has proposed a 
theory of classification at multiple levels, from specific classifications de- 
veloped in accordance with local contingencies to those general classifica- 
tions developed by the so-called “hard” sciences, such as biology and medi- 
cine. However, analysis of the role of dialogue in the creation of classifica- 
tory structures indicates that traditional classification schemes frequently 
function as control structures that forestall an interpretive approach to 
scheme design through the imposition of controlled vocabulary that lim- 
its the impact of dissonant viewpoints (Jacob & Albrechtsen, 1997). In 
this manner, current developers of classification systems do not function 
as epistemic engineers, creating a discursive arena or forum for multiple 
views of knowledge, but rather as engineers of one episteme or worldview 
seeking to control the flow of knowledge production within a given dc- 
main by systematically legitimizing a single universal classificatory scheme, 
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thereby disenfranchising those researchers and practitioners who do not 
participate in the resulting structure. 
Star’s Yj.pe.7 Book House Dutubusr 2001 
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Multiple kinds of 
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formy: 
Figure 3. Boundary Objects in the Book House and Database 2001 Viewed in 
Kelation to Star’s Tvpology of Boundan, Objects. 
In general, however, the library and its organizational structures must 
be viewed as important actors in the general process of knowledge pro- 
duction because their primary goal is to mediate between knowledge pro- 
ducers and users. This role is generally realized through the provision of 
information services to users and producers who are very often members 
of the same knowledge communities. Although the scenario sketched 
here is traditionally understood as a closed world-i.e., where librarians 
mediate between documents and users- it could equally well be described 
as an information ecolo<gy-i.e., as a practice that builds environments by 
bringing together heterogeneous materials and actors. 
The librarians’ practice of building information ecologies is based on 
both explicit and tacit knowledge. The explicit knowledge is typically based 
on principles and formalisms for presenting classificatory structures in 
the form of universal classifications or faceted thesauri. The tacit knowl- 
edge inchides knowledge of the interests of their user communities, the 
users’ levels of computer and information literacy, arid preferred tactics 
for “mediated” versus “unmediated” information services. In mediated 
services, the librarians communicate with the users, either directly or by 
e-mail, and guide them to relevant information sources. In unmediated 
services, such as the Book IIouse system or Database 2001, the users may 
search a card catalog, a database, or a contingent local classification scheme 
prior to browsing the conceptual space within a domain. Such 
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“unmediated” services are, in fact, “silently” mediated by librarians or other 
information professionals who designed or customized a conceptual space 
for end-user searching. The librarian’s service to the users has been “trans- 
lated” or formalized through the classification scheme. It has been ab- 
stracted or “disembedded” from the work context of a human intermedi- 
ary interacting with a user. 
Following Star and Strauss (1999), much of the mediating practice of 
librarianship may be considered “invisible work.” Even though the librar- 
ian as human intermediary is visible within the traditional library setting, 
his or her work is frequently considered to be “background work” involv- 
ing the identification and delivery of books or other materials in support 
of the “real thing”-i.e., the user’s immediate work task or particular in- 
terest. When the work of the intermediary is abstracted from the work 
setting, this “invisible work may become “visible” in that the task now falls 
to the user, but the dialogue between the user and the intermediary is 
effectively silenced. No longer is there a human intermediary to inform 
the user and ensure equality of services. 
Gross and Borgmann (1995, cited in Bishop & Star, 1996) point out 
that: “Even home shopping requires informed consumers” (p. 904). When 
the librarian’s mediation work is silenced in the high-tech home shop- 
ping environment of electronic libraries-when the task of the user is no 
longer supported by, or facilitated through, dialogue with the human in- 
termediary-some users will not be informed but will be reduced to mere 
consumers of standardized information services. Obviously, then, the in- 
formation ecology of the electronic library cannot be responsive to the 
needs of the individual user without achieving a balance between visible 
and invisible work. As Star and Strauss (1999) point out: “Making visible 
can incur invisibilities; obscuring may itself become a visible activity.” In 
“unmediated” information services, cooperation between librarians and 
users in the design and maintenance of classificatory structures may be 
one method for achieving this balance between the visible and the invis- 
ible and for ensuring the evolution of an information ecology that is con-
tingent upon the needs of an informed public. 
CONCLUSION 
Classification systems and indexing languages have been constructed 
as organizational tools in order to provide structure to a body of knowl- 
edge, but they frequently have the effect of limiting or restructuring indi- 
vidual conceptual structures during a process of information searching 
(Tang& Solomon, 1998). Established approaches to classification research 
and development appear to suffer from a fear of touching the real thing- 
the social worlds constituting an information system and the collective 
conditions for knowledge production. However, in LIS and the sociology 
of science, new approaches to classification research are emerging, 
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approaches that build on the idea of information systems as open and 
collaborative systems. A similar trend toward development of open sys-
tems has been identified in the public libraries in Europe which are evolv- 
ing from manual, paper-based services to the electronic multimedia li- 
brary. In the modern electronic library, classification is similarly trans- 
formed from a tool for establishment of order and control over the collec- 
tion to a boundary object functioning to create cohesion across diverse 
information ecologies. The modern information ecology is a socio-tech-
nical network comprised of heterogeneous materials, people, and prac- 
tices. Within this emerging network, the classification scheme constitutes 
a discursive arena facilitated by the library and functions as a boundary 
object for the various interests that exist among users and librarians. Such 
an information ecology is at the same time a situated network and an 
open system wherein the classification scheme supports coherence and 
articulation across the domains encompassed by the network both locally 
and globally. 
The practice of classification is changing from invisible work car- 
ried out in centralized agencies to articulation work emerging within 
socio-technical networks. As the role of the library evolves from collec- 
tion guardian to facilitator of connections, the role of classification is 
similarly transformed from control of collections to facilitation of com- 
munication, maintenance of coherence, and establishment of a shared 
conceptual context. From this perspective, then, the intelligent inter- 
mediaries of today are the human agents in diverse information ecolo- 
gies who facilitate the process of knowledge production by collaborating 
with communities of users in the creation and use of boundary objects 
such as classification schemes. 
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Psychiatrists make Diagnoses, but not in 
Circumstances of Their Own Choosing: 
Agency and Structure in the DSM1 
MARKA. SPASSER 
ABSTRACT 
PSYCHIATRIC activity that CLASSIFICATION IS A PROFOUNDLY IMPORTANT 
directs subsequent treatment decisions, assumptions about etiology, and 
prognostic considerations. While the ideal classification scheme would 
be clear, concise, comprehensively inclusive of, and hospitable to, the en- 
tities under consideration, in practice, all classification systems reflect trade- 
offs and embody flawed structures. Accordingly, it is essential to be fully 
cognizant of the shortcomings, biases, and tacit assumptions of extant 
systemsso that classifications can be improved and so that misrepresenta- 
tions will not be blindly repeated or reproduced. Modern psychiatric clas- 
sification and diagnosis are almost exclusively defined within the context 
of the nomenclature and diagnostic categories of the American Psychiat- 
ric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
This article adapts Giddens’s (1984) theory of “structuration” to explain 
how at least some of the consequences of relying on the DSMfor classifica- 
tion result in unexamined conditions of its use and unintentionally repro- 
duced its underlying assumptions. This article uses the DSMto explicate 
agency in structuration theory and structuration theory to illuminate the 
structure and use of the DSM. The discussion suggests that Mouzelis’s 
(1995) four-fold duality-dualism typology, by empowering the agent not 
only virtually but in actuality, is a necessary and salutary modification of 
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INTRODUCTION 
Classifying (understood most broadly as arranging or grouping phe- 
nomena on the basis of some system or principle) is fundamental to, and 
underlies, all human thought (see, for example, Svenonius, 1983) and is 
thus an indispensable tool for understanding contemporaiy knowledge 
structures as well as their era-specific historical place and development. 
Classification is both the scientific origin and an arena of ongoing evolu- 
tion, evaluation, and contention for the development of systematic knowl- 
edge. All classifications of knowledge, including library classifications and 
psychiatric nosologies, have been objects of contention because they in- 
eluctably harbor tacit presuppositions of all kinds-e.g., scientific, socio- 
cultural, practical, and ideological, to name but a few. 
The ideal classification scheme would be clear, concise, and compre- 
hensively inclusive of, or hospitable to, the entities and to the approaches 
to classifjmg the entities under consideration. Obviously, realizing such a 
classification is impossible. Thus, all attempts to classify reflect, to some 
degree, trade-offs, compromises, biases of omission and/or commission, 
possibilities, impossibilities, successes, and failures. Because an ideal clas- 
sification is impossible, it becomes essential to be fully cogniLant of the 
shortcomings, biases, and tacit assumptions of extant systems so that clas- 
sifications can be improved and so that problems will not be repeated 
blindly or reproduced. This discussion is an attempt to contribute to that 
project. 
This article elaborates on a theoretical framework for analyzing the 
operation of the official diagnostic classification system within the mental 
health professions. However, it is perhaps unremarkable that many of the 
most prominent issues and concerns of psychiatric nosologists resonate 
with those that have concerned, and continue to interest, library 
classificationists. The birth of psychiatry (as well as of library and infor- 
mation science [LIS]) was characterized by the introduction of classifica- 
tions with a three-fold purpose (Pichot, 1986)-i.e., social, scientific, and 
pragmatic: “The early psychiatric nosology tried simultaneously to attain 
these three goals. Basic to this position was the conviction that, if the 
classification was ‘natural,’ i.e., scientific, it was at the same time the most 
pragmatic” (p. 63). 
Compare the above assertion to Bliss’s resolutely held conviction that 
the library classification that best mirrors the scientific and educational 
consensus would also be the most useful to library patrons (see, for ex- 
ample, Bliss, 1929). Clearly, the status and validity of the warrants, if any, 
that underwrite classification schemes are a source of ongoing contro- 
versy. 
Critical, recurring, and LIS-relevant issues in the history of psychiat- 
ric classification include the following (see, for example, Freedman, 
Silverman, Brotman, & Hutson, 1986). First, what is classified in a 
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psychiatric nosology-disease, disorder, syndrome, individual patients, or 
patient/client groups? This problem of identifying the unit or object of 
classification has its parallel in librarianship with the problem of distin- 
guishing, descriptively, among the work, book, or manifestation. 
Second, for whom is the classification scheme created? Is it for the 
researcher, mental health practitioner, or the courts? In other words, 
there are ongoing concerns with the audience for, and purpose of, the 
psychiatric classification. In LIS, classifications have traditionally been 
constructed for use by librarians but recently, with the advent especially of 
online public access catalogs, it has become increasingly clear that classifi- 
cation schemes need to be useful to the patron or end-user as well. 
Third, there are concerns about the social inputs and consequences 
of classifications in terms of which fashions, societal trends, or pressures 
influence (or bias) the categories of a classification and of how types of 
knowledge (and people) get represented (and obliterated). Because of 
the relatively compelling economic and political implications of psychiat- 
ric classification (and, conversely, of the seeming absence of such ramifi- 
cations with classifications of library materials), such sociocultural and 
ethical concerns have received far less attention in library science than in 
psychiatry. 
Fourth, two related, common, and recurring themes in the history of 
psychiatric nosology arise directly from its ineluctable subjectivity: lump- 
ing versus splitting and the categorical/hierarchical versus dimensional 
(or, in library and information science terms, faceted) approach to classi- 
fication construction (Mack, Forman, Brown, &Frances, 1994). The num- 
ber and granularity of categories, and whether they can be considered 
discrete isolatable entities, are ongoing and potentially insoluble prob- 
lems for both psychiatry and library science. These issues concern the 
epistemic status of our classifications and the distinctions they make and 
have equal applicability both to the classification of diseases/disorders in 
patients and to that of subjects/topics in LIS materials. 
Finally, perhaps most symptomatically, both disciplines have been 
deeply concerned with the consistently inconsistent manner in which their 
classifications have been applied. In psychiatry this concern goes under 
the name of inter-rater unreliability, while in LIS it has been referred to as 
inter-indexer inconsistency. The intractability of this vexatious problem 
in both professions suggests their foundational relevance to each other. 
Thus, it can now be readily appreciated that the study of psychiatric 
classification has much to offer library classification in terms of the rel- 
evance of, and overlap among, common and recurring themes. This ar- 
ticle will therefore exploit the sociological-sensitive research about the 
former to frame and illuminate the latter. 
This article will focus on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (hereafter the DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IVwill be collectively 
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referred to either as the DSMs or as the collective singular, the manual, 
unless otherwise indicated). The DSMs comprise the official nomencla- 
ture and classification system of the American Psychiatric Association and 
as such delineate the boundaries within which psychiatry claims epistemic 
and professional authority (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; McCarthey & Gerring, 
1994). However, the DSMs reflect a compromise of interests. While their 
primary goal is the pragmatic one of clinical utility, their underlying struc- 
tures reflect not only (or even primarily) researchers and clinicians, but 
also the interests of lawyers, statisticians, epidemiologists, insurers, and 
disability claims personnel, among others. Accordingly, many decisions 
were made on the extra-clinical and non-empirical basis of expert consen- 
sus (Blashfield, 1984; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992) in the absence of empirical 
data. The DSMs are documents of mixed origins and conflicting purposes, 
based partly on scientific interests but also reflecting other clearly politi- 
cal and social (including professional) concerns. 
While the DSMs have been the object of intense scrutiny, especially 
scientific, philosophical, and linguistic (see, for example, the contribu- 
tions in Sadler, Wiggins, & Schwartz, 1994), they have not as yet been read 
from a “structurational” perspective. The purpose of this article is to ana- 
lyze the DSMs by employing Giddens’s theory of “structuration.” 
This discussion will begin with an outline of the major tenets of 
structuration theory, highlighting those principles especially applicable 
to classification in general and to diagnostic identification in particular. 
This will be followed by a close structured reading of two situated activi- 
ties related to the development and use of the DSMs. To illustrate the 
analysis of strategic conduct,’ I will reread, from a “structurational” per- 
spective, McCarthey’s (1991) review of the use made of DSM-111by one 
child psychiatrist in her hospital-based clinical practice. This will be com- 
pared to the article with McCarthey and Gerring (1994) in which the child 
psychiatrist of the 1991 article, as a co-author, rhetorically analyzes the 
sociopolitically motivated revision process leading to DSM-IV 
This comparative analysis will illustrate an important weakness of 
Giddens’s duality of structural theoretical framework and the utility, at 
least in terms of the analysis of strategic conduct, of maintaining the dual- 
ity-dualism distinction. Briefly, Giddens’s structuration theory simply does 
not exhaust the types of relationships that actors have toward rules, re- 
sources, and social objects, such as classifications. In fact, opting, as 
Giddens does, for subject/object duality conflates agency and structure 
so that the possibility for actors to distance themselves from social resources 
to view, and orient toward, them strategically is severely curtailed, contra- 
dicting his useful distinction between institutional and strategic conduct 
analysis. In effect, this limitation in Giddens’s duality-of-structure notion 
limits the ability to distinguish the effects of classifications on classifiers 
and classificationists from those of the latter on the former. 
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STRUCTURATIONTHEORY 
Giddens’s structuration theory is especially useful in attempting to 
understand the social context and consequences of classification. 
Structuration theory is concerned with the conditions governing the con- 
tinuity or transmutation of structures and therefore the (re) production 
of social systems (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1993, 1995). 
Basic concepts of structuration theory especially relevant to this dis- 
cussion can be adumbrated as follows:3 
1. The duality of structure refers to the fact that social structures are 
simultaneously produced and modified by human agents and are used 
as resources; structures are dual in the sense that they are both the 
medium and outcome of the interactions and institutions they recur- 
sively organize. 
2. 	Structure is a virtual order of rules and resources that exists only when 
instantiated in interaction and simultaneously both constrains and 
enables knowledgeable and skilled human agency. Conversely, sys- 
tems are reproduced relations between actors, organized as regular/ 
routine social practices; systems are the observable patterns of social 
interaction and can be said to exhibit, rather than have, structures or 
structural properties. 
3. 	Modalities of structuration are rules that guide action (normative and 
interpretative) and facilities that empower action (authoritative/po- 
litical and allocative/economic resources). Modalities (i.e., interpre- 
tative schemes, norms, and resources) are understood to be drawn 
upon by actors in the production of meaningful interaction: commu- 
nication, sanctions, and power while, simultaneously, they are the re- 
productive media of the structural components of interaction systems: 
structures of signification, legitimation, and domination. The ana- 
lytic significance of the modalities is that they provide the coupling 
elements whereby the analysis of interaction is linked to the 
(re) production of the structural components of social systems. 
Critics of Giddens’s explication of structure (see, for example, Ar- 
cher, 1982; Ldyder, 1987, 1990) accuse him of obscuring the ontological 
status of structures. Because Giddens claims that structures exist only 
when instantiated in human activity, they reason that structures must be 
recreated anew each time. In other words, structures are created by hu- 
man agency but must pre-exist any given actor’s appropriation of them as 
resources in activity. However, supporters of Giddens have suggested that 
such criticisms exaggerate this difficulty by focusing almost exclusively on 
structures as necessarily instantiated in action, neglecting their continuity 
as “memory trace^"^ (Giddens, 1984, p. 17). 
However, there is a more serious problem with Giddens’s concept of 
duality of structure. It conflates agency with structure and, in doing so, 
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simply does not address all the important relationships between agents 
and the rules and resources that comprise social objects (Mouzelis, 1995) .’ 
As we will see when examining a psychiatrist’s use of the manual, by main- 
taining the duality-dualism distinction, agency can be better theorized 
both sociologically and critically. It is essential for agents to be able to 
distance themselves from rules so that we can account for their strategic 
use (and possible transformation) .” 
THEDiag-nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
The Diagnostic and Statistzcal Manual of Mmtal Disorders is the official 
classification system of mental disorders published by the American Psy- 
chiatric Association. The third edition of the DSM (DSM-III)was pub- 
lished in 1980, was revised (IXM-III-R) in 1987, and the fourth edition 
( D S M - w  was published in 1994. It can be considered a charter docu- 
ment in that it “establishes an organizing framework that specifies what is 
significant and draws people’s attention to certain rules and relationships. 
. . . defines as authoritative certain ways of seeing and deflects attention 
away from other ways . . . stabilizes a particular reality and sets the terms 
for future discussions” (McCarthey, 1991, p. 359). 
Since 1980, the DSMs profoundly influenced the way in which the 
mental health field defines itself, the way in which it conducts its clinical 
and research work, the way it educates and socializes new professionals 
entering the field, and they have shaped legal and financial arrangements, 
including which treatments are eligible for insurance reimbursement 
(McCarthey & Gerring, 1994). Moreover, through the manual, a rela- 
tively small group of closely knit psychiatrists, known as the neo- 
Kraepelinians (Blashfield, 1984; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992) ,7 has attempted 
to accomplish three other things. 
The primary goal of the neo- Kraepelinians is to assert the primacy 
and dominance of the biomedical model in the mental health field. There 
are at least two competing and contradictory models that have dominated 
psychiatry. The first, the biomedical-empirical model, comprises two pri- 
mary assumptions. First, there are real discrete entities to which disease 
labels such as “dysthymia,” “schizophrenia,” or “attention deficit disorder” 
ought legitimately to be applied. These disorders are seen as generic and 
applicable across cultures, and there is the related assumption of underly- 
ing behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction: the disturbance 
is not to be located in the relationship between the individual and society. 
Second, the model employs the assumption of specific etiology, which in 
medicine states that diseases are caused by a single biological factor. That 
assumption has been modified in psychiatry to include patterns of mul- 
tiple, discrete, and interacting etiological factors: biological, psychologi- 
cal, genetic, environmental, and/or social. Because these etiological fac- 
tors are not well understood, the DSMs have adopted a fully or purely 
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descriptive approach: they attempt to describe comprehensively the mani- 
festations of disease-i.e., they are intended to be atheoretical as regards 
the etiology of mental disorder. 
The second model is hermeneutic-intuitive and fundamentally evalu- 
ative. The mentally ill patient is seen as an individual whose symptoms 
have meaning particular to him or her. In this model, the focus is less on 
distinguishing, describing, and classifying symptoms as manifestations of 
some unknown (and heretofore unknowable) underlying disease process, 
than on the meanings that those symptoms have for the individual. Men- 
tal health professionals, working within the hermeneutic model (many 
with psychodynamic and psychoanalytic orientations), understand the pa- 
tient as an individual with a “story to tell” that must be understood and 
explained, while those working within the biomedical model see the indi- 
vidual as a member of a group with impairments to be explained. A 
psychiatrist’s choice of perspective, which is often taken without aware- 
ness but which has profound ramifications for how the patient is concep- 
tualized, is a result of personality, education, interests, and situational and 
professional pressures, a point that has important implications for this 
argument. 
By imposing the biomedical model on mental health classification, 
this small group of psychiatric researchers (who are, most importantly, 
not clinicians) has attempted to accomplish two other more exclusively 
professional goals:’ (1) to achieve superiority over neighboring non-medical 
disciplines within the mental health field; and (2) to strengthen their 
affiliation and to achieve parity with other medical specialties (Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1992; McCarthey, 1991; McCarthey & Gerring, 1994). 
The publication of DSM-111has often been referred to as a landmark 
event and a major scientific achievement (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). Ac-
cording to Blashfield (1984), four major changes were made between 
DSM-z DSM-II, and DSM-III and beyond: “ ( 1) the use of diagnostic crite- 
ria; (2) a multiaxial approach to patient evaluation; (3) expanded de- 
scriptive information; and (4) a reorganization of the diagnostic catego- 
ries” (p. 112). However, these diagnostic systems were, and are, contro- 
versial. Criticism has come from a wide variety of perspectives, some fo- 
cusing on specific diagnostic entities and categories and others on broader 
conceptual issues, such as diagnostic boundary problems and the implica- 
tions of a categorical classification for the measurement of comorbidity 
(Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995). Without undertaking the impossible 
task of reviewing all critiques of the DSMs, three recurrent and important 
ones will be highlighted below. 
One of the major criticisms of these diagnostic manuals is the focus 
on the individual, its individualistic metaphysics: “minds reside in brains, 
which in turn reside in individual persons. Minds, and subsequently men- 
tal disorders, do not reside in the social world” (Sadler & Hulgus, 1994, 
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p. 262). The underlying assumption is unrealistic in that all psychiatric 
disorders (in fact, all human experience) are deeply embedded in social, 
community, or family networks (see, for example, the essays in Sadler, 
M.’iggins,& Schwartz, 1994). This underlying structural principle under- 
mines the usefulness of the DSM’s multiaxial structure (especially with 
regard to axes IV and V) at least as it is currently constructed. 
The second m?jor area of criticism has been most strongly voiced by 
psychoanalysts and other dynamically oriented psychodiagnosticians. It 
focuses on the historical emptiness in theDSM (McHugh & Slavney,1983), 
claiming that they largely ignore the life story of the person: “The etio- 
logical, clinical, and practical significance of these [historical events such 
asjob loss, catastrophic loss of loved ones, marital discord, and other stress- 
ful life events] and other life events in the patient’s past are pushed into 
the nosological background” (Sadler & Hulgus, 1994, p. 262). 
This fundamental disregard for the temporal and contextual dimen- 
sions of lived experience tends to reify or naturalize diagnostic categories. 
Instead of seeing DSM nosological entities as potentially useful abstrac- 
tions, clinicians are encouraged to see their patients in terms of-and as 
being coextensive with-concrete diseases. Giddens (1984) talks about 
reification in a manner particularly apposite to classifications: 
The concept [reification] should not be understood simply to refer 
to properties of social systems which are “objectively given” so far as 
specific, situated actors are concerned. Rather, it should be seen as 
referring to forms of discourse which treat such properties as “objec- 
tively given” in  the same way as are natural phenomena. That is to 
say, reified discourse refers to the “facticity” with which social phe- 
noniena confront individual actors in such a way as to ignore how 
they are produced and  reproduced through human agency. 
Reification thus should not be interpreted to mean “thing-like” in 
such a connotation; it concerns, rather, the consequences of think-
ing in this kind of fashion . . . .The “reified mode” should be consid- 
ered a form or style of discourse, in which the properties of social 
systems are regarded as having the same fixity as that presumed in 
laws of nature. (p. 180) 
As a result, a vast literature exemplifying the vital relevance of recent and 
remote historical life events to psychiatric problems, as well as an equally 
vast literature on human development and its pertinence to such prob- 
lems, are excluded from consideration in the IISMs. 
The third, and perhaps most celebrated, problem area in the DSlMs 
has to do with their alleged atheoretical stance toward etiology. However, 
while no overt declaration is made in the manuals, they describe or struc- 
ture diagnostic reality so that some etiological theories are more appli- 
cable or relevant than others (Faust & Miner, 1986). The diagnostic ap- 
proach selects operationalized individualistic signs and symptoms as the 
relevant clinical data, whereas other kinds of contextual and temporally 
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sensitizing data are ignored as classificatorily irrelevant. As Sadler and 
Hulgus (1994) observe: 
This descriptive, syndrome-bound approach to diagnosis fits the needs 
of a biological psychiatry much better than other etiological models 
as, for instance, a family interactional model . . .or a developmental, 
life story approach. . . . Because DSM-111-R [as well as DSM-111and 
DSM-IVj fit biological psychiatry’s theory base better than other psy- 
chosocially oriented therapies, the DSM-111-Rdiagnosis tends to make 
biological conceptualizations of the patient primary and the psycho- 
social secondary. In summary, DSiM-III-R may not state a theory, but 
the metaphysical structure of its classification prefers the theoretical 
bases of descriptive/biological psychiatry. (p. 263) 
STRUCTURATION CLASSIFICATION,THEORY, AND THE DSMs’ 
MODALITIESOF STRUCTURATION 
As has been already stressed, all human action and interaction is in- 
extricably and simultaneously composed of structures of meaning, moral- 
ity, and power. In terms of the modalities of structuration, social practice 
links the realm of human agency with that of social structure. Interpreta- 
tive schemes are standardized shared stocks of knowledge that humans 
draw upon to interpret behavior and events, thereby achieving meaning- 
ful interaction. They are the cognitive means by which each actor makes 
sense of what others say and do. Resources are the means through which 
intentions are realized, goals are accomplished, and power is exercised. 
Norms are the rules governing sanctioned or appropriate conduct, and 
they define the legitimacy of interaction within a locale’s moral order. As 
Orlikowski and Robey (1991) state: “Those three modalities determine 
how the institutional properties of social systems mediate . . . human ac- 
tion and how human action constitutes social structure” (p. 148). 
InterpretativeSchemes 
From the point of view of strategic conduct, human interaction in- 
volves the communication of meaning which is achieved via interpretative 
schemes-i.e., stocks of mutual knowledge that agents draw upon in the 
production and reproduction of interaction. “These form the core of the 
mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sus- 
tained through and in processes of interaction” (Giddens, 1979, p. 83). 
Interpretative schemes do more than merely enable the communication 
of shared meaning; they also serve as media for the imposition of struc- 
tural constraints and affordances. 
From the viewpoint of institutional analysis, interpretative schemes 
comprise structures of signification that represent the social rules that 
enable, inform, and constrain the communication process itself. Thus, in 
any interaction, mutual knowledge does not merely provide background 
for the communication process but is constitutive of it, in part organizing 
it and in part being constituted by the process itself. 
322 LIBRARY TRENDS/FALL 1998 
As such,a diagnostic nosology like the DSMis an interpretative scheme 
that mediates between signification structure and social interaction in the 
form of meaningful communication among researchers, clinicians, pa- 
tients, and such other organizational actors as insurers and government 
agencies. The signification structure in those cases comprises the shared 
rules, concepts, and theories that are drawn upon to make sense and or- 
ganize communication about etiology, diagnosis (including reliability and 
validity issues and concerns), treatment plans, efficacy, and of course 
reimbursability. 
Facilities (&sources) 
From the point of view of strategic action, power enters into human 
interaction by providing the facilities and capabilities to accomplish out- 
comes. For example, the DSMs provide clinicians and researchers with 
categories that determine the applicability of various types of treatments. 
Power is understood here in both its broader meaning as transformative 
capacity-that is, the ability to transform or to affect the social and mate- 
rial world-and in the narrower sense of “power over”-that is, power as 
the domination of some individuals over others. Its use in organizations is 
mediated by the resourcesyJo that agents appropriate within interaction. 
All social systems and institutions are characterized by an irreducible 
asymmetryof resources (involving relations of both autonomy and depen- 
dence), the existing structure of domination is reinforced through the 
use ofthose resources, and it is when the existing asymmetry of resources 
is explicitly challenged or resisted, via what Giddens calls the dialectic of 
control,” that the existing structure of domination may he creatively trans- 
formed. 
This is especially the case with psychiatric diagnoses. For many, if not 
most, of the reasons mentioned above, both those diagnosing or applying 
the classification and those diagnosed may use a diagnosis (or assignment) 
for purposes of their own, purposes for which the nosology was not in- 
tended. Kirk and Kutchins (1992) explain in some detail the use of the 
manual to misdiagnose (both to under- and over-diagnose patients for 
purposes of stigma avoidance or to ensure reimbursability, respectively). 
Several authors (see, for example, Starr 1992; Hacking 1992) have called 
attention to the fact that, while classifications of the natural world are 
one-way relationships in that only people categorize natural objects, 
“ [p] eople, however, have their own ideas about group membership-not 
only ideas but strong sentiments. When institutions classify, therefore, 
they often confront the self-conceptions of the subjects” (Starr, 1992, p. 
158). Nowhere do those concerns, essentially with power, apply more 
problematically than in psychiatric classification. 
Norms 
From the viewpoint of strategic action, norms are organizational rules 
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or more or less binding conventions legitimating appropriate conduct. 
Such moral codes for legitimate conduct are created out of the continu- 
ous use of sanctions by agents in interaction. Norms play an active role in 
the shaping of institutional notions of “correct” behavior, that is, in what 
is to be regarded as vice or virtue, as important or trivial, and as obligatory 
or merely contingent. In this way, the practice of psychiatric diagnosis 
ineluctably involves the communication of a definite set of values (see 
Fulford, 1994, concerning the repolarization of illness and disease in terms 
of a value-based perspective on classification). The practice of diagnosis 
and of consequent classification can then be seen as involving the com- 
munication of notions of what should be, and it is primarily on the basis of 
those notions that sense is made of (or meaning constructed and imposed 
on) what psychiatrically exists. 
From the viewpoint of institutional analysis, norms articulate, con- 
ventionally reproduce, or creatively (usually incrementally) transform es- 
tablished structures of legitimation. The legitimation structure institu- 
tionalizes the reciprocal rights and obligations of social actors and medi- 
ates, through norms and moral codes, the sanctioning of particular ac- 
tions and interactions. Systems of psychiatric classification provide and 
legitimize the categories to which people can be assigned. For example, a 
DSM diagnosis is necessary for reimbursement from insurance companies 
or other third parties for treatment costs. The classification system em- 
bodies norms (such as reliability, validity, and conceptual operationalism) 
that legitimize diagnoses made from within its descriptive biomedical frame- 
work. 
However, the modalities, either from the perspective of strategic con- 
duct or from that of institutional analysis, are only isolatable for analytic 
convenience; in the flow of conduct and institutional life these are inex- 
tricably intertwined in each action and interaction. From an institutional 
perspective, modes of signification, domination (and subordination), and 
legitimation are intersecting dimensions of the wholeness of institutional 
social practice. From the point of view of strategic conduct, any interac- 
tion simultaneously exemplifies “three fundamental elements: its consti- 
tution as meaningful, its constitution as a moral order, and its constitu- 
tion as the operation of relations of power” (Giddens, 1993, p. 110). 
We can now explore, in detail, the use of the DSMs from a 
structurational perspective. A diagnostic classification system, as does all 
classification, exists in and as language (Hodge & Kress, 1993). Once 
inscribed in language, and after legitimizing sociocultural resources are 
mobilized and aligned (i.e., after much necessary, but often invisible, so-
cial and political work is transacted), a classification scheme becomes ca- 
pable of coordinating and controlling action across long durations of time 
and large tracts of space. Moreover, as language, a classification scheme 
can be seen, structurationally, as a set of generative rules and resources 
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which are drawn upon (and, often, in the process, reproduced) in its ap- 
plication, in this case classifying. 
However, to understand the actual operation of such systems, it is 
helpful to go beyond descriptive and conceptual accounts and examine 
the conditions and consequences of its use in actual situated practices. In 
practice, different people will perceive a particular system in a variety of 
ways, and their appropriation of systemic resources will both reflect and 
reproduce their various interests. Moreover, the use of a classification 
systemwill inevitably reflect its unacknowledged conditions and generate 
unintended consequences because, according to structuration theory, ac- 
tors, while inherently knowledgeable, may be unaware of the conditions 
of at least some of their actions and certainly of all the consequences that 
feed forward from previous-and feed back to subsequent-action. 
To illustrate the application of structuration theory to the study of 
diagnostic classification, I will analyze one child psychiatrist’s experience 
with the DSM in her clinical practice, suggesting both that we pay too 
high an analytic price by eliding the subject-object distinction and that to 
re-energize agency in structuration theory, we must allow for dualism, as 
well as for duality subject-object relations. Actors must be permitted to 
stand back and distance themselves from rules, resources, and interactive 
situations for the vitally important, and commonly observed, purposes of 
strategy or monitoring (Mouzelis, 1995). 
STRATEGIC AND THE DSMsONDUCT 
McCarthey (1991) arid McCarthey and Gerring (1994) have provided 
a detailed picture of the use of the manual by the child psychiatrist Gerring, 
who coauthored the 1994 article. In particular, this comparative analysis, 
while certainly not parallel, illustrates how Gerring’s conception of (and, 
by implication, use of) the manual obviously changed over several years. 
The material presented in this section relies heavily on McCarthey’s (1991) 
and McCarthey and Gerring’s (1994) papers, which should be read in the 
original for a detailed and more complete accounting of their research. 
On the one hand, McCarthey (1991) will afford the analysis, from a 
structurational perspective, of the strategic conduct of one child psychia- 
trist to better understand and illustrate the ways in which structures (that 
are virtually present in the classification system) are appropriated and 
drawn upon to constitute social action as meaningful, legitimate, and en- 
abling (and simultaneously constraining), while also being unintention- 
ally reproduced through their appropriation and use. On the other hand, 
McCarthey and Gerring (1994) present the same psychiatrist interacting 
with the manual strategically and critically (however, not clinically). In 
terms of Mouzelis’s duality/dualisrn typology, the former article illustrates 
paradigmatic duality and syntagmatic dualism, while the latter illustrates 
paradigmatic dualism and syntagmatic duality.12 
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McCarthey (1991) used a multi-methodological approach to study the 
epistemological and textual consequences of DSM-111 for the diagnostic 
work of Gerring, who was a child psychiatrist on the staff of a university 
hospital-based rehabilitation team that ministered to children who had 
suffered brain injury. McCarthey’s detailed analysis follows Gerring 
through one case as she conducts interviews and draws her diagnostic 
conclusions. As might be expected, a biological psychiatric model, rather 
than a hermeneutic perspective, is more likely to be adopted (and rein- 
forced) by psychiatrists working in this setting. Moreover, Gerring admit- 
ted to McCarthey that her own training emphasized the biomedical ap- 
proach to studying psychiatric disorders as a result of studying pediatrics 
for years before undertaking her psychiatric training. 
McCarthey presents her analysis in terms of how the manual struc- 
tured and determined the gathering of data, the presentation of data, 
and finally, and most importantly, the analysis of the data that were gath- 
ered and presented in the psychiatrist’s clinical diagnostic evaluations of 
one brain-damaged and comatose patient. McCarthey breaks those down 
into two general areas for analysis. 
The first area concerns “DSM-IZZselectivity” (McCarthey, 1991, p. 365). 
The diagnostic classification determined the type and amount of data that 
were gathered about patients. Thus, while the categories of the manual 
were enabling in that they facilitated the collection of detailed informa- 
tion about some aspects of the patient’s condition, they more problemati- 
cally constrained Gerring from seeing other important data about the 
patient. In terms of the aforementioned structural principles that tacitly 
underlie the manual, the data required to make a DSM diagnosis do not 
include contextual and, for the most part, historical data about people 
(Sadler & Hulgus, 1994). 
The manual assumes that mental disorders are real discrete entities 
that can be identified in patients by their clinical symptoms. Not only did 
the psychiatrist neither speculate as to the underlying meaning of the 
symptoms nor attempt to specify their etiological significance (unknow- 
able in terms of the DSM), she used a highly structured interview sched- 
ule based on, and derived from, the DSM itself. In fact, not surprisingly, 
the schedule is designed to lead specifically and rigidly to a DSM diagno-
sis. We can see, then, that the conditions of its use reproduce the struc- 
tural properties of the DSM. For example, as reported by McCarthey 
(1991): “ I f .  . . [she] found no symptoms for a particular disorder, she 
moved on quickly. However, when her questioning revealed the presence 
of some [DSM-validated] diagnostic criteria for a disorder, she questioned 
. . . further” (p. 366). While Gerring reports feeling frustrated by what 
the manual and the interview schedule leave out, it is not surprising that 
the time constraints she feels-”[tlime is the problem” (McCarthey, 1991, 
p. 368)-are the logical result of using a DSM-based interview schedule 
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that merely reproduces the manual’s lack of concern with temporal is- 
sues. Speeding through the interview looking for “legal” diagnostic crite- 
ria ensures that these, and only these, will be found. 
Moreover, in terms of how the data are presented, the psychiatrist 
evinces her commitment to the biomedical model that tacitly underlies 
the DSM. As McCarthey (199l)points out, the headings that are used 
closely follow the hidden logics of the manual (Fulford, 1994) and the 
manual-based interview schedule. Three pages of the five page report 
that she completes on the patient are devoted to the data elicited from 
using the manual-based interview schedule. Two pages are left for basic 
facts about the patient, information sources, history of the present illness, 
observation of the patient, and family information, as well as other types 
of contextually and historically sensitive information. In more Giddensian 
terminology, she shows relatively little discursive penetration into the con- 
ditions of the perspective that organiLes her clinical reality. And in terms 
of dualism-duality typology, on the paradigmatic level, she relates to the 
DSMdualistically in a taken-for-granted performative way. The instantiation 
of the rules and resources of the DSMare the medium and outcome of its 
use. On the syntagmatic plane, she relates in terms of dualism as some- 
thing external to her over which she has little or no effect or control. 
Most importantly, those aspects of the clinical evaluation suggest an 
acceptance of the belief that DSM, as a classification of mental disorders, 
is atheoretical; it presupposes both pure perception uninfluenced by 
thought, raw facts free of interpretation, and an atheoretical observational 
language. Unfortunately, “there is no perceptual experience that does 
not involve cognitive processing directed by assumptions, no fact that is 
not constituted by theory-guided interpretation of sensory stimuli, and no 
observational language that can describe experience without involving 
some theoretical background, whether explicit or implicit” (Goodman, 
1994,p. 295; for a highly influential treatment of the theory laden-ness of 
observation, see Kuhn, 1970). The problem with an implicit commitment 
to atheoretical description (in addition to its falsity) is that, by accepting 
only those theories (paradoxically, atheorism is of course also a theory) or 
particular worldviews based on descriptive realism, a clinician will only 
consider an unnecessarily restricted range of options when contemplat- 
ing alternative, and perhaps equally valid, conceptions of clinical reality. 
To the extent that such factors operate tacitly or covertly without being 
subject to examination, clinicians will unintentionally further and repro- 
duce the presuppositions that subserve the sectional interests of such he- 
gemonic groups as the neo-Kraepelinians. 
The second, and more important, way in which Gerring relies on the 
DSM is not only to analyze the information that she gathered, but also to 
authorize her specific diagnoses, referred to by McCarthey as “DSM-III-
backed analysis.” In her analysis, Gerring refers to diagnostic criteria and 
SPASSER/AGENCY AND STRUCTURE IN T H E  DSM 327 
DSM categories in a taken-for-granted manner without explanation. The 
audiences for which this evaluation is intended require DSM-based diag- 
nostic analyses. Only in this legitimized and legitimating nomenclature 
can Gerring authoritatively communicate with the other rehabilitation unit 
medical personnel, other mental health researchers, and insurers and le- 
gal personnel. Thus, her conclusions are validated by the same document 
that generated the type and form of her data. The same document, the 
DSM, determined not only the data and information that were collected 
but also their communication, interpretation, and authority. 
Giddens (1984) would rightly call such a system a reproduction cir- 
cuit: “By circuits of reproduction, I mean fairly clearly defined “tracks” of 
processes which feed back to their source, whether or not such feedback 
is reflexively monitored by agents in specific social positions” (p. 192). 
According to Giddens, these circuits of reproduction are implicated in 
the “stretching” of institutions across time and space. In the case of a 
psychiatrist who gathers data on the basis of the same system of diagnostic 
categories in terms of which she analyzes them, we have a relatively closed 
impermeable circuit in which the structures instantiated in the DSM are 
both the medium and outcome of her practice. 
Subsequent to her work with McCarthey, the psychiatrist Gerring co- 
authored a paper on the revision process leading to DSM-N (McCarthey 
& Gerring, 1994), a paper that evinces a radically different view of the 
DSMfrom the orientation of McCarthey (1991). While not a clinically- 
oriented study like the latter paper, the former offers a rhetorical analysis 
of the DSMs, along the more critical lines of Kirk and Kutchins (1992). 
Specifically, in the 1994 paper, the authors analyze the revision of DSM-111-
R by observing work groups, by textually analyzing documents, and by 
interviewing principals in the revision process. The paper concludes with 
a detailed analysis of work group deliberations about the conception and 
inclusion of a new diagnostic category, BED (Binge Eating Disorder). 
After critically discussing the theoretical and sociopolitical background 
of the DSMs, McCarthey and Gerring (1994) move to a detailed rhetorical 
analysis of the “selling of DSM-IK” Without repeating their argument, 
they bisect the persuasion strategy used to “sell” DSM-Ninto strategic use 
of two rhetorical repertoires. First, the contingent repertoire is used when 
task force leaders attempt to distance themselves from DSM-IVs predeces-
sors. Invoking the rhetoric of contingency allows them to account for 
mistakes made in past revisions in terms of the personalities and biases of 
the individuals involved. 
However, since there is direct and virtually unbroken continuity be- 
tween DSM-Wand its predecessors (in fact, the former can only be dis- 
cussed and understood in terms of the latter), too severe criticism of the 
past would inevitably undermine their current efforts. Consequently, DSM-
Ntask leaders can securely position themselves as being “in a direct line 
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with DSM-IIIand DSM-III-R, by using the empiricist repertoire to describe 
the development of all three manuals” (McCarthey & Gerring, 1994, p. 
166). In what they call the progress of the science repertoire, the false 
steps of past revisions can be “presented as vital stepping stones in the 
increasing adoption of the empirical method by the mental health field, 
as the best and only thing that could have been done under the circum- 
stances” (p. 167). This rhetorical move allows the framers of DSM-IVto 
represent their work as another logical and essential step towards “a time 
when mental disorders will be understood well enough to be classified 
according to their pathogenesis, that is, their causal mechanisms [i.e., 
etiology], rather thanjust according to their symptomatology, as at present” 
(p. 167). 
Finally, on the basis of observations of the deliberations of the BED 
work group, as well as of discussions with the participants, the authors 
draw four conclusions. First, the work group followed a strategy designed 
to present psychiatry as a mature biomedical discipline. Second, work 
group deliberations were shaped by scientific and clinical data, conceived 
as professionalizing concerns. Third, just as the texts themselves are in- 
fluenced and shaped by unacknowledged personal and sociopolitical agen- 
das, so were the work group discussions of BED. For example, “work group 
conversations were shaped by members’ differing assumptions about the 
maturity of the field and the role DSM should play in either stimulating 
new research or slowing change and stabilizing current knowledge in psy- 
chiatry” (p. 171). Finally, they found evidence in the work group delib- 
erations both of the contingent repertoire to describe their predecessors’ 
erroneous work and of the empiricist progress of science repertoire to 
account for their niore scientific work on BED. 
Comparing this rhetorical analysis with the description of the con- 
ventional reproductive rule-following of Gerring in McCarthey ( 1991) 
suggests that a transformation in her orientation to the manual has oc- 
curred. In terms of the four-fold typolo<gy, we see, on the paradigmatic 
level, a movement from duality to dualism-i.e., from a natural- 
performative to a strategic-theoretical Orientation to the rules and resources 
that structure the manual. On the syntagmatic level, there is movement 
in the opposite direction from dualisni to duality-from a situation in 
which the actor is inseparable from, and whose actions constitute, the 
system to one in which the system is perceived as external to the agent. In 
other words, by distancing herself from the manual, rather than merely 
enacting the presuppositions of it, the psychiatrist is able to critically ana- 
lyze and perhaps transform her interactions with it. 
Thus, by examining the perception and use of the manual by a 
psychiatrist over time, the utility (necessity) of-maintaining the duality,’ 
dualism distinction to truly empower the knowledgeable and capable agent 
has, it is hoped, been demonstrated. As Mouzelis (1995) correctly states, 
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if one opts exclusively for a subject/object duality approach, the only 
way of conceiving the relationships between subject and structure is 
to see the latter as medium/outcome-which means conflating 
agency and structure, and eliminating the possibility of actors dis- 
tancing themselves from rules and resources in order to view them 
strategically. (p. 123) 
While Giddens claims that his construal of reflexivity encompasses both 
that of the agent (as social theorist)in the flow of action and that of “the 
institutionalization of an investigative and calculative attitude towards 
generalised conditions of social reproduction” (Giddens, 1993, p. 6) ,  a 
theory of knowledgeable and capable agency must allow the actor the 
necessary distance to strategically “stand back from institutionalized rules 
to be able to attack or defend them or their variously perceived contradic- 
tions and incompatibilities. Consequently, agent-structure dualism, while 
problematic if not rigorously conceptualized, cannot be eliminated from 
structuration theory without paying too high a price, that is without sacri- 
ficing the agent to the constraints and affordances of structure. 
DISCUSSION 
Structuration theory has several theoretical (as well as meta-
theoretical) implications for classification research in general and for con- 
struction of diagnostic classifications in particular. As mentioned earlier, 
structuration theory allows not only for theorizing processes leading to 
change and continuity within theoretical systems but also facilitates theory- 
guided specification of genrrative mechanisms,” processes underlying 
system dynamics that account for their surface manifestations. Such a 
distinction exists in psychiatric classification as the ongoing interlevel de- 
bate between etiological explanation and symptom description. 
Second, not only does structuration theory focus our attention on 
situated practices as constitutive frames for understanding structures, but 
it also maintains that classification is an inherently social practice and, as 
such, cannot be understood without reference to the larger forces in which 
it, as a social practice, is embedded. The manual must be understood not 
only as the official nomenclature and classification of the American Psy- 
chiatric Association but also as a field of competing and intersecting forces, 
including psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, clinical psychologists, clinical so-
cial workers, psychiatric nurses, and insurers, each striving to control its 
ultimate form and content. 
Equally applicable to library classifications, Kwasnik (1993), echoing 
the introduction to DSM-III, states that the DSM, as a conceptual structure 
intended to coordinate and articulate interaction (Schmidt & Bannon, 
1992), is meant to facilitate and further the intradisciplinarily necessary 
functions of providing a common language, an accurate diagnostic tool, 
and a standardized vocabulary. However, she asserts unequivocally that: 
The mandate for [the DSMs were] . . . politically and economically 
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motivated: government agencies, insurance companies, benefits pro- 
grams, and others wanted to be able to differentiate and “tag” patients 
with mental disorders unambiguously for the purpose of reimburse- 
ment, legal action, confinements and so on. (Kwasnik, 1993,p. 64) 
Consequently, to nontrivially understand the development, amplifications, 
and uses of a discipline’s powerful conceptual structures-its official clas- 
sifications-nomenclatures-it is imperative to account for both 
intradisciplinary and professional as well as societal, cultural, and histori- 
cally situated forces and contingencies. As Bowker and Star (1991) said of 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD),an even more widely used 
and thus consequential conceptual scheme, “the list cannot be made ho- 
mogeneous, neutral and appeal to all parties” (p. 77) because different 
categories of developers and users have (often incommensurable) differ- 
ent needs and impose conflicting demands on its design. 
De Grolier (1982), employing the seminal observation of cultural 
anthropologists Durkheim and Mauss (1903,4963) that conceptual classi- 
fication systems depend upon and reflect social conditions, bibliometrically 
investigated Classification structures from medieval times to the present 
as cultural artifacts, and suggests that library classifications both are corre- 
lated with conceptual structures prevailing at their respective times and 
are thus inextricably historically situated. Additionally, Britain (1975) and 
Batty (1969) looked at the cultural context and embeddedness of classifi- 
cation and subject indexing, especially differences between British and 
American classificatory practices. 
Britain (1975) states that there continue to be strongly held, conten- 
tious opposing points of view about, and dissident reactions to, classifica- 
tion as a tool and as the basis for subject analysis precisely because there 
are neither transcultural nor panhistorical acceptance of any consistent 
set of underlying principles. He quotes A. C. Foskett approvingly that 
“practically any classification scheme one would care to examine, far from 
being objective as it should be according to the emphasis of classification 
theorists is likely ‘to reflect both the prejudices of its time and those of its 
author’ [i.e., the classificationist]” (p. 34). 
He rightly concludes that librarianship, being a historically situated 
professional subculture, has “its own ideas, its norms, and its tools . . . 
[which] will always tend to reflect the larger culture ofwhich it is a part-its 
ideas, its laws and mores and even its aberrations” (Britain, 1975, p. 35). 
Batty (1969) asserts that, in addition to such extrinsic (or external) 
factors as the sociopolitical system (e.g., democratic versus oligarchic class 
structure) of a culture, the intrinsic meaning of indexing and classifica- 
tion systems vary and must be understood if such differences are to be 
appreciated rather than judged or blindly repeated. He concludes that: 
To the Western European, classification is an almost inevitable method 
of expression: it seems so natural to order subjects or ideas into 
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groups, each with a group name that therefore allows the further 
collection of groups-as-units into higher classes still. To the Ameri- 
cans, classification has meant only one thing: shelf-“marking and 
parking” . . . . It is not that there is any inability to understand how 
complex numbers are put together, or even how facet theory can be 
used to make a classification scheme: it is rather an inability to un- 
derstand why they should be. [emphasis in original] (Batty, 1969, p.6) 
Clearly, Batty is alluding to deeply held beliefs about the what, why, 
and how of library classification, and not merely to the more superficial 
(and probably more cross-culturally stable) technical abilities of classifiers 
to master any given scheme. 
In sum, what Grob (1991) said of psychiatric nosology can be said of 
all attempts to classify and order, including LIS classificatory activities: 
Classification systems are neither inherently self-evident nor given. 
On the contrary, they emerge from the crucible of human experi- 
ence; change and variability, not immutability, are characteristic. 
Indeed, the ways in which data are organized at various times [and in 
various places] reflect specific historical circumstances. (p.421) 
Nosologies and classificatory schemes are rarely, if ever, etched per- 
manently in stone. They ineluctably grow out of specific historical con- 
texts and reflect the various Zeitgeist of the times and places in which 
they were, and are, developed. 
Reviewing three comprehensive, and currently used, library classifi- 
cations, the Dewey Decimal Classification, Library of Congress Classifica- 
tion, and Bliss Classification, second edition, Langridge (1995) makes the 
apposite and salutary observation that: 
The number, scope, and order of main classes represents a conscious 
or unconsciously held view of the world. . . .Yet all three systems, 
samples of a liberal humanist attitude, look alike when compared 
with Marxist schemes devised for Russia or China or with mediaeval 
schemes. [It seems likely that]. . .changes over long periods of time 
make different classifications appropriate to different epochs. The 
knowledge of the ancient world, the middle ages, and modern times 
are best accommodated by different schemes. (pp. 12-13) 
Programmatically, structuration theory affords the study of library clas- 
sification what it offers the study of the development and use of the con- 
ceptual structures and schemes of any other discipline: discursive pen- 
etration into the sociocultural conditions of the multiple perspectives that 
organize the context within which historically situated practitioners act. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, the inability of Giddens’s structuration theory, at least the 
version of it presented above, to theorize intentional transformative ac- 
tion has an unfortunate and particularly paralyzing relevance to the 
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ongoing revision of a living, yet institutionalized, text such as the manual. 
In general, change is problematic and only some sorts of it are always 
everywhere realistically possible. Unless we maintain the distinction be- 
tween duality and dualism, allowing for agent-structure distanciation, im- 
plications of Giddens’s structuration theory are that only an arbitrarily 
limited range of options will be possible for particular agents, that of pos- 
sible changes only sonie will be known and desired, and that only an unre- 
alistically limited range of those may be realized as the unintended conse- 
quences of agents’ otherwise (but contentless and sterile) knowledgeably 
directed action. While Giddens emphasizes the importance of a critical 
reading and application of theory (see, for example, Giddens, 1984), he 
pays much more attention to the unintended consequences of social re- 
production than to intentional creative transformation, which emphasis 
itself seems an ineluctable (unintended) consequence of his misguided 
and unsuccessful attempt to transcend agent-structure dualism. 
According to New (1994), we intentionally change social structures 
by identifying them, the activities in which they are used, and their role in 
the reproduction of the social system to determine their liability or sus- 
ceptibility to change. Moreover we, as knowledgeable agents, need to 
understand how these social structures simultaneously enable and con- 
strain various position-practices, and how, by offering channels for agents’ 
purposes, those generative rule-resource sets themselves consciously mo- 
tivate. Consequently, New (1994) rightly concludes: 
[el ffective “reflexive appropriation” requires agents to recognise their 
own structural capacity and t o  use it to the full, or act to increase i t .  
. . increasing our understanding of all the “unacknowledged condi- 
tions of action,” which would include unconscious sources of motiva-
tion, is likely to reduce the proportion of unintended consequences. 
. . . The better these are theorised, the more likely that the chosen 
policy will fulfill its [intended] purposes. (p. 203) 
In the final analysis, knowledgeable transformative action presup- 
poses intentionality. Otherwise, we will be left in the ironic and unenvi- 
able position that “society is transformed by‘knowledgeable agents,’ that 
this represents an ‘achievement,’ and that nevertheless these knowledge- 
able agents know not what they do, since they both change and repro- 
duce society by mistake, unintentionally, as a side effect of everyday social 
life” (New, 1994, p. 200). Unless we successfully theorize intentional pro- 
cesses of social change, for example, by acknowledging the situated real- 
ity of agent-structure dualism (or subject-object distance), agents, such as 
the psychiatrists of this paper’s title, are unhappily and unnecessarily re- 
duced to Garfinkel’s “judgmental dopes,” despite Giddens’s protestations 
of knowledgeability, producing invalid diagnoses for seemingly valid orga- 
nizational and professional reasons. 
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NOTES
’ This, of course, is a rather broad transposition of Marx’s celebrated aphorism, “Human 
beings make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing” (cited 
in Cohen 1987, p. 273) .  However, Giddens takes Marx’s point very seriously; in fact, 
one could cogently argue that a large part of the Giddensian project is directed at expli- 
cating the full import of that aphorism. Additionally, throughout the paper the acro- 
nym DSM will he used to refer to various editions of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Dia,mostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
According to structurational analysis it is essential to distinguish between the study of 
structure-agency interdependencies at both the social and systemic levels. Consequently, 
there are two principal ways to study social system properties, each of which is separated 
out by a methodological epoche: 
To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study 
the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements-rules arid resources 
-in their sorial relations. “Structure” here appears as actors’ mobilisation of 
discursive and practical consciousness in social encounters. Institutional 
analysis, on the other hand, places the epoche upon strategic conduct, treat- 
ing rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems 
(Giddens, 1979, p. 80) 
However, the introduction of the duality/dualism typology enables a more nuanced 
interpretation than the binary (and, perforce, reductionistically false) methodological 
bracketing advocated by Giddens. 
’ For full treatments of‘structuration theory, it is essential to read Giddens’s evolving and 
variously nuanced accounts, which can be found in Giddens (1979, 1984, 1993) among 
others. 
According to Cohen (1989), “ structure ‘exists’ in manifest form only when it is instanti- 
ated in social practices. It otherwise persists between instances of social reproduction 
only as ‘memory traces’ sustained by knowledgeable social agents” (p.46). 
Mouzelis (1995, p. 138) correctly observes that: 
“aproper study of the linkages between a micro and a macro approach should 
not take the form 
Institutional Structures (macro level) 
t 
Participants (micro level) 
but the more complex configuration 
Macro Institutional Macro Actors 
Actors 
Micro Institutional x Micro Actors 
Actors 
Simply put, MouLelis’s more complex configuration posits that the consequentiality of 
an actor’s actions for others can he large (macro) or small (micro), whether the actor is 
a single individual or a collective. 
j One of Giddens’s important contributions to social science research is the realization 
that such analysis always involves a double hermeneutic: 
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The intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of 
social science, the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and 
the metalanguages invented by social scientists; there is a constant “slippage” 
from one to the other involved in the practice of the social sciences (Giddens, 
1984, p. 374). 
One of Giddens’s important contributions to social science research is the realization 
that such analysis always involves a double hermenelltic: 
The intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of 
social science, the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and 
the metalanguages invented by social scientists; there is a constant “slippage” 
from one to the other involved in the practice of the social sciences (Giddens, 
1984, p. 374). 
’ The so-called neo-Kraepelinians comprised a rclatively small group of research oriented 
psychiatrist-nosologists,who, in the 1960s and 1970s, promulgated tenets of diagnostic 
classification first advanced by nineteenth century German nosologist, Emil Kraepelin. 
Their credo can be summarized as follows: psychiatry is a branch of medicine and 
should seek to establish scientific know-ledge; psychiatry treats people who are sick, and 
who can be reliably distinguished from those who are well; psychiatry should conceive 
of mental illnesses biologically, as discrete isohtable entities; and classification and di- 
agnosis are important and legitimate arras of research within the biomedical science of 
psychiatry. For detailed treatments ofthe neo-Kraepelinians see, for example, Blashfield 
(1984) and Herman (1978). 
’According to Ahbott (1988), the successful advancement of a profession’s knowledge 
base is central to its jurisdictional strength. He states that: 
the academic knowledge system of a profession generally accomplishes three 
tasks-legitimation, research, and instruction-and in each it shapes the vul- 
nerability of professional jurisdiction to outside interference. Legitimacy 
provides a central foundation forjurisdiction, and its absence provides a cen- 
tral line for attack. . . . The academic knowledge system also provides new 
treatments, diagnoses, and inferences for working professionals; if it fails in 
this function, professional jurisdictions gradually weaken. (pp. 65-67) 
Giddens (1979, 1984, 1993) distinguishes two types ofresources: allocative, arising from 
command over objects and material phenomena, and authoritative, arising from capa- 
bilities to organize and coordinate the activities of social actors. These clearly have 
implications for use of the DSM. For example, allocative resources pertain to the eligi- 
bility of DSM diagnoses for third party reimbursement, while allocative resources refer 
to the power of the I>SM to construct mentally ill identities. 
’” Sewell (1992) makes the useful point that if structures are virtual, then they cannot 
include both rules and resources, and if they include both, they cannot be virtual. Re- 
sources, as media of power, and particularly allocative resources, must exist materially, 
and thus cannot br  considered virtual. Thus, Sewell (1992) suggests that structure should 
refer only to rules or schemas, not to resources, which are better seen as effects of 
structures, as “media animated and shaped by structures, that is, by cultural schemas” 
(p. 11). 

According to Giddens (1984), the dialectic of control is characteriied by “the two-way 

character of the distributive aspect of power (power as control); how the less powerful 

manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in estab- 

lished power relationships” (p. 374). 

According to Mouzelis (1995): 

On the syntagmatic level [actual relationships], subject-object dualism refers 
to situations where a subject’s participation in a game does not seriously af-
fect its outcome, whereas duality refers to situations where the opposite is 
true. 
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On the paradigmatic level [virtual linkages], actors can, for strategic/moni- 
toring reasons, distance themselves from rules (paradigmatic dualism); or 
they can use rules in a taken-for-granted manner (paradigmatic duality). (p. 
156) 
Thus, on the one hand, in terms of practice, dualism (separation) connotes little conse- 
quentiality, while duality describes situations wherein the consequences of an actor’s 
practice for others are large and compelling. On the other hand, in terms of the struc- 
tural properties of social practices, duality (closeness) refers to a performative relation- 
ship of actor to object, while dualism describes situations in which actors distance them- 
selves from formal structures for strategic purposes. Only by considering the conse- 
quences of the full range of relationships that actors have with rules and resources at 
both strategic conduct and institutional analytic levels can we fully account for the irre- 
ducible logics of the dispositional, interactive-situational, and positional dimensions of 
social action. 
lYAn admittedly arbitrary overview of social scientific realism posits that knowledge is a 
social product and lacks any sort of secure foundations; that there is a knowable exter- 
nal world; that while the social world is a construction, it is profoundly constrained by a 
specific history that provides agents with the materials for continued reproduction and, 
less frequently, transformation; and that valid social science aims to explain rather than 
predict. As to whether Giddens is a realist, there seems to he little doubt, hut what kind 
of realist he is has been the subject of some debate. Some complain that he emphasizes 
structure over agency, others that he privileges agency over structure, and finally some 
accuse him of merely conflating agency and structure, explaining neither. In addition 
to Mouzelis’s (1995) critique, as presented in this paper, for differing but suggestive 
viewpoints, see, for example, Archer (1982), Layder (1987, 1990),Pawson (1989), the 
collected essays in Bryant &Jary (1991) and Held & Thompson (1989), and finally the 
special issues of Theory, Culture, and Society (1982), 2(2) andJonrnalfor the Theory of Social 
Behavior (1983), 13. 
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